

04.07.23

# International Migration from Latin America & the Caribbean: In Numbers






# Scale, Composition, and Nature of Migration in the Americas

# The Scale, Composition, and Nature of Migration in the Americas has Changed Drastically since 2015

- The future of migration will likely show similar characteristics albeit in a lower pace:
- **Scale—**
- Migrants from LAC increased from 33 million in 2015 to at least 43 million in 2022—four million of which since 2020
- Migration flows to the United States have doubled to nearly 2 million people annually in 2021 and 2022.
- The sustained increases in the past two years are exceptional, given that migration inflow to the United States in 2019 was large, to nearly a million.
- Migration to Chile, Costa Rica, Panama, the D.R., has also increased in large numbers. With these countries capturing more than 20 percent of all migrants from LAC. Chile is now host to 1.42 million migrants.
- Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico and Panama have become destination and transit countries for hundreds of thousands of migrants
- **Composition—**
- The composition of migration has also changed. Demographically people on the move are half adults, and half families and unaccompanied children: 5 percent of all migrants entering the US in 2022 are unaccompanied minors;
- More kids are leaving every year than the annual increment of matriculation in high school in Central America: Guatemala's matriculation is declining since 2018
- This inflow to the United States is composed of migrants from Mexico, Central America—with significant increases from Nicaragua—and Ecuador as well as refugees from Venezuela, Cuba and Haiti.
- **The nature—**
- The factors explaining current migration are more complex and include political crises, economic insecurity, violence, weak social protection systems, COVID-19 contagion, low vaccination rates, and natural disasters.
- The nationalities with higher migration inflows are those coming from more politically unstable or repressive countries, like Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela
- The economic impact of these flows are now 5 percent of Latin America and the Caribbean's national income
- Future migration is likely to continued but at a lower pace, and its continuity calls for concrete solutions moving forward

# Migrants from LAC Increased from 33 Million in 2015 to 43 Million in 2022




# Migration to Chile, Costa Rica, Panama, and the D.R., has also Increased in Large Numbers (2022)

- These countries capture more than 20 percent of all migrants from LAC


Migrants from	Brazil	Chile	Costa Rica	Colombia	Dom. Rep	Ecuador	Panama	Peru	United States	All countries	Part.	M/ Pop
Colombia	8,395	173,440	26739	..	3,687	200,539	98,253	44,250	753,847	2,736,230	47%	5%
Cuba	2,544	3,173	5,791	1,945	3,927	3,083	2,917		1,251,037	1,558,312	83%	14%
El Salvador	279	242	13,984	409	273	537	3,330		1,392,663	1,559,924	94%	24%
Guatemala	357	236	2,676	490	438	442	1,658		975,504	1,117,355	89%	7%
Haiti	10,000	180,852		122	336,729	98	559		671,499	1,364,492	87%	12%
Honduras	155	249	3,947	376	433	482	1,553		597,647	722,430	85%	7%
Nicaragua	449	249	440,298	611	298	403	40,000		540,000	1,136,000	93%	17%
Venezuela	388,120	444,717	29,906	2,477,588	115,283	502,214	146,358	1,490,673	700,000	7,131,435	88%	25%
Nine countries	410,299	803,158	423,341	2,481,541	461,068	707,798	294,628	1,534,923	6,682,197	17,080,156	82%	12%
Latin America & Caribe	550,000	1,482,390	458,237	2,500,000	500,000	800,000	350,000	1,300,000	23,362,654	43,326,446	73%	
	75%	54%	92%	99%	98%	98%	98%	98%	98%	37%		

# Migration Flows to the US have Doubled to Nearly 2 million People Annually in 2021 & 2022 (Compared to 2019 & Earlier Years)

**Nationwide encounters at US borders: 80% from Latin America and the Caribbean**




# Apprehensions of *Other Than Mexicans* on the rise



# A Shifting Trend in Migration?

Apprehensions as Share of the US Population







# Recent Migration Growth is Originating from Fragile States

Countries	2020	Growth (2015-2020)
Venezuela, RB	5,415,337	51%
Guatemala	1,577,375	7%
Nicaragua	850,000	7%
Honduras	985,077	6%
Haiti	1,869,671	5%
Cuba	1,897,128	4%
LAC	41,395,895	4%
Brazil	1,850,000	4%
D. Republic	1,724,189	3%
Argentina	1,076,148	3%
Bolivia	927,244	2%
Colombia	3,024,273	2%
Peru	1,519,635	2%
Jamaica	1,118,931	2%
Costa Rica	150,241	1%
Trinidad and Tobago	330,519	1%
Paraguay	896,484	1%
El Salvador	1,599,058	1%
Mexico	12,185,737	0%
Ecuador	1,127,891	0%
Panama	139,520	-1%
Guyana	438,413	-2%
Belize	52,756	-4%
Suriname	273,209	-8%
Uruguay	367,060	-9%

# Changing Composition of Migration: The Increase is from Fragile States



# Regular Immigration: In the Upswing?



Immigrant Categories	2022 Percent	
Immediate relatives	218,185	44%
Family sponsored residence	156,800	32%
Employment based preference	55,058	11%
Diversity migrants	54,334	11%
Other	9,071	2%

Region	2022	
Africa	54,711	11%
Asia	178,958	36%
Europe	47,422	10%
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean	176,747	36%
Oceania	2,034	0%
South America	33,576	7%
Worldwide	493,448	

# Composition of Migration



- The composition of migration has also changed
- Demographically people on the move are half adults, and half families and unaccompanied children: 5 percent of all migrants entering the US in 2022 are unaccompanied minors
- For the Northern Triangle that composition is more distributed
- More kids are leaving every year (15 percent of all Guatemalan migrants) than the annual increment of matriculation in high school in Central America: Guatemala's matriculation is declining since 2018
- This inflow to the United States is composed of migrants from Mexico, Central America—with significant increases from Nicaragua—and Ecuador as well as refugees from Venezuela, Cuba and Haiti

# The Nature of Migration



- The factors or determinants explaining current migration are more complex and include political crises, economic insecurity, violence, weak social protection systems, COVID-19 contagion, low vaccination rates, and natural disasters

Economic	Social and Aspirational	Transnational	Political	Environmental
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Unemployment</li><li>• Informal economy</li><li>• Low income (&lt;\$400)</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Pessimist outlook of the present and future;</li><li>• Victimization</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Relatives abroad;</li><li>• Receiving remittances;</li><li>• Market access knowledge</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Mistrust of political system;</li><li>• Concentration of power;</li><li>• Intimidation and political threats</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Earthquakes;</li><li>• Hurricanes;</li><li>• Droughts;</li><li>• Floods</li><li>• Pandemics;</li></ul>


# Political Stability Correlates Negatively to Migration



# Migration, Informality, and Labor Productivity



# Migration and Environmental Vulnerability in Latin America & the Caribbean 2000 – 2020: Not a Correlation but...





# Climate Change & Migration in Central America (2000-2021)

- The regularized effect of natural disasters creates displacement or gradual wearing out of resources over time
- In turn some relationship between migration and climate change exist
- Statistically, there is no relationship because these events do not always have immediate effects ,with some exceptions as a massive event like Hurricane Eta
- However, is important to consider diaspora engagement on issues related to conservation and climate adaptation among Caribbean countries and some from Central America

Type of disaster	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Nicaragua	Four countries
Flood	8	18	9	13	48
Tropical Cyclone	7	4	5	8	24
Epidemic	6	3	6	3	18
Drought	4	4	5	3	16
Earthquake	5	5	2	2	14
Tech. Disaster	2	8			10
Severe Local storm	2	2	1	4	9
Volcano	2	6			8
Land Slide	1	4		1	6
Other		2	1	1	4
Cold Wave		3			3
Wild fire			2	1	3
Mud Slide		1		1	2
Extreme temperature		1			1
Fire			1		1
Mudslide		1			1
Storm Surge	1				1
Tornadoes				1	1
Wave			1		1
<b>Total</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>171</b>

# Outmigration at a Municipal Level from the Three Countries as Share of Migrants from the Dry Corridor

- Over time the shifts have been small and uneven (compare Guatemala and Honduras)
- The most affected area by the Dry Corridor in Honduras is the Western part of the country, where 20 percent of Hondurans live (some of the poorest areas)
- There is a significant increase in outmigration and proportional to its population—unlike other areas
- The geographic origin of migration is not related to population distribution but to economic factors (marginal declines in income in large cities, transnational ties, insecurity in high crime areas)

Dry Corridor	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS
2012	100%	72%	44%
2015	100%	70%	48%
2018	99%	67%	46%
2020	100%	68%	47%
Pop.2018 Dry C	100%	60%	54%

NW Dry corridor	HONDURAS
2012	12%
2015	11%
2018	19%
2020	18%
Pop.	20%

# Central America Exemplifies the Complexity and Differences in Migration

- Guatemala and Honduras exhibit a mix of issues, from economic, political, and aspirational issues to impacts of natural disasters
- Nicaragua, instead, shows economic and aspirational issues both tied to political conditions with an intention directly connected to the dictatorship
- El Salvador's migration is similar to Nicaragua's, and the concern on Bukele is concentration of power
- In turn, migration continues, and in some cases increases like in Nicaragua

Total migration	2,018	2,019	2,020	2,021	2,022
El Salvador	53,406	85,419	16,262	64,106	65,295
Guatemala	150,938	205,349	32,631	152,738	112,765
Honduras	109,383	211,589	28,337	173,095	136,202
Nicaragua	4,161	11,034	2,265	92,300	184,775
Four countries	317,888	513,391	79,495	482,239	499,037

# The Intention to Migrate 2020: Triggers and Statistical Determinants

Reasons given to explain reasons to migrate...	Guatemala	Honduras
<b>Aspirational Improvements</b>		
Because my family or friends recommended it	6.00%	6.5%
To be with family	4.80%	2.2%
To study/so that my kids can study in another country	6.00%	6.3%
To better my life or the lives of my children / family	14.70%	9.8%
To send money to my family	13.80%	10.6%
<b>Economic Difficulties</b>		
Because my income is very low	12.30%	9.0%
Cost of living is too high – I can't live here	5.80%	6.3%
Because there are no jobs here	9.40%	6.9%
There is hardly any yield from harvest	4.50%	3.8%
Because we lost our land	3.20%	4.2%
<b>Natural Disaster/Crisis</b>		
Because of the situation caused by covid-19	3.60%	8.0%
Because of the damage caused by Hurricane Eta		5.1%
<b>Victimization &amp; Politics</b>		
Because there is so much violence here	5.00%	7.7%
I / my family was threatened through extortion	0.30%	4.6%
Because of the political situation	4.80%	8.9%

“The intention to migrate changes to largely economic issues, and increases when an individual is not receiving remittances; lost work due to the pandemic; is receiving less remittances in 2020 than in 2019; home was damaged by hurricane ETA; is unemployed; works in the informal economy; is male (for Guatemalans only).”

# The Intention to Migrate from Nicaragua

- Four broad factors explain a strong intention to migrate:
  - First, perceiving that economic conditions will be worse, and the country is going in the wrong direction
  - Second, belief that Ortega will have more support, that elections were illegitimate, and one can't trust people after the elections
  - Third, having a household income below US\$500
  - Other factors include being under 35 and living in Managua.

	Exp(B)	Stat. sign.
Country is going in the wrong direction	1.874	***
After elections, there is a feeling of distrust to talk to even friends	1.78	***
Age (the younger, the higher intention to migrate)	0.978	***
You family's economic situation will be worse in 2022	1.668	***
Managua	1.524	***
Strongly disagree that Ortega will have more support after January	1.437	***
Household income is less than 20,000 Cordobas	1.405	***
Under 35 years	1.585	***


# Socioeconomic and Political Perspectives on Intent to Migrate & Marginal Effects

- Intention to migrate from El Salvador is 34 percent:

Characteristic	Model 1
Positive Country/Presidency Outlook	-0.033*
Have Sibling Abroad	0.028*
Receive Remittances	0.081*
Own Land	-0.214*
Have Savings	0.122*
Negative Economic Outlook	0.126*
Negative Hope for Personal Future	0.132*
Concentration of Power	0.000
Age (younger)	-0.003*
Mobile Bank Account Ownership	-0.226*
Monthly Income btw \$400 and \$600	0.127*
Crime Victimization	0.153*
Informality	0.037*

\*p < .05, all other coefficients p > .05; Notes: Positive Country/Presidency Outlook is combination of P20 & P18; Informality is vendedores y dueños de empresas con ingresos mensuales debajo de \$300 resto formal. Obs = 488; Pseudo Adjusted r<sup>2</sup> = 0.2867


# Border Apprehensions as Share of Home Country Population






# Share of Remittances to GDP 2022

- The economic impact of these flows are now 5 percent of Latin America and the Caribbean's national income translated into an estimated payment network of 45 million p2p transactions a month



# Migration, Remittances, and Environmental Vulnerability



# Remittance Transfers: Five Year Annual Growth and Migrants as Share of Population


Country Name	Growth 2001-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2022	Migr./Pop.
Argentina	18%	8%	-5%	7%	2%
Belize	9%	12%	-7%	8%	19%
Bolivia	20%	23%	11%	3%	8%
Brazil	14%	2%	-2%	6%	1%
Colombia	10%	4%	11%	11%	5%
Costa Rica	16%	5%	3%	2%	3%
Cuba	3%	2%	5%	-1%	14%
Dominican Republic	7%	7%	11%	10%	13%
Ecuador	12%	1%	8%	10%	8%
El Salvador	9%	3%	9%	9%	24%
Guatemala	37%	7%	12%	16%	13%
Guyana	55%	13%	0%	6%	61%
Haiti	10%	8%	13%	6%	13%
Honduras	24%	8%	11%	13%	13%
Jamaica	11%	3%	1%	6%	37%
Mexico	18%	-1%	11%	13%	11%
Nicaragua	13%	6%	9%	14%	17%
Panama	12%	26%	6%	0%	4%
Paraguay	3%	21%	7%	1%	12%
Peru	14%	12%	5%	5%	5%
Suriname	81%	2%	-127%	-29%	63%
Trinidad and Tobago	18%	0%	-7%	5%	25%
Uruguay	562%	10%	14%	7%	14%
Venezuela				5%	25%
LAC (24 countries)	15%	3%	12%	11%	

# Is Migration to Continue? - Solutions at Hand

- Migration is likely to continue but not above 7 percent annual growth as in the past three years
- The continuity of human mobility ensures the presence of a trend for which leveraging tools are critically important
- Regardless of cause, labor mobility is integrating Latin America and the Caribbean to the global economy
- Successfully addressing solutions to the increasing numbers of migrants into the United States and other countries within the LAC region will require interventions that can have a regional as well as a country-by-country approach
- The challenge is that the region is leading with non-cooperative partners and players
- Some solutions include:
  - Humanitarian assistance
  - A development and democratization strategy
  - Regularization and migrant inclusion efforts
  - Transnational city strategies


# Migrants as Share of Population and Annual Migration Growth

- Over time, migration growth slows down when the diaspora is over 20 percent of its population
- 1 percent increase of migrants relative to their homeland population decreases growth by 2.7 percent



# Growth of Remittances 2015-2021 and Share of Migrants Relative to Population in 2021

- Remittance flows slow down during normal times across countries with large diasporas and decades long migration



# The Importance of a Differentiated Country Approach

- It is important to consider a differentiated country approach for any strategy, particularly among 11 countries which capture 90 percent of all flows

Year	Remitt. Growth	Share of GDP in 2022	Migr. Growth (2015-2020)	Political Stability	Willingness To Cooperate	RRHH /THH*	Competitive Position of Payment Networks (share of top three payers)	Payment network	Digital integration level of financial ecosystem	Financial Inclusion **
Honduras	20%	29%	6%	Conflictive	Moderate	45%	Over 70%	More than 8,000 payment points	Low	37.85
El Salvador	4%	27%	1%	Conflictive	Reluctant	64%	Over 70%	More than 6,000 payment points	Low	35.85
Jamaica	-3%	26%	2%	Stable	Open	84%	Over 70%	Over 3,000 payment points	Medium	73.3
Guatemala	21%	21%	7%	Conflictive	Moderate	45%	Over 70%	More than 20,000 payment points	Low	40
Nicaragua	40%	21%	12%	Conflictive	None	46%	Over 70%	Less than 2,000 payment points	Fragile	30
Haiti	-10%	17%	5%	Failing	Open	36%	Over 70%	Less than 1,000 payment points	Fragile	30
Dom. Rep.	-7%	10%	3%	Stable	Open	28%	Between 40-50%	More than 3,000 payment points-home delivery prevails	Low	51.3
Venezuela	5%	5%	51%	Conflictive	None to Reluctant	26%	Informal	No marketplace, in need for dense network	Low	80
Mexico	18%	5%	2%	Stable	Moderate	25%	Between 40-50%	Extensive network of more than 100,000 points	Medium	40
Ecuador	7%	4%	0%	Stable	Moderate	17%	Between 40-50%		Low	64.18
Colombia	9%	3%	2%	Stable but tense	Open	16%	Over 70%	Extensive network, of more tan 20,000 points	Medium	59.72
Peru	5%	2%	2%	Stable but tense	Open	10%	Between 40-50%	Competitive and working on digital integration	Medium	57

\*RRHH/THH: Share of remittance recipient households relative to all households in country; \*\* Percent of people who own bank accounts



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