The Thaw with Cuba and the Region
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Until December 17th, 2014, only two of the Cold War’s many walls endured: the 58th parallel that divides the two Koreas and the Straits of Florida that separate the United States and Cuba. That day, President Barack Obama announced the end of the diplomatic isolation put into place by President Eisenhower—after Fidel Castro’s turn towards communism—and reinforced by his successors, even in the years after the fall of the Soviet Union.
It has been clear for some time that a policy of isolation has failed to spur change on the island. Yet it was President Obama who at long last made the decision to do away with this relic of a past age. The opening of embassies in Washington and Havana is a profound symbol of this new era, but much still remains to be done—above all the lifting of the embargo and better recognition of human rights in Cuba—before the relationship is fully normalized.
As Obama signaled in his announcement of the thaw with Havana, change will not be easy. Diplomatic normalization and new commercial opportunities even in spite of the embargo will have effects only in the long-term. That new leadership will emerge on the island is inevitable. Raúl Castro has indicated that he will step down in 2018, taking with him the generation that led the revolution. The Obama administration’s decision to abandon a strategy of isolation positions the United States to have a greater impact on the next leaders of Cuba.
Beyond the bilateral relationship between the United States and Cuba, the “thaw” has rippled through Washington’s relationship with Latin America as a whole. The stoic resistance of a small island’s government against pressure from the world’s greatest superpower—even at the expense of the welfare and freedom of Cuban citizens—had long generated sympathy in Latin America. The symbolic gesture of a trip to Havana and a photo-op with Raúl and—above all—Fidel Castro had been an easy way for Latin American leaders of diverse ideological stripes to demonstrate foreign policy independence.
At each Summit of the Americas, the exclusion of Cuba had become a growing obstacle. This tension came to a head after Cartagena 2012, when many governments declared clearly that they would not attend the next meeting if the island were not participating. The image of Presidents Obama and Castro talking animatedly only three years later, at the Panama summit, circled the world and marked a new era for hemispheric affairs.
There is no doubt, therefore, that Obama’s change towards Cuba—even only in the diplomatic sphere—has had a positive impact on hemispheric relations. What is less clear is if it has marked a profound transformation in the United States’ approach to the region. In any case, the decision to remove this obstacle to positive relationships with Latin America, combined with certain political changes in the region, offers an opportunity to improve relations. In this sense, Latin America will be a much friendlier place for the United States in the immediate future than it has been for the last 15 years.
For policymakers in Washington, most countries in Latin America continue to be distant priorities, geopolitically secondary and in some cases hostile towards regional initiatives by the United States. Instead of a profound restart in attention towards the region, what the Obama administration signaled was its pragmatic approach in relationships with the hemisphere. The reopening towards Cuba fits clearly into this framework.
Since the failure of the Free Trade Area of the Americas initiative in 2005—rejected by many South American countries—the United States had not attempted anything important on the hemispheric level. Beyond the novelty factor in Panama, the Summits of the Americas continue to be relegated to good intentions and few concrete advances. In recent years, the United States had launched important efforts in the region—such as supporting the Colombian peace process and the “100,000 Strong in the Americas” educational program—but seemed to lack a long-term strategy to strengthen links with Latin America as a whole.
During recent years, the political landscape in the region led the United States to concentrate on relationships with a limited number of countries, particularly on the Pacific Rim. Decision makers in Washington considered this to the best strategy given the proliferation of leftist and profoundly anti-US governments. This also marked the fragmentation and differentiation between Latin American countries, making it more convenient to maintain individual policies towards each one. Today, this reality is changing: Venezuela moves towards the political and economic precipice with Chavismo badly weakened, Argentina recently elected president a pro-market businessman, and in Brazil only the ongoing political crisis impedes the implementation of adjustment and liberalization mechanisms widely seen as essential. These transformations in Latin America could generate a favorable context for deeper relationships between the US and the hemisphere as a whole.
All of this will depend on the next president of the United States—and his or her Latin American counterparts—to take advantage of this opportunity for better relationships. Compared to the rest of the world outside of North America and Europe, Latin America is culturally diverse, stable, and overwhelmingly democratic. The political and economic potential for the millions of Latin Americans that entered the middle classes in the last decade is enormous, although the recent economic deceleration has brought it somewhat into question.
Without resurrecting grand integration schemes—which have had disappointing results in the past—there is a profound opportunity to increase cooperation between the United States and Latin America. For that, just as Obama did with Cuba, his successors should remember that the United States can promote its interests and values through closer relationships and a shared vision for the future with the governments and people of Latin America, as opposed to leaning on the weight of its economic and geopolitical power.