Lead FARC negotiator Iván Márquez and Humberto de la Calle (L-R)

Colombia’s government and the FARC rebels on Wednesday announced they had reached final agreements on peace accords following nearly four years of talks in Havana. Before the accords can take effect, Colombian voters must approve them in a nationwide referendum, set for Oct. 2. A recent Ipsos Napoleon Franco poll said more than half of voters would reject the accords, but another poll by Invamer said two-thirds would approve them. What is behind the opposition to peace accords? What will happen politically and economically to Colombia if voters reject the deal? What should President Juan Manuel Santos do to garner more public support for the accords? How much influence will Santos’ predecessor and political foe, Álvaro Uribe, an opponent of the peace talks, have on the outcome of an eventual vote?

Barry R. McCaffrey, president of BR McCaffrey Associates, retired U.S. Army four-star general and former director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy: "President Santos is one of the most astute and capable political leaders I have encountered in the global community. He is very intelligent, a patriot, experienced, and he surrounds himself with extremely capable and sophisticated senior cabinet officials. He has taken a risk in Havana to achieve the most important goal in Colombian society--to end the senseless and cruel civil war that has caused such immense suffering for so many decades. History tells us there comes an inflection point in these savage internal struggles when all involved simply can no longer tolerate the chaos and endless rounds of bloody revenge killings. They turn to peace simply through exhaustion. Santos is offering both sides a way out. His security forces have nearly destroyed the offensive capacity of the ELN. The FARC is crippled. The Colombian people have categorically rejected the message of the revolution. They despise the drug trade, the poverty engendered by the war, the murders, the kidnappings and the anachronistic message of the FARC. Will the peace process work? Will the FARC disarm? Will the FARC disengage from the streams of cash they generate from running the largest global drug cartel? Will the Colombian people accept the de facto impunity of FARC killers entering the political process? Will the brave men and women of the CNP and the armed forces accept the FARC gutting their senior leaders through continuing accusations of war crimes? Probably not. The agreement in Havana was a bold move driven personally by President Santos to snatch peace from endless war. It is more likely that this is only the opening phase of the end of a nightmare. But the Colombian people and the security forces still have the stamina and courage to eventually return law and stability to this beautiful land."

Maria Velez de Berliner, president of Latin Intelligence Corporation: "A final ‘yes’ or ‘no’ hinges on: 1) a timely, unredacted publication of the final agreement; 2) the wording of the referendum; and, 3) the resources and breadth of the respective campaigns. Having tied the success of his presidency to the agreement, President Santos and former President César Gaviria, head of the ‘yes’ campaign, have the coercive power of the state regarding career advancement and job security of government employees, and project financing in the states to get to ‘yes.’ They will use it freely. Few Colombians believe Santos’ claim that it is either this agreement or unending war. Instead, they believe the FARC will renegotiate the agreement, if necessary. Santos’ unpopularity increases the based-on-experience atavistic distrust Colombians have for the FARC. As of today, Colombians’ antagonism toward Santos’ concessions within the legislative framework for the implementation of the agreement means Uribistas have a high probability of getting to ‘no’ in Antioquia and Los Llanos. However, the missteps of Uribe, the leader of the ‘no’ campaign, and of his inner circle in their opposition to Santos, left them with limited influence elsewhere. There are dissidents within Uribe’s Democratic Center party who have swallowed the frog of a likely ‘yes’ to see if they can affect the implementation of the agreement, which is the critical issue. Colombia lacks the monetary resources to finance the massive restructuring of the state’s institutions, society and culture required by the agreement. Therefore, most of the financing will have to come from foreign borrowing, adding to today’s fiscal hole, which Colombian taxpayers cannot plug, even with higher corporate and wealth taxes."

Virginia M. Bouvier, senior advisor for peace processes at the United States Institute of Peace: "It is striking that the peace agreements, widely embraced by the international community, have not found more traction within Colombia. Why not? First, there is little knowledge or understanding of what the accords say or how they might transform the lives of the citizenry. Furthermore, most urban residents don’t feel vested in ending a war that has largely shifted to the countryside--areas not covered by most major polls. Second, the complexity of the formula reached in Havana is hard to sell. It includes jail time for those who don’t confess their crimes fully and reduced sentences with alternative restrictions of liberty for those who do. The ever-popular Uribe has largely hijacked the debate on justice, hammering home two simple messages: the FARC must face jail time for their crimes, and they should be banned from political office. These points resonate deeply with public opinion. Third, the Santos government has had little success in challenging Uribe’s position, keeping the media focused on the larger issues addressed by the agreements, or in convincing the Colombian populace that it is unreasonable to expect political exclusion and jail time for rebels who have not been defeated. Fourth, Santos’ low popularity ratings, related to his handling of other domestic issues, including simmering social conflicts, don’t help. The identification of the ‘yes’ vote with support for Santos makes it hard to evaluate whether people are voting for peace or against Santos. A signed agreement in hand will make it easier. It will then fall to the Colombian government to remind the citizenry of the costs of war and the benefits of peace and to persuade them that they have secured the best deal possible for Colombia. In the end, I have no doubt that Colombians will choose peace."

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