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Energy Transition and Climate

The Inter-American Dialogue’s Energy Transition and Climate Program aims to accelerate a just energy transition and expand access to clean, secure, and affordable energy in the Western Hemisphere. By convening experts, policymakers, corporate leaders, and civil society to share balanced, innovative, action-oriented analysis, and best practices, the program aims to enhance energy security, mitigation, adaptation, and resilience to the climate crisis in line with the objectives and timeline of the Paris Agreement and Sustainable Development Goals.

 

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There is a new source of controversy around carbon offsets the role of governments. Nation-states are getting more involved in voluntary carbon markets (VCMs), and that is not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, it was only a matter of time before governments began to participate, and, if done right, such government involvement can help address some of the issues surrounding VCMs. These markets could reach between US$100 billion and US$500 billion or more, depending what activities are allowed to generate carbon credits.

A necessary condition for markets to function properly is establishing who has the right to trade. For voluntary carbon markets, this is still under debate. Recently, countries like Papua New Guinea and Honduras declared bans or moratoria on trading carbon for private interests. In another example of government involvement, Zimbabwe - the twelfth largest source of carbon offsets - announced earlier this year it would take half of all revenue created by offset projects.

Behind this trend of increasing state involvement is Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, partially agreed upon during the climate conference held in Scotland in 2021. The “Glasgow Rulebook” sheds some long-awaited light on how nations can participate in carbon trading, but as a report from The Nature Conservancy explains, there is still work to be done. Namely, guidelines need to be put in place to understand how a credit traded in the voluntary market—for example for the purposes of meeting a corporation’s climate pledge—could be accounted for in national climate commitments, or NDCs.

Countries have not fully agreed on the rules, but, since Glasgow, they have reacted swiftly to the prospects Article 6 entails, including in the Americas. This region is the world’s second largest provider of carbon credits and is home of some of the largest carbon reserves, such as the Amazon rainforest. In Brazil, the government of President Lula da Silva has backed a draft law that would introduce a cap-and-trade system which would regulate heavy industry and keep a rein on the many carbon trading activities in the country. To mention one example, the state of Tocantins has reached an agreement to sell carbon credits to Swiss oil-trading company Mercuria. The law is under discussion but has already drawn criticism as the Senate exempted the largest source of emissions: the agricultural sector. In another example, Japan is setting the groundwork to trade carbon credits to meet its own climate targets, and has signed preliminary agreements with 27 countries, including Costa Rica, Chile and Mexico.

There are three main underlying motives behind public involvement. First, some states wish to pause carbon projects until proper safeguards are in place so that integrity, equity, and land rights can be considered properly. Second, countries want to make sure they can comply with their climate obligations before selling their carbon sinks to foreign parties. Third, governments want to rightfully participate in the financial benefits of carbon trading operations. These points are illustrated in Honduras’ 2022 press release about a carbon trading moratorium, or in the indigenous protection language that has been included in Brazil’s proposed cap-and-trade system.

Governmental participation was bound to happen and can help address some of the major issues with carbon markets. These include questions about their true capacity to capture CO2 and concerns about land-owner protections, the accumulation of which led the CEO of Verra – a leading credit certifier – to their resignation. Governments are well-positioned to address these integrity concerns, prompting a public discussion about climate change mitigation. For example, in the US, a report by the Bipartisan Policy Center and the company Carbon Direct outlines how federal government involvement can help ensure high-quality carbon credits. According to the report, most stakeholders agree that at least some level of government involvement would contribute to the market’s integrity.

Furthermore, the involvement of governments is an unavoidable step to clarify how carbon markets interact with countries’ climate change plans or Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Until now, three carbon trading systems have been running in parallel: voluntary carbon markets, compliance carbon markets (like the EU’s and California’s Emission Trading Scheme), and trading that happens under the Paris Agreement’s framework. Given their legislative power and role in international negotiations, government participation must ensure these systems interrelate properly.

It is important to recognize that inadequate policies can also be detrimental to climate change mitigation prospects and that climate change won’t wait until we figure them out. For example, the Zimbabwean Government’s decision to take half of the carbon offset’s revenue was an unexpected policy choice, added regulatory uncertainty, and left project developers and investors reevaluating future projects.

Behind the complex conversations on carbon offsets is the possibility that carbon markets are not the ultimate goal but are a means to an end. Ultimately, their objective is to mobilize financial resources towards activities that remove, reduce, or avoid greenhouse gas emissions from the atmosphere.

Recognizing this, innovative approaches that could prove less fraught have come forward. For example, the Emission Liability Management, in which emissions are properly accounted for and addressed as liabilities, solves the drawbacks of the current three-scope system and forces corporations and countries to internalize the cost of their GHG pollution. The Paris Agreement recognizes the need for new approaches and includes language for “non-market” activities in it, which could include capacity building or financial transfers that do not involve carbon trading. Quickly testing and scaling these new financial tools will be crucial. As Elinor Ostrom, a pioneer of environmental governance, clearly stated: while important, neither states nor markets alone can address complex environmental governance issues.

Voluntary carbon markets have proliferated, fueled by their promise to mobilize resources to address climate change quickly and at scale. However, just like any other market, the time has come for public institutions to set the rules surrounding them. COP28 may provide much needed clarity around how to do this. The window for climate action keeps shrinking and we cannot wait much longer.

Daniel Gajardo is an interdisciplinary environmentalist originally from Santiago, Chile, and the co-founder of Reciprocal, the first environmental venture studio in Latin America in the Caribbean. The research for this piece was done while he was a Sustainable Finance Fellow and a Knight-Hennessy Scholar at Stanford University, where he pursued a dual Master’s in Environment and International Policy. Daniel writes about current environment and climate change issues, with perspectives from the Global South, and has been published by Mongabay, the World Resources Institute and Chinese Dialogue. 

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Amidst global efforts to mitigate climate change, analysts forecast a spike in demand for the building blocks of the clean energy transition, namely, critical minerals—resources that are essential to the economy but vulnerable to supply chain disruption. In fact, under a scenario in which the Paris Agreement’s goals are achieved, the International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that a demand boom for copper, lithium, nickel, and cobalt could lead to a more than fourfold increase in total mineral demand from 2020 to 2040. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) will supply much of this growing critical mineral demand. Most saliently, the region holds two-thirds of global lithium reserves, a metal whose demand is projected to increase by 42 times (relative to 2020 levels). However, the region also shares significant supplies of other critical minerals, bearing over 40 percent of global copper reserves and sizeable shares of nickel and cobalt. 

Considering the region's long history of natural resource governance challenges, endless reports have highlighted current and future socioenvironmental impacts provoked by this incipient mining boom. However, the boom’s potential economic impacts have received less attention. While heightened demand could increase economic rents, reduce the balance of payments deficit, and potentially fund social programs (as occurred during the last commodity boom that coincided with the "Pink Tide"), high rents could alternatively foster a “green resource curse.” This neology derives from a phenomenon called the resource curse, which describes a paradox in which countries with an abundance of natural resource wealth often experience lower economic growth and higher levels of conflict, rent-seeking, poor investment, corruption, poverty, and democratic backsliding.  

Historically, key factors contributing to this curse include high dependence on commodity exports, lower competitiveness of non-commodity exports, and mismanagement of rents due to a lack of institutional capacity. To date, these factors remain top concerns in LAC: from 2015-2019, 42 percent of all regional economies were export commodity-dependent, including all countries in South America, and many other countries were verging on dependence. Moreover, in 2021, the mining sector alone accounted for 15 percent of Chile’s GDP, and mining exports made up over 62 percent of the country’s total exports. In the same year, mining accounted for 10 percent of GDP and 60 percent of exports in Peru. Additionally, institutional and administrative capacity—especially for redistribution of wealth, efficiency of spending, and successful implementation of policies—remains a concern in LAC. This is particularly relevant as a growing body of research suggests that institutional quality plays a critical role in determining the effects of newfound resource wealth. 

Amidst booming mineral demand, high commodity dependence, and continued governance challenges, this plausible “green resource curse” merits speculation. However, in practice, examining the unique characteristics of the critical mineral economy raises crucial caveats that diminish the likelihood of a modern-day resource curse. First, myriad factors will impact the level of demand for minerals and thus rents received. According to a 2022 Brookings Institution report, critical mineral demand depends on “the pace of the energy transition, technological developments, improvements in recycling, and domestic mineral development in the European Union and United States.” For example, innovations in batteries could likely avert the need for lithium. In addition to this list, policy change plays a pivotal role, especially through subsidies, local content requirements, and incentives. This was illustrated in the passage of the US Inflation Reduction Act, which could increase demand for Chilean lithium.  

Secondly, the resource curse catalysts of the 20th century, fossil fuels, operate under different life cycle models compared to the minerals used in clean energy. To keep producing energy, fossil fuels must be burned and replenished after each use. In comparison, once non-fuel minerals are mined to be used in clean energy technology, they stay in use for 10-30 years (the current shelf life of batteries and renewables), after which they could be recycled. Without the need to drill for oil or mine for coal, according to some estimates, in the long term, the total global mining burden is actually predicted to drop in a renewables-driven world. Thus, the “one-time mining” structure of critical minerals usage poses less of a risk for the resource curse in the long term compared to the unsustainable consumption model required by fossil fuel dependency. 

Lastly, context-specific factors are key to determining whether resource curse symptoms will manifest, according to a 2022 study. The energy transition will differentially impact each country, so country-level risk assessments are a sensible first step towards identifying and mitigating potential negative outcomes. For example, a 2019 study found that under the IEA’s 2 degrees scenario, increased metal demand will cause the highest GDP growth in Chile and Cuba at 10.5 percent and 14 percent, respectively. Other metal producers like Brazil, Peru, and Argentina are predicted to experience more manageable growth between 0-2 percent of GDP. Considering all of these factors, a widespread resource curse caused by critical mineral mining is unlikely to materialize in LAC.  

Regardless, high dependency on mining revenues amidst potential skyrocketing demand certainly remains a cause for concern. Given the high rents forecasted for certain countries, governments should consider implementing transparent and fiscally responsible policy options to avoid rent mismanagement, encourage economic diversification, and promote specialization in value-added, price-stable economic activities.   

Policy options previously deployed to mitigate the resource curse have caused conflict between developed and developing countries as well as mining and energy industries. Economic policies intended to stop the cause of the resource curse through levers like price controls, export caps, and suspension of foreign direct investment have been criticized for reducing overall revenues. Instead, policies working to mitigate the effects of the curse, such as citizen rebates, sovereign wealth funds, and regulations limiting government spending, better enable countries to receive and responsibly allocate their newfound wealth.  

Given the dire need for climate finance in the region, governments could simultaneously boost twin goals by diverting extractives revenues towards climate action. Similarly, to reduce economic dependence, rents could be invested in studies and projects to diversify regional supply chains towards renewable energy technologies. This would require high investments in R&D as well as education to build human capital, which could facilitate a just transition. Importantly, these investments must take into consideration the volatility of commodity prices; historically, unpredictable commodity price swings have led to abrupt cuts in funding for social programs. To avoid this, revenue investments could be backed by stabilization funds, earmarked for short-term projects, or blended with other financing sources. For example, in 2012, Colombia instituted a sovereign wealth fund administered by the central bank called the Regional Savings and Stabilization Fund which is drawn upon to mitigate fluctuations in royalty income. 

Overall, a widespread green resource curse is unlikely to take hold across LAC. However, the impacts of unforeseen mining rents in certain countries can and should be mitigated by implementing responsible fiscal policies and allocating rents towards a diversified, decarbonized economy.  

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An interview with Andrés Mogro, regional manager of the Climate Action Programme in Fundación AVINA.

The 27th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27) will be held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt from November 6-18, 2022. The world’s premier climate negotiations will bring together over 30,000 participants, including heads of state, ministers, mayors, negotiators, journalists, civil society, and private sector representatives. While the official purpose of the event is to review progress made since COP26 in Glasgow and outline updated country-level climate commitments, certain themes with relevance for the global south such as climate finance and loss and damage have emerged as defining topics of the conference. 

Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) face similar adaptation financing challenges, which appears to be increasingly propelling the region to collaborate around COP. Historically, LAC negotiated at climate talks via different groups. This year, calls for climate finance and adaptation assistance, as well as an incoming wave of leftist presidents in leading economies in South America, have brought LAC together at COP27, with some even calling for a joint bloc for negotiation purposes. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), a bloc including all Latin American and Caribbean countries, issued a joint declaration at COP27 calling for increased financial support from developed countries, sovereign bonds, debt swaps, and most importantly, regional climate coordination.

To learn more about LAC's increasing regionalization, subnational action, climate finance, and other salient issues at COP27, the Energy, Climate Change, & Extractive Industries Program at the Inter-American Dialogue spoke to Andrés Mogro, Regional Manager of the Climate Action Programme in Fundación AVINA.

COMMENTS FROM ANDRÉS MORGRO

Question (Q): Traditionally, LAC does not act as a region at COPs. Is there an opportunity for regional interests to align at this year's COP? If not, how can national governments exchange knowledge regarding best practices for adaptation and resilience?

Answer (A): It is true that LAC does not act as a region at COPs, but that is also true of every other region in the world aside from Africa. It remains unclear whether incoming left-leaning governments will bring new perspectives regarding regionalism. Regardless, Latin American countries face very similar climate impacts, so regional projects are an opportunity to collaboratively tackle these common challenges.

Despite Latin America’s fragmented positions at COPs, countries do collaborate with one another to share climate knowledge through networks like Euroclima+ and NDC Partnership. On a more regionalized level, Resilient Andes (Andes Resilientes), a project Fundación AVINA implements with Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation focusing on familial agriculture and adaptation in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru, brings together together representatives of diverse sectors—regardless of country relationships to COPs—to discuss how to improve resilience.  

Q: Over 80 percent of climate finance is aimed at mitigation and reaches only national levels. How can Latin American leaders make increasing adaptation finance a priority at COP27 discussions, and how can international finance become more accessible for smaller projects in remote communities?

A: Latin America has made it clear that it prioritizes adaptation over mitigation and that its needs are local in nature, but climate financing continues to be primarily channeled toward national mitigation. Nevertheless, the region as a whole does not advocate for increasing the ratio of adaptation to mitigation funding at a political level as much as it should.  

Financing of smaller, more local projects has been stymied byseveral barriers. At an international level, funding allocation depends on an organization’s project requirements. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) for instance, rarely finances a project that is smaller than $10 million, and for a local community, that amount is beyond their capacity to administer, implement, or monitor, as local needs tend to be smaller in scale. Thus, increasing financial access for local communities requires funding sources to adjust their administrative requirements to fit local capacities and their access to information. Overall, international funds like the GFC are inaccessible for local stakeholders and focus on large programs that can only be brought to the table by organizations the size of United Nations agencies.  

 A second barrier at the international level is that many projects require costly preliminary studies to provide proof of “climate rationality,” which becomes a disincentive for local communities. Climate rationality refers to scientific studies and data proving that a proposed action constitutes a measurable response to a problem caused by climate change. In practice, this is unnecessary because the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) already publishes detailed information on the impacts of climate change per region and the types of actions needed to combat them, but most funds demand a case-by-case argument, and it is their role to contest that argument. Given resource disparities for local communities, this often becomes a prohibitive requirement deterring proposals for projects addressing local needs.

Finally, access to finance for local communities also depends on the support of national governments, which tend to prioritize projects with a better opportunity of being approved by international funds or that will attract investment.  

Q: How has the international community's failure to deliver the promised $100 billion in climate finance affected Latin America? Will the developed world follow through on this promise? Does the $100 billion plan address the region’s needs?

A: Governments in the region need to bring to light not just the failure to deliver the $100 billion promised but also how the funding allocation fails to meet the region’s needs. The commitment says that these $100 billion will be mobilized for developing countries, taking their needs and priorities into account. However, most financing flows towards mitigation, and most of it is offered in the form of loans, not grants. This has forced developing countries to acquire debt to reduce emissions, even if their main need has been grants to finance adaptation. This primarily owes to the fact that mitigation projects can generate returns on investment (such as through electric cars or solar panels). In contrast, adaptation funding will almost never generate returns. Thus, much of the climate finance we are seeing is motivated by generation of revenue instead of consideration of developing countries’ most urgent needs.    

Not only have developed countries failed to fulfill the promise, but now they are shifting the responsibility of their commitments to the private sector. This can be seen, for example, in forcing developing countries to become “more attractive” to investment; otherwise, they are to “blame” for the fact that they have not received climate financing (in loans, because grants are rare). Developed countries have refused to agree on replenishment values for the Green Climate Fund or the Adaptation Fund, have refused to define what climate finance is, have insisted on reporting non-concessional loans (granted under less generous terms compared to concessional loans and clearly motivated by revenue), and have turned a blind eye to loss and damage finance needs by designating it as a humanitarian aid issue, not a climate finance issue.  

Q: How can different Latin American countries integrate Indigenous and local and community-based voices to identify climate priorities, design commitments, and delineate future updates of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs)? How can these organizations’ capacities be strengthened while building governments’ institutional capacity to integrate their knowledge and feedback?

A: Feedback from local organizations is invaluable for governments, since local stakeholders know their unmet needs and the actions that will directly affect their territories or constituencies. Integration of Indigenous and local knowledge depends upon two factors. The first is the level of openness of governments to include local and community-based voices in climate planning. Oftentimes increased openness results from pressure from the media and organized social movements. The second factor is thus the level of coordination among these local stakeholders to exert that pressure.  

To that end, local actors should work to create a shared agenda and solidify links among themselves. Creating governance mechanisms for a local network and increasing spaces for dialogue can enable these organizations to speak with a single voice. This could include, for example, organizing assemblies to determine an agenda, priorities, or demands, and identifying spokespersons to articulate them, including at a technical level. 

After solidifying a shared agenda and building communal organization, these groups can advocate for their needs with the governmental body assigned to work with local or Indigenous voices. By creating fora to bring all these stakeholders to the table, they can build power to demand the government branch in charge of climate planning includes them in all stages of climate action.   

On a final note, government functions and capacities in Latin America are often supported by international agencies dealing with issues related to gender, Indigenous peoples or human rights. National governments and local stakeholders can seek support from these organizations to create spaces for conversation and bring technical expertise.  

Q: Digitalization and digital inclusion have gained relevance as enablers of resilience and adaptation. How can Latin America leverage this international forum to use information and communications technology to combat climate change?

A: Digitalization has aided in the fight against climate change by increasing access to essential information and facilitating interaction between local and international stakeholders. However, different categories of new technologies have different applications.

Most countries in Latin America have used tools related to digital inclusion and knowledge sharing to consult and involve local actors in climate policy development, implementation, and monitoring. The efficacy and impact of such technologies continue to improve. Given that COP discussions tend to be far from local realities, any effort to either bring those realities to those deliberations or bring results back to a local level can be much improved through today’s communication technologies. 

In contrast, intellectual property rights restrict access to various tools related to climate mitigation, which is an additional obstacle for widespread technology adoption in developing countries. Given that many of these patents come from countries with higher historical emissions, monopolizing essential climate mitigation technologies and withholding them from the global south is an issue of climate justice. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 36.7 percent of patents related to technologies aimed at clean energy generation are held in European Union countries, 20.2 percent in the United States and 19.8 percent in Japan. This disincentivizes research & development in the global south and prevents scaling up much-needed climate technologies.  

Q: Going into this year's COP, justice is at the forefront of debates and negotiations. Within that context, what lessons can we learn from under-represented communities? How can we amplify their voices before, during, and after COPs?

A: The knowledge these groups share has much to teach us; so, a first lesson to be learned is that any conversation with local stakeholders and communities must begin from a point of mutual respect and acknowledgment of diverse practices, beliefs, governance schemes, and traditional and ancestral knowledge. It is important to be aware that modern economic and political practices have brought the world to the current state of climate crisis, whereas local communities have played a crucial role in preservation of biodiversity and sustainable practices.  

A second important lesson learned from these groups is that climate efforts can never have sustainability or scalability over time if they do not strengthen and empower the role of local stakeholders. Governments change; projects open and close. The processes and capacities needed to promote long-term collaborative action have the potential to remain at the local level.  

Finally, it is important to realize that COP, regardless of its good intentions, is not a fully participatory process in which anyone who is interested in attending can do so. Being at COP requires considerable work and resources such as an organization to accredit one’s participation; in most cases, visa arrangements (especially for the global south); and funding for flights, accommodation, transport, and food. On top of high socioeconomic barriers, from a global south perspective, COP takes place in a foreign language and remains mostly led by heterosexual, middle aged, white men. Great efforts must be made on the side of all non-governmental and governmental organizations in the global south to guarantee that local voices can participate. This could be improved through allowing increased virtual participation, through the sharing of information pre and post COPs, or through processes to discuss developments at the international level and their national and local implications.  

Q: Usually, we think of COPs as fora for national governments. How can cities and local jurisdictions become protagonists at these events, and what can they commit to in terms of assessing their level of dependence on ecosystem services or of delivering on urban sustainability and resilience?

A: It is true that the governmental side of COPs, which is to say, negotiations, are fora limited for national governments, who are attending in their capacities as ratifying parties to the UNFCCC or the Paris Agreement. However, a COP is also the largest meeting in all the UN system, and it is an opportunity for all stakeholders working around climate change to meet, discuss and agree on anything they see fit, taking advantage of the forum.   

These summits have provided the opportunity to create all kinds of initiatives, like the Covenant of Mayors, Resilient Cities Network, and other spaces where cities may create links, exchange best practices, and communicate their climate commitments, which may lead to potential cooperation. Fundación AVINAS's Resilience Hub, is another example of a regional initiative aimed at generating regional dialogues with local actors around priorities and lessons learned to further resilience. 

In many cases, Latin American cities are independent from national governments in the ways in which they manage solid and liquid waste, provide clean water, determine which technologies to use in the provision of energy and public transport, and which criteria to use in public purchases, conservation standards, or resource preservation within their jurisdiction. All of these provide avenues to improve the use and preservation of ecosystem resources and to promote citizen climate empowerment. A COP may provide public spaces to announce these actions and plans, either through participation in events, panels, press conferences, high-level meetings, pavilions, exhibits, or networking. Cities’ representatives attending a COP should make use of all these opportunities in-situ and strategically assess their options in advance.  

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