Peter Hakim is president emeritus and a senior fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue. From 1993 to 2010, he served as president of the organization. Hakim writes and speaks widely on hemispheric issues and has testified more than a dozen times before the U.S. Congress. His articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, New York Times, Washington Post, Miami Herald, Los Angeles Times, and Financial Times, and in newspapers and journals in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Canada, Cuba, El Salvador, Italy, Mexico, Peru, and Spain. From 1991 to 2001, he wrote a monthly column for the Christian Science Monitor, and now serves as a board member of Mexico’s Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica and editorial advisor to the Chilean-based América Economia. Prior to joining the Dialogue, Hakim was a vice president of the Inter-American Foundation and worked for the Ford Foundation in New York, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. He taught at MIT and Columbia, and has served on boards and advisory committees for the World Bank, Council on Competitiveness, Inter-American Development Bank, Canadian Foundation for Latin America (FOCAL), Partners for Democratic Change, Human Rights Watch, and the Council on Foreign Relations. He has been decorated by the governments of Brazil, Chile and Spain. Hakim earned a bachelor’s at Cornell University, a master’s in physics at the University of Pennsylvania, and a master’s in public and international affairs at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School.
Peter Hakim, president emeritus and a senior fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue, joined Imran Garda of TRT World’s The Newsmakers to discuss recent developments in Colombia and the future of the Colombian government’s peace deal with the FARC.
Rather than building a robust partnership with the United States, Bolsonaro’s current trajectory may end up with Brazil facing a largely indifferent Washington. Yes, Trump did declare this week that he wants a free trade deal with Brazil, but even if Brazil can find a way around Mercosur’s rules and begin to pursue a bilateral accord, negotiations will take several years to complete. A successful outcome is not out of the question, but it will require to thoroughly overhaul its highly protected economy, which is among the most insular in the world.
It is hard to imagine exactly what kind of deal Bolsonaro and Trump, both anomalous, unconventional leaders, drawn to one another mainly by temperament and ideology, could strike with another. Could they really end up accomplishing what previous governments in both countries had failed to achieve? Could they forge an alliance between two countries that have long maintained a rather distant and often distrustful relationship?
Recent global developments offer substantial evidence that the so-called liberal or rule-based international order, set in place in the aftermath of World War II, is fast eroding with no replacement in sight. The important question now is how governments across the globe should be adjusting to the systemic changes taking place in world politics and the new risks they pose.
After little more than a year of tension-filled talks, US and Mexican negotiators have reached a preliminary agreement that would largely preserve, in both concept and content, the original NAFTA. But for both Mexico and Canada, the uncertain and painful renegotiation of NAFTA comes with high costs beyond the expected economic losses. Resolving the NAFTA dispute will not repair the damage Trump has inflicted on US relations with both Mexico and Canada.
El experimento de la CICIG funcionó porque tenía el respaldo financiero y político de EE.UU., y se tambaleó cuando Washington dejó de protegerlo. Trump claramente tenía otras exigencias: frenar la migración centroamericana, trasladar la embajada de Guatemala en Israel a Jerusalén, unirse a la condena a Nicolás Maduro y Daniel Ortega, y ahora el tratado del ‘país seguro y protegido’.
Trump está demostrando al Ejército venezolano —principal sostén de Maduro— que tiene el poder de causar un dolor inmenso y, de esta manera, persuadir a los militares a usar su poder para sacar al régimen chavista. Supongo que este es el comienzo de una negociación de alto riesgo entre las dos grandes y verdaderas potencias en el conflicto de Venezuela: es decir, EE.UU. y los militares venezolanos.