Press Mentions

Abrams es muy inteligente. Sin embargo, él lleva equipaje que se remonta a la década de 1980 y hace que algunos latinoamericanos desconfíen de su papel actual en Venezuela.

O regime chavista utiliza diesel [importado] para geração de eletricidade, então também podemos começar a ver cada vez mais apagões.

Sanctions could have enormous impact on an already dire humanitarian crisis [in Venezuela] if the situation drags on. Obviously, the U.S. was utterly convinced that sanctions would be the final blow and the collapse would happen in a matter of days. It underestimated the regime’s resilience, even in the face of mounting domestic or international pressure.

There’s an idea that you hear a lot in Washington that it’s now or never [in Venezuela]. My concern is whether they’ve boxed themselves in.

The big mistake [in Venezuela] was not diversifying the economy and being so dependent and so reliant on the petroleum sector. That’s virtually the only thing that Venezuela produces.

It would’ve been much wiser, in retrospect, to have had more attention on targeted social policies in the 1990s. There was a desire for change and especially for the poor. They wanted a voice. And Chávez, I think, very effectively tapped into that desire.

It seems like Venezuela has come full circle. The problems today are magnified —  but they’re the same kind. The corruption is monumental, the mismanagement is monumental, and so it’s interesting to reflect on the same themes being touched on by Juan Guaidó, the interim president of Venezuela, as was touched on by Hugo Chávez 20 years ago.

The crucial factor in determining bilateral relations [between El Salvador and China] will be Bukele’s initial hold on power. A landslide victory would give him considerable leeway in how he governs... Anything short of that would leave him at the mercy of establishment figures and limit his options both domestically and internationally.

[In a democratic transition in Venezuela] Venezuelans have to take the lead.

[Rusia y China] temen que un cambio de gobierno [en Venezuela] pueda significar que nunca recuperarán su dinero. Expertos rusos y chinos también me han dicho que ninguno de los dos países está dispuesto a enfrentarse a EE.UU. por Venezuela. 

Afortunadamente [Trump] no menciono [durante el discurso sobre el estado de la nación] una opción militar [hacia Venezuela] porque creo que eso hubiera corrido el riesgo de alienar no solamente a Demócratas y Republicanos con este tema pero también a los aliados latinoamericanos de Estados Unidos.

China made itself indispensable [to Venezuela]: it very generously gave billions of dollars in low-interest loans, first to Chávez and then to Maduro, in exchange for the export of oil.

Esto puede explicarse por la inmensa influencia que los asesores de línea dura ante Cuba, Nicaragua y Venezuela tienen en la definición de la política del gobierno de Trump hacia América Latina. Hablo de (el senador) Marco Rubio, de John Bolton y, ahora, de (el secretario de Estado) Mike Pompeo.

A questão é: os militares vão tomar o controle ou não do governo de transição? Deles dependerá a decisão sobre o destino de Maduro, se ele será preso na Venezuela ou exilado.

A Venezuela foi um dos poucos países sul-americanos a não passar por ditadura nos anos 1970 e 1980. Todos os que foram governados por regimes de exceção tiveram de entrar em acordo com os militares, engolir a seco e conceder anistia geral.