Press Mentions

If you look at it in a wider context, it’s hard to say [that Trump’s position towards Venezuela] shows a broader commitment to human rights and democracy. But from my perspective, we’ll take what we can get. In my view, he’s on the right side of this one. Whether he’s got a strategy, whether it’s all been thought out, I don’t know.

[The Trump administration’s posture towards Venezuela] is so at odds with what we’ve seen in other parts of the world. But Latin America is different. It’s where domestic politics has a greater role than other parts of the world.

Guaidó has tried to reach out to the military, tried to unify the opposition and tried to reach Chavista folks as well. I think that with some opposition, the agenda was to go back to a pre-Chávez past.

Reconocer a Guaidó como el presidente legítimo podría ayudar a intensificar la presión sobre Maduro y mantener el impulso de la oposición. Existe, sin embargo, el riesgo de que aumente la represión sobre los manifestantes.

I’m not sure anybody really knows what this means in terms of the practical effects of having parallel governments [in Venezuela].

In Washington, there is this scenario that all of this is going to end up in a transitional government and that the regime will somehow collapse. I think there has to be a bridge to get from one side of the river to the other; they’re making a leap that is not entirely clear.

Pelosi and Trump fighting about the State of the Union sound like Guaidó and Maduro. It’s like we have parallel governments here.

I don’t rule out that there could be some force used to carry out his decision [to expel US diplomats in Venezuela].

Maduro will want to demonstrate that he remains in charge, even as the Trump administration undermines him with its decision Wednesday to recognize Venezuelan National Assembly Leader Juan Guaidó as the interim president.

 [US diplomats in Venezuela] could be picked up and sent out of the country forcefully. I wouldn’t rule that out. It could get pretty ugly.

The military is a black box. Unless and until it makes a move, the future of Venezuela looks very grim indeed. And if it does, nobody can be sure what will come out.

Back in 2002, the [Venezuelan] opposition was dominated by pot-banging members of the bourgeoisie, but these days — a crucial difference — it cuts across all strata of society.  It’s not just the middle class, it’s much broader and much deeper.

Maduro inherited an impossible situation. Although Maduro tried to continue Chávez’s controversial social programs, his government suffered from outright mismanagement and increased corruption. Criminality is prominent.

The [Maduro] regime is going to show force, and it’s been successful at intimidating the opposition and instilling fear. Under both Chávez and Maduro, they haven’t been good at governing, but they’ve been very good at dividing the opposition—that is the one thing they’ve done consistently well.

This highlights the enormous risks of having parallel governments [in Venezuela]. The situation has put the U.S. and the embassy staff in a very difficult position. If the diplomats do not leave, they could face considerable danger. Yes, it could get ugly. And yet, if they do leave, that would deflate Guaidó.