

Migrants and the Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Remittances

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This analysis offers a glimpse of the potential impact of the Coronavirus pandemic on US immigrants and family remittances.

The COVID-19 pandemic will have particular consequences for those who are financially vulnerable and have underlying health risks. Even though this pandemic tends to be more dangerous for older adults, migrants (who are typically far younger than this high-risk age-group) will likely be disproportionately affected.¹

In terms of health risks, migrants are among the cohort of the US population that lacks access to adequate health services and may be exposed to higher risks than others. Fear of deportation further complicates matters as it discourages migrants from seeking care.²

With continued business closures, diminished economic activity, and a forecasted recession, migrants, who predominantly work in the construction and services industries, may be the first ones to lose income—either by working fewer hours, days, or losing their jobs.

Moreover, past events involving worldwide crises can offer insight as to how this pandemic will likely affect remittance transfers. For instance, migrants' capacity to send money to relatives dropped by at least 10% during the 2009 financial crisis, which had an 8% increase in the unemployment rate within 18 months.

Considering migrants' financial and health vulnerabilities as well as the forecast recession, a conservative estimate shows that in 2020 remittances will decline as far as negative 7% from 2019, from US\$76 billion to US\$70 billion.

I. Migrant Financial and Health Vulnerability in the US

Physical and material conditions can have an effect on the capacity to remit in so far as a labor force depends on its good health to stay employed. US Census figures point to Latin American and Caribbean migrants as being predominantly young, 86% are between 21 and 70 years of age. Although they are younger than the average native-born American (62% are in the same age group), they are more vulnerable both financially and health wise.³ Their greater, relative financial vulnerability further exacerbates these health weaknesses.

In terms of financial vulnerability, Latin American and Caribbean migrants in the US have lower personal earnings. Thirty-five percent (35%) earn less than \$20,000 and 15% earn over \$50,000. In comparison, 34.6% of native-born Americans earn over \$50,000. Moreover, their access to healthcare is also different and may make them more vulnerable. For example, 20% of all migrants are uninsured. Among the unauthorized population and non-citizens, the percentage (32%) of individuals without medical insurance is even higher.⁴

¹ Over 80% of migrants are under 65 years of age.

² <https://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/17/deportation-fears-under-trump-have-immigrants-forgoing-medical-care-240635>

³ Pew Research Center tabulations of 2017 American Community Survey (1% IPUMS).

⁴ Pew Research Center tabulations of 2017 American Community Survey (1% IPUMS).

In a 2013 Inter-American Dialogue (IAD) study, migrants reported that flu like symptoms, headache, fever, coughing, and allergies were the most common health conditions they experienced.⁵ However, the main problem, which is related to the lack of insurance or affordable medical costs, was that half of the migrants would self-medicate without seeking medical attention. In this pandemic, self-medication is not an option nor a solution, especially given the contagion effect and the deadly risks of this pandemic, combined with their lack of self-awareness of their health conditions as discussed later in the analysis.

TABLE 1: HEALTH ISSUES EXPERIENCED BY RESPONDENT OR IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBER IN PAST 12 MONTHS, 2013

Source: Orozco, Manuel, 2013.

Health Condition	% Respondents
Flu like symptoms	45.5
Headache	29.7
Fever	25.8
Cough	22.8
Allergies	18.4

TABLE 2: INCOME, LEGAL STATUS, AND STEPS TAKEN TO RECOVER FROM HEALTH ISSUE, BY GENDER 2013

Source: Orozco, Manuel, 2013.

			Visited a Private Clinic (%)	Visited a Doctor (through Medical Insurance) (%)	Visited a Free Clinic (through City or County) (%)	Self-Prescribed Medicine or Treatment (%)	No Steps Taken (%)
Income	Personal Income Above \$25,000 a Year	F	17.8	58.9	12.3	23.3	4.1
		M	24.7	34.8	26.4	29.8	10.7
	Personal Income Below \$25,000 a Year	F	9.2	5.8	55.4	41.8	9.2
		M	11.8	6.9	38.8	44.3	16.4
Legal Status	Undocumented	F	4.9	4.1	45.7	55.1	11.5
		M	12.6	2.8	39.1	52.1	18.0
	TPS	F	4.3	30.4	52.2	34.8	0.0
		M	9.4	40.6	31.3	31.3	12.5
	Permanent Resident	F	20.7	29.7	43.2	17.	4.5
		M	18.6	31.4	37.3	20.6	9.8
	US Citizen	F	11.5	32.8	50.8	18.0	3.3
		M	30.1	41.1	19.2	6.8	12.3

⁵ Orozco, Manuel. For a Better Life: The Social, Economic, and Political Conditions of Latin American Immigrants.

Among national origin groups, differences emerge as well. Mexicans and Hondurans are among those least likely to seek medical care at a doctor's office or a private clinic, relying on self-treatment and free services. Only 10.7% of Mexican respondents and 4.5% of Honduran respondents report going to a doctor's office, which raises concerns about their access to preventative medical care.

These conditions are important considerations in the face of the pandemic, where according to a report by Kaiser foundation 16% of adults under 60 are likely to be at risk due to a medical condition (such as heart disease, cholesterol or lung disease), against 72% of those over 60.⁶

The percent of migrants with a medical condition related to heart disease or cholesterol appears to be lower than that of native-born Americans. However, many migrants are unaware of their health conditions due to lack of testing or medical examination.⁷ Therefore, not only do they self-medicate but they are also not aware of the health hazards they are exposed to.

This situation not only highlights the need to promote greater awareness about migrant financial and health vulnerabilities during this pandemic, but it also has implications for migrants' decision and/or ability to remit to relatives in Latin American and the Caribbean. For example, many may lose their jobs or wages while sick or spend needed money to look after themselves.

Below we look at what this may mean for migrants, their families and aggregate remittance flows.

II. An Economic Recession in 2020 and Lessons from the 2009 Recession

Several expert projections point to a global and US recession that will affect economic growth and remove at least 10 million additional jobs, with an estimated -2.5 GDP decline,⁸ which would affect 595,000 migrant workers. A decline in remittance sending is one of the several consequences of this job loss.

The 2009 recession offers important lessons and clues as to the impact of this crisis on sending behavior. The severity of the recession had an effect of reducing remittance growth by 12%. This decline was largely associated with the inability of those unemployed to remit as well as a decrease in the amount sent by those employed.

A 2009 study by the IAD showed that the principal amount sent dropped 5% compared to 2008 and the frequency of sending dropped 20%. Among those unemployed, the percent of people that continued remitting in the first six months of losing their jobs dropped to 25% from 40%.⁹

The effects of the recession resulting from the pandemic will deal a blow to employment as well as remittance sending.

⁶ <https://www.kff.org/global-health-policy/issue-brief/how-many-adults-are-at-risk-of-serious-illness-if-infected-with-coronavirus/>

⁷ <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3939795/>

⁸ COVID-19: Implications for business, <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-insights/covid-19-implications-for-business>; U.S. Braces for Sharp Economic Downturn as Coronavirus Bears Down, The Wall Street Journal, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-braces-for-sharp-economic-downturn-as-coronavirus-bears-down-11584386207>; Bivens, Josh, "Coronavirus shock will likely claim 3 million jobs by summer," <https://www.epi.org/blog/coronavirus-shock-will-likely-claim-3-million-jobs-by-summer/>.

⁹ Orozco, Manuel. Understanding the continuing effect of the economic crisis on remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean, Washington, DC, IADB, 2009.

III. An Impact Estimate on Remittances from the Pandemic

All the issues mentioned above may affect the decision to remit to relatives in Latin America. It is also possible that with increasing material needs among families, and recessionary conditions in the home country may feel compel migrants to rely on their savings to send money.

Here we offer a preliminary exploration of a drop in remittances using existing data with lessons learned and assumptions from the 2009 crisis.

The assumptions explored take into consideration experts' current predictions of this upcoming recession as being less severe than the 2009 recession as partly due to its exogenous effect.¹⁰ It does not consider the effect of those directly afflicted by the virus.

As we discussed above, migrants face a set of health and financial vulnerabilities that put them at risk of job or wage loss if they get sick or have to care for a sick relative, which could further exacerbate the foreseen drop in remittances.

Assumptions:

- About 6% of the total Latin American and Caribbean migrant labor force will lose their jobs (10% of the 10 million workers in the US who will lose their jobs, which totals almost 1 million workers).
- Among the unemployed: only 10% will use their savings to send money back home (in 2009 it was 25%).
- Thirty-five percent (35%) of those with jobs but still affected by the recession due to a two-month temporary loss of work will send 5% less. This is a less drastic situation than what occurred in 2009; 45% of those in this same category sent 10% less.
- Sixty-five percent (65%) of those with jobs who are somewhat affected by the recession¹¹ will continue to send as they would prior to the pandemic.

In turn these estimates point to at least a negative -7% decline in US outbound remittances, with Mexico and Central America receiving families being most affected, from US\$76 to \$70 billion. The estimate is rather conservative and does not take into consideration factors such as needs in the country of origin, severity of the crisis past July 2020, and those sectors most affected (many of which are where migrants were working)¹² nor people directly affected by the pandemic.

¹⁰ "The Coronavirus crisis is no 2008," <https://voxeu.org/article/coronavirus-crisis-no-2008>; <https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/09/economy/global-recession-coronavirus/index.html>

¹¹ Working less hours or days during an extended period.

¹² "Which jobs are most at risk from the coronavirus shutdown?," <https://theconversation.com/which-jobs-are-most-at-risk-from-the-coronavirus-shutdown-134680>

TABLE 3. ESTIMATES OF REMITTANCES FROM THE US IN 2020

Source: Author's own with ACS 2017 data, remittance company data, Inter-American Dialogue survey data.

Age group	Ages 16-60	Over 60	Total
Population (volume)	19,139,450	3,377,550	22,517,000
Population (%)	82%	12%	94%
At Risk from Pandemic (%)	15%	70%	
Labor force	12,361,607.83	1,809,015.78	15,075,131.50
Expected Job loss	768,290	135,581	903,870
Additional Unemployment rate (%)*	6%	6%	6%
Health Condition	Fair (40% or less have had the flu or other chronic problem)		
Migrant remitters in 2020 (excluding the unemployed from the crisis)	10,717,514	1,568,417	12,285,930.67
Remittances sent in 2019	\$66,019,886,170	\$9,661,446,757	\$75,681,332,926
Remittance behavior (% unemployed who would stop remitting)	612,000	108,000	720,000
Among those unemployed who would try to send remittances	\$23,562,000	\$4,158,000	\$27,720,000
Remittance behavior (others, 35% of people would send 5% less)	3,751,130	548,946	4,300,076
Amount among those sending less	\$20,796,264,143	\$3,043,355,728	\$23,839,619,872
Amount among all others	\$42,912,926,010	\$6,763,012,730	\$49,675,938,740
Total 2020	\$60,905,312,154	\$9,311,566,458	\$70,216,878,612
Remittance behavior (amount lost among unemployed who would stop remitting)	2,827,440,000	498,960,000	3,326,400,000

* T his does not include the 4.2% unemployment rate among foreign born in the US.

Given that remittances are among the top spending priorities for migrants and are a key economic input for recipients, the negative 7 percent growth in provides insight on the hardships to be faced by migrants, recipients, and countries in which remittances form a large portion of their respective GDP.

Following the 2009 crisis, migrants changed their behavior by restricting expenditures and tapping into their savings. Migrants with higher incomes (\$20,000 and above) limited their expenditures while looking for a second job or another job was the coping strategy for those earning less. Recipients, on the other hand, received less, and also had a decreased capacity to consume and invest. Furthermore, countries where remittances represented a large portion of their respective GDPs saw a significant drop in remittances which affects a country's stock of foreign exchange.¹³

The current and future unemployment increases resulting from this pandemic will put pressure on migrants in their attempts to continue remitting and helping their families in their country of origin. Remittance recipients will struggle as their household income is affected by a decline in remittances combined with the economic situations in their own countries. The vulnerabilities of migrants both in their destination countries as well as the vulnerabilities of remittance recipients will be highlighted during this recession and will put pressure on their respective countries' social nets.

¹³ Orozco, Manuel. Understanding the continuing effect of the economic crisis on remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean, Washington, DC, IADB, 2009.

IV. The Economic Consequences of the Pandemic on Remittances in Latin America and the Caribbean

The drop in remittances to the region will hit many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean at a time when economic growth was already weak.

The Economic Commission for Latin America had already established that the flow of remittances in 2019 contributed to smooth a possible recession last year.¹⁴ With the coming decline, at least one million households will be affected. The countries that are more remittance dependent or with lower economic performance will be most hurt. Haiti, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Honduras, are likely to be the most hit by this recession.

The first three economies are already struggling to show any signs of positive growth, and for Venezuela and Nicaragua remittances have been the only positive macroeconomic indicator. For Haiti and Honduras, the drop in remittances will largely affect a drop in economic growth. Both countries depend to a large extent on the flow of money, which represents 36 and 22% of the Gross Domestic Product respectively. In the case of Haiti, which in 2019 the country experience -0.7 GDP decline, the increase in the amount remitted, which stood at \$150 million, prevented the economy from further declining. Honduras, with only 2.9% growth saw the increase of \$650 million in remittances carry over 80% of the country's growth.

The Nicaraguan economy, which suffered -5.7% growth in 2019, with remittances being the only positive indicator with an increase of \$200 million, were already sustaining households struggling to cope with a political and economic crisis driven by current Ortega's government. Nicaragua's economy, like Venezuela's, has registered severe disruptions and its \$12.3 billion GDP last year was that of 2015, but in per capita terms had dropped to \$1800 to the year 2013 levels. In 2020, with a radical drop in remittances of \$75 million and no growth in other sectors of the economy, the country may have a minimum an additional -2% decline, bringing the country even further down.

The most dramatic impact, however, is among households in many of these countries. Remittances from the world and to all of the region, are family to family transfers originating from 28 million migrants. At least 7% or over 2 million of households receiving remittances will not have that income. To these households, this inflow represents 50% of all income among those homes. For those countries that have experienced slow economic growth, the lack of remittances will affect their day to day expenditures. With an estimated -1.6% contraction for the region, a drop in remittances will further exacerbate conditions.

Those countries also appear to be the places that have more problems facing the health crisis. As medical experts warned "once the virus starts spreading freely in poorer communities, some of which don't have proper water or sewage hook-ups, it could spark a humanitarian crisis."¹⁵

¹⁴ Orozco, Manuel, 2019. REMITTANCES TO LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN 2019, Emerging Challenges https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Remittances-to-the-LAC-2019_Emerging-Challenges-1.pdf

¹⁵ "Latin America Isn't Ready for the Virus Onslaught Headed Its Way," <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-20/latin-america-isn-t-ready-for-the-virus-onslaught-headed-its-way>.

TABLE 4: THE DROP OF REMITTANCES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Source: Author's estimates.

Indicators	Migrant remitters	Job losses among remitters (7% Unemployment)	Increase of new migrants in 2020 (1.3%)	Remittance behavior (90% of the unemployed who would stop remitting)	Net remitters in 2020	Remittances sent in 2019	Average remitted	Remittance Behavior (others, with jobs, of which 35% of people would send 5% less)	Amount among all others sending same as last year but no more	Expected volume in 2020
Nicaragua	750,000	90,000	759,750	81,000	678,750	1,700,000,000	2,267	484,627,500	1,000,025,000	1,484,652,500
El Salvador	1,040,673	62,440	1,054,201	56,196	998,005	5,650,270,000	5,429	1,706,861,813	3,522,095,805	5,228,957,617
Guatemala	1,500,000	90,000	1,519,500	81,000	1,438,500	10,508,307,400	7,006	3,174,402,041	6,550,353,418	9,724,755,459
Honduras	850,000	51,000	861,050	45,900	815,150	5,424,037,908	6,381	1,638,520,491	3,381,074,030	5,019,594,521
R. Dom.	897,793	53,868	909,464	48,481	860,983	7,103,181,292	7,912	2,145,764,521	4,427,768,058	6,573,532,579
Ecuador	681,803	54,544	690,666	49,090	641,576	3,250,250,092	4,767	963,422,881	1,988,015,469	2,951,438,350
Costa Rica	125,000	7,500	126,625	6,750	119,875	518,197,025	4,146	156,539,548	323,018,116	479,557,664
Mexico	7,399,547	443,973	7,495,742	399,576	7,096,166	36,045,524,000	4,871	10,888,812,118	22,468,977,385	33,357,789,503
Haiti	1,585,681	126,854	1,606,295	114,169	1,492,126	3,346,270,000	2,110	991,884,622	2,046,746,046	3,038,630,668
Colombia	2,869,032	229,523	2,906,329	206,570	2,699,759	6,772,510,000	2,361	2,007,473,552	4,142,405,742	6,149,879,293
Jamaica	913,896	54,834	925,777	49,350	876,426	2,376,130,000	2,600	717,793,231	1,481,160,636	2,198,953,867
Venezuela	2,835,000	255,150	2,871,855	229,635	2,642,220	3,115,900,211	1,100	915,529,230	1,889,187,300	2,804,716,530
Bolivia	570,837	45,667	578,258	41,100	537,158	1,318,220,000	2,309	390,740,181	806,289,263	1,197,029,444
Brazil	1,047,000	62,820	1,060,611	56,538	1,004,073	7,962,000,000	7,605	2,405,200,770	4,963,112,700	7,368,313,470
Paraguay	697,310	48,812	706,375	43,931	662,445	568,430,000	815	170,102,678	351,005,525	521,108,203
Peru	1,210,336	72,620	1,226,070	65,358	1,160,712	3,325,920,000	2,748	1,004,710,543	2,073,212,232	3,077,922,775
Other nationalities	3,121,576	249,726	3,162,156	224,753	2,937,403	4,406,103,819	1,500	1,387,922,703	2,863,967,483	4,251,890,186
All Latin American migrant remitters	28,095,484	1,999,331	28,460,725	1,799,398	26,661,327	103,391,251,748	3,680	31,150,308,423	64,278,414,206	95,428,722,628

^a: Assuming that the unemployment rate for all migrant host countries ranges between 6 to 9% as it did for the US and Spain.