Brazil & the US: A Saab Story

This post is also available in: Português 

Matthias Kabel / CC BY-SA 3.0

“Brazil Snubs Boeing” headlined the NY Times following Brazil’s decision, after many years of hesitating, to purchase nearly $5 billion worth of fighter jets from Swedish manufacturer Saab, rather than from its US rival Boeing. Brazilian officials maintained the decision was based only on financial and technical criteria, however, rejecting the notion that this was further political payback for US spying activities in Brazil, which had already provoked President Rousseff to cancel a long sought-after state visit to Washington. What, in fact, motivated the Brazilians to buy the Swedish planes at this time is a complex and important question. Its answer reveals a great deal about the current state of US-Brazil relations. But an even more vital concern is the impact the decision will have on the future course of those relations.

US-Brazilian ties were brought to their lowest point in recent memory by revelations of the US’s massive surveillance in Brazil and worldwide, compounded by the way the two governments reacted to them. Relations were already badly damaged, particularly by the 2010 clash between two countries over Brazil’s negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program, but also by multiple disagreements over other global and regional issues. US spying in Brazil—which egregiously included President Rousseff’s communications with her top advisors and the files of Petrobras, the  national oil company—not only prompted cancellation of the state visit intended to mend already soured relations. It also led the Brazilian president to launch an international campaign against US intelligence operations.

The US surveillance  raised and reinforced the deep-seated distrust between the two countries. The White House and State Department considered Brazil’s reaction to be overwrought and exaggerated. In their view, Brazil needs to settle down.

The US surveillance  raised and reinforced the deep-seated distrust between the two countries. The White House and State Department considered Brazil’s reaction to be overwrought and exaggerated. In their view, Brazil needs to settle down, understand that US security requires expansive worldwide intelligence gathering, and recognize that US intends no harm to Brazil. And if it has any complaints against the US, it ought to deal with them bilaterally. The cancellation of the state visit was seen as a petulant response far more costly to Brazil than to the US.

From Brazil’s perspective, the US is something of a bully that often does not play fairly. Washington’s massive surveillance demonstrates once again its willingness to use economic and technological superiority to gain improper advantage over Brazil and other nations (and, at times, even intimidate and humiliate them). Making things worse, while US officials gave considerable attention and deference to German President Angela Merkel’s anger at US spying in her country, they seemed largely indifferent to the objections from Brazil. The difference in treatment did not go unnoticed in Brasilia.

The central question is not about the wisdom of Brazil’s decision. It is about whether the Brazilian government rejected the Boeing planes because it had lost confidence in the US government or wanted to make it pay a price for dismissing Brazilian concerns about surveillance. More than anything else, it is the timing that suggests the decision was, in fact, a rebuff to the Washington.

The choice of Saab over Boeing is hard to evaluate for anyone outside the decision process. No choice can be free of political considerations. The Brazilian criteria--cost of purchase and maintenance, quality of performance, and access to new technologies--may sound technical but they also involve deeply political questions: What is the acceptable trade-off between cost and performance, particularly with an election on the horizon in a year when millions of Brazilians went to the streets to demonstrate against wasteful government expenditures? Is Stockholm or Washington more likely to full comply with the terms of an agreement and be flexible in its implementation? Can Brasilia count on getting planes that are not part of an intelligence gathering effort?

No question, the Saab jets are substantially cheaper to buy and use than the Boeing model. And the Swedes for sure put far fewer restrictions on technology transfer that the US, which Brazil has learned from bitter experience. But no one doubts that the US plane, which had been rumored to be the favorite of the Brazilian Air Force, is technically far superior.

The central question is not about the wisdom of Brazil’s decision. It is about whether the Brazilian government rejected the Boeing planes because it had lost confidence in the US government or wanted to make it pay a price for dismissing Brazilian concerns about surveillance. More than anything else, it is the timing that suggests the decision was, in fact, a rebuff to the Washington. With an electoral year just starting and after the public protests against government profligacy, it was a surprise that Brazil chose to act at all at this point. Some press reports said that even the leadership of the air force was informed only days before the official announcement. After successive Brazilian administrations had deferred the decision for years, it was widely anticipated that it was still a way off.

The US government was certainly not pleased by the Brazilian rejection of the Boeing F-18, viewing it largely as another intemperate response to the US surveillance programs and a further setback to relations between the two countries. Surely, the Brazilian government knew that the US would see it in this light and went ahead anyway. Where, then, does that leave the relationship.

There is no easy path to resolving these or the multiple other differences between the US and Brazil. It would be good start for both governments to acknowledge the fact that the relationship is deeply troubled and begin working to avoid it getting any worse. Grander ambitions, and accompanying  rhetoric, to construct new partnerships or become strategic allies should be held in check for a while.

The clash over US intelligence gathering is the second major confrontation of the US and Brazil in the past three years. The first, their discord over Iran, should not be downplayed. It continues to cause damage. The spying disclosures have now upended the two opportunities that might have set the relationship on a more cooperative, less contentious course. First, President Rousseff’s state visit to Washington would have certainly been an opportunity to rebuild a depleted reservoir of good will. A well-managed visit would, in substantial measure, have demonstrated Brazil’s regional and global significance in US foreign policy, clearly an outcome Brazilians desired. A decision to buy the Boeing fighters would likely have had an even bigger impact by clearly signaling the importance the Brazilian government assigns to its economic and security arrangements with the US, and setting the stage for heightened technological and military cooperation. Nothing on the horizon comes close to offering the opportunities of the state visit or the Boeing sale. US surveillance continues unabated, while Brazil maintains it position on the Iranian nuclear program largely unaltered.

There is no easy path to resolving these or the multiple other differences between the US and Brazil. Formally, the state visit was only “postponed” and not canceled—so it should be possible to reschedule, but neither the US or Brazil has yet shown much interest. Both governments are probably aware that, at this point, a presidential summit is pointless until the underlying tensions are substantially moderated and there is reasonable assurance that something concrete can be accomplished. It would be good start for both governments to acknowledge the fact that the relationship is deeply troubled and begin working to avoid it getting any worse. Grander ambitions, and accompanying  rhetoric, to construct new partnerships or become strategic allies should be held in check for a while.