Citizen Security in Latin America and the Caribbean

Challenges and Innovation in Management and Public Policies over the Last 10 Years

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First edition.
Printed in Washington, DC.

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Layout: Tamar Ziff / Inter-American Dialogue
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ABSTRACT

In the last decade, Latin American and Caribbean governments have advanced towards a systemic management of the citizen security and justice issues, integrating strategies of crime and violence prevention and control, the application of justice, and social rehabilitation. The region has moved from reactive and punitive approaches to the design and implementation of comprehensive models focused on human rights and multisectoral coordination. Likewise, security institutions have been decentralized to incorporate multiple institutional and social actors at the different government levels. In addition, in terms of public policies, the governments have proposed a range of tools for management by results, coordination, planning, financing, and evaluation of programs. Unfortunately, conceptual and doctrinal advances have not been incorporated with the necessary speed to address the high levels of crime and violence faced by the region. The four main institutional challenges to citizen security are: (i) comprehensiveness, (ii) multisectoriality, (iii) rigorousness, and (iv) sustainability and scalability. The document proposes 10 actions to accelerate the transformation of the security governance.

JEL Codes: H10, H11, O21, O22

Keywords: citizen security, public policies on security and justice, security governance.
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As a multilateral organization, the IDB has been accompanying countries in the region with technical and financial support on issues of citizen security and justice with a comprehensive approach, and with interventions based on evidence and knowledge generated mostly from the region. In this sense, the IDB focuses its actions on four main areas: (i) strengthen actions that work toward social prevention of violence that affects young people and women, to counteract the factors that increase the risk of being a victim or victimizer; (ii) strengthen the training and professionalization of the police to bring them closer to the citizens in order to prevent and deal with crime; (iii) reduce barriers to better criminal justice, curb the use of pretrial detention, and promote rehabilitation programs and alternative mechanisms to prison; and (iv) strengthen institutional, national, and local leadership capacities, and intersectoral coordination.

As part of these efforts, the IDB has financed 30 projects, which include interventions in the different links of the citizen security and justice chain, both nationally and locally, totaling US$1.15 billion in 23 countries in the last two decades. The IDB has also provided the countries with technical assistance through non-reimbursable financing of US$70 million, which has allowed the testing of innovative management models for citizen security and justice and a rigorous evaluation of interventions in this sector. These efforts would not have been possible without the confidence displayed by the authorities of the different countries of Latin America and the Caribbean and especially by the Ministries of Security / Interior / Government, who have promoted the prioritization of these issues in their respective national agendas.

In the last decade, the demand for IDB support from member countries has increased significantly. From 2013 to 2016, ten loan operations were approved for a total of US$322 million. This increase in the request for support from different countries reflects the growing concern of governments of the region to address this problem, taking into account the added value that the IDB can offer as a strategic ally throughout the project cycle.

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1. It should be noted that the Bank does not finance activities that due to their characteristics and contents can be interpreted as political interference or in the national affairs of the country or with other operational risks; as well as activities of national security, transnational organized crime, or arms control.
2. In the study What Works in the Criminal Justice System (And What Does not), the importance of knowing effective interventions in the area of justice is acknowledged in order to face the contexts of crime and insecurity experienced by the region. Pousadela, I., What Works in the Criminal Justice System (And What Does not), Policy Brief, No. IDB-PB-227, 2014.
Based on the experience of the implementation of citizen security and justice operations in the region in the last decade, the following key elements have been identified for the adequate governance of citizen security:

- **Citizen security is much more than the fight against crime.** It covers concepts such as compliance with rules of coexistence, conflict resolution, and the efficiency of the justice system and the penitentiary system, among others. Its ultimate goal is the protection of the rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens.

- **Strong institutional management is essential for an effective citizen security policy.** To do this, we need to (i) generate political will, (ii) generate processes with continuity, with clearly defined objectives and goals, and, (iii) build good governance, which allows the orderly and coordinated participation of relevant actors.

- **Public policies cannot be constructed blindly.** We need quality information to understand and address this problem. We must continue supporting the adoption of different tools and techniques to measure and monitor the impact of crime; evaluate the results of policies and programs, and design better targeted and more effective interventions.

- **Urban violence mainly affects young people, both as victims and as perpetrators.** There is evidence that young people between 15 and 29 years are the group most vulnerable to violence. 40% of all homicides in the region target this age bracket, of which 8% are children.

- **Violence against women is an epidemic in the region, and yet it is underrecognized.** One out of every three women in the region has experienced some type of physical or sexual violence at some point in her life. Addressing this situation is urgent and requires a comprehensive response from authorities and society, including the provision of better prevention and care services.

- **The transformation of the quality of services and the way in which the police relate to citizens begins with the investment in human capital.** Better training and specialization of the police honors the work of public servants and modernizes the profile of these institutions to ensure long-term improvements.

- **We must prioritize, when possible, the adoption of measures that allow us to evolve towards a system that ensures community rehabilitation.** The deprivation of liberty must be considered as the last resort to facilitate the rehabilitation of the population in conflict with the law.

Parallel to learning from the region, the IDB has made a tremendous effort to generate knowledge in this area over the last few years, and has created the following products together with countries in the region: (i) Citizen Security Week, which has been held annually for ten years, becoming the only platform for a permanent dialogue between authorities responsible for citizen security in the region and a space for disseminating applied knowledge; (ii) the “Leaders for knowledge management in citizen security and justice” course, created to train public officials and actors in theoretical and practical content of citizen security and justice management, based on the experiences accumulated in the region over the last decade; (iii) rigorous evaluations of programs for the social prevention of violence, police strategies and the judicial system; and (iv) regional comparative studies, such as those conducted on the quality of security spending by country, the estimation of the cost of violence for LAC, the measurements of victimization and perception of violence in the Caribbean, the levels of violence against women in the Caribbean, and studies on the profile of the penitentiary population in the region, among others.

The following document offers a comprehensive perspective on the important progress that has been made in the region and the remaining challenges. It is indisputable that there are still complex situations in our region, but there are also signs that we are on the right track. Those countries that have opted for comprehensive reforms in the security sector are seeing important results today in reducing crime, demonstrating that it is possible to build safer societies.
Introduction

Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been waging a war of low intensity but with high mortality and exorbitant economic, social and political costs. Although the region does not have active armed conflicts, it shows high levels of violence with the highest homicide rate in the world: 22.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants compared to the global average of 5.3 in 2015. Although there are differences in the dimensions of the problems between countries, the homicide rates of the different subregions have tended to align. This is explained by the decline of violence in some countries of Central America and the Caribbean, and a strong increase in Venezuela, raising the average for South America.

Violence makes young people especially vulnerable, as they are more likely to be victims of crime and are more likely to fall into criminal networks because of their high participation in violent crimes. The loss of human lives is compounded by the economic cost of crime, estimated on average as 3% of the region’s GDP, twice what is estimated for developed countries, and even doubling in Central American countries such as Honduras and El Salvador (IDB, 2017).

These conditions have created a state of social alarm to the point that it is estimated that 43% of the population is constantly afraid of being a victim of a crime, and public safety has become one of citizens’ main concerns (Latinobarómetro Corporation, 2017). All of this converges so that the issue becomes enmeshed in networks of punitive populism, generating perverse incentives in those seeking immediate credit—especially in the media and electoral sphere—to respond viscerally rather than rationally, turning citizen security into one of the greatest challenges for democratic governance in the region.

Despite lasting challenges, it is worth highlighting that, in recent years of the region’s efforts to address and prevent the phenomenon of violence, progress is being made in the field of citizen security, both at a conceptual and institutional design level as well as on the level of public policy innovation. At the conceptual level, the region has moved from the State’s denial of responsibility and its reactive and repressive nature to instituting a new paradigm that focuses on comprehensiveness, human rights, and multisectoral coordination for the prevention of crime and violence. In terms of institutional design, progress has been made from overwhelmingly centralized national defense institutions to systems and sectors composed of multiple institutional and social actors endowed with a range of management tools, coordination, planning and financing. Finally, in terms of public policies, successful interventions in the containment and reduction of crime and violence have been identified and documented, although the challenges of expanding their impact geographically without ignoring local needs and making them sustainable over time remain.

Strengthening conceptual and institutional advances and building on empirical evidence has become a priority to strengthen citizen security.

This study aims to address the challenge of how to improve institutional management and the effectiveness and sustainability of public policies within the framework of a systemic vision of the Citizen Security value chain. In other words, this study considers how to consolidate an effective governance of citizen security, based on the principles of human rights and democracy.

Governance is understood as the set of processes and mechanisms through which societies or organizations define and manage their public policies, determine leaderships, and define who participates in the process and how they will be held accountable. In terms of Citizen Security, governance refers to all the factors, norms, and actors that are coordinated to produce an institutional structure, generate a public good or implement a public policy, taking into consideration the participation of the police, the public prosecutor, regional and local governments, the private sector, and civil society.

3 Technically, the armed conflict that involves the guerrilla organization National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia persists, but since 2016, peace talks with the government have been held.
5 In the case of the subregion of Central America, the fall in homicide rates has been marked mainly by Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama since 2010, and Honduras since 2013. Although El Salvador and Costa Rica added to this downward trend between 2010-2013, new hikes began to register as of 2014.
6 The results of a survey conducted by the Andean Development Corporation (2014) of a group of victims of crime in several cities in Latin America, reveal that the majority (85%) were attacked by people under 35 years of age.
7 Basombrío and Dammert (2013) state that punitive populism is based on those who consider that the impunity of crime is encouraged by the excess of guarantees for offenders and that this deprives the victims and society as a whole. Hence, it is considered necessary or urgent to take tougher and even exceptional measures to face it (p. 1).
8 Following the conceptual framework of the United Nations Development Program (1997), it is understood that governance transcends the single-handed action of the State to integrate the participation of civil society and the private sector in policy decisions.
9 IDB, 2018, Leaders Course for the management of citizen security and Justice, Module 2.
The science of citizen security management and the prevention of crime and violence is a field of recent research (Fixsen et al., 2005), but one that is growing rapidly (Homel and Homel, 2012). According to this literature, good governance of the sector requires: (i) a strong governing body and a specialized institutional structure; (ii) basing management on quality information and timely evidence; (iii) defining, implementing and evaluating an intervention strategy (Mertz, 2014); and (iv) implementing effective mechanisms of horizontal coordination between relevant ministries and vertical coordination between levels of government.

This document is divided into four sections. The first section addresses the conceptual advances regarding citizen security, and the challenges that such advances introduce to institutional management. The second section presents the analysis of the main governance instruments that affect the organization and management of the security sector. The third section examines the public policy cycle to elucidate key factors that explain the most promising and innovative results of policy initiatives. The last section presents recommendations and possible areas of further research.

2 Conceptual advances and challenges in institutional management

For the purposes of this study, the conceptual analysis of strategies for citizen security is grouped into three paradigms differentiated over time (Table 1). Each one has left its mark and together they have developed scenarios where approaches and measures are superimposed, and occasionally oppose each other. This alerts us to the difficulties of securing the new paradigms of security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARADIGM</th>
<th>PRIMARY FOCUS</th>
<th>DEFINING ACTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Save yourself if you can</td>
<td>Violence and crime are not a priority for the State, but a matter that must be resolved by everyone.</td>
<td>Privatization of security services. Vigilantism. Segregation of urban space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron fist</td>
<td>Violence and crime are the result of transgressive behavior and are solved by neutralizing individuals with repressive measures.</td>
<td>Hardening of sentences and a reduction of the age of criminal responsibility. Growth of the incarcerated population. Extension of the powers of the Police and incorporation of the Armed Forces in the preservation of public order. Establishment of exceptionality measures - curfew, raids, roadblocks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaboration of the authors.

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10 This is exemplified by the cases of some countries in Central America and Mexico, where at the same time that security institutions are following a process of reforms inspired by principles of action consistent with the rule of law and democracy, the Armed Forces continue to be called upon to assume functions of the Police in the fight against crime (González, 2014).
The first, based on the slogan "Save yourselves if you can", is characterized by an attitude of indifference and denial on the part of public bodies in regard to the problem of violence and crime. It was the dominant paradigm about three decades ago when insecurity began to surface as a matter of citizen concern. This indifference delayed the incorporation of the topic of citizen security into the public agenda and, consequently, private and individual solutions were promoted. This paradigm caused a steep growth of private security services, civilian arms, and an accelerated change in the urban profile of many cities. The social segregation of spaces led to inequality in access to quality services - including security - according to people's purchasing power.

Given the intensifying problem of insecurity and the growing perception of social alarm, the paradigm of the "Iron fist" (Mano dura), inspired by punitive populism, began to gain ground. This approach favored the adoption of repressive measures at the legislative, administrative, judicial and community levels. At the legislative level, new criminal offenses were promoted, the application of custodial sentences was extended, and the age of criminal responsibility was reduced (see more in Basombrio and Dammert, 2013). At the administrative level, special police units with extended powers of detention and investigation were created, and the Armed Forces took over the duties of the police (see more in Arias et al., 2012; Rico and Chinchilla, 2006). In the judicial sphere, resources for preventive detention and the application of more drastic sanctions were intensified, which led to the growth of the prison population and a serious deterioration in the conditions of detention. Finally, at the community level, vigilantism spread and cases of social lynching began to be recorded.

Although 95% of the electorate supported the "Iron fist" policies, in some countries of Central America these policies did not work well (Holland, 2013). For example, in the United States the punitive crime policies of the 1970s seem to have had at best a modest impact on the reduction of crime rates, but have had a significant impact on the distortion of labor markets by reducing the welfare for children, and undermining civic and political participation (Travis, Western and Redburn, 2014). In a similar vein, the costs of policies such as the "Iron Fist" outweighed the benefits, since after their implementation homicide rates experienced temporary reductions and subsequently shot upwards. These policies undermine the will of citizens to report crime, generating impunity for criminal activity (Gingerich and Oliveros 2018).

11 As reported by the United Nations Development Program (2013), between 2012 and 2013 there were 2.6 million police officers in the region while the number of private security guards amounted to more than 3.8 million. In Guatemala, for example, the rate of private security guards reached a little over 900 per 100 thousand inhabitants, while the rate of police barely reached 150.
12 Latin America and Africa are the regions of the world with the highest number of firearms per capita. Particularly in Latin America, the negative impact is greater due to the proliferation and misuse of small and light weapons associated with common crime (Sáenz, 2007). Indeed, the percentage of homicides committed with these weapons far exceeds the world average, 78% in Central America, 53% in South America and 51% in the Caribbean, compared to 32% globally (Muggah and Aguirre, 2018).
13 These policies proliferated especially in some countries of Central America during the first decade of the 21st century. For example, in 2003 in Guatemala, the Plan Escoba was created to control of juvenile delinquency. As a result, joint forces of police and military were deployed to carry out mass arrests of young people suspected of belonging to gangs, special courts called "high-impact courts" were created, the death penalty was re-established, and declarations of states of emergency were issued in some areas. That same year, the Iron Fist Plan was launched in El Salvador and later the Super Iron Fist Plan, through which sentences were toughened, new powers were granted to the Police, and Joint Police-Army operations were deployed in marginal areas to control gangs (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2008).
14 Carranza (2012) reports that in the last two decades the rates of prison population in Latin America increased exorbitantly. In countries like Brazil and El Salvador they tripled, and in others like Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay they doubled.
15 In Honduras, for example, it is estimated that between 1998 and 2007, more than 3,600 young people were killed by social cleansing squads (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2008).
Although some elements of these failed strategies continue to guide the security sector, the lack of positive results derived from their application has led to a conceptual change in approaching the issue. This is how the new paradigm of citizen coexistence and prevention was born, characterized by a human rights approach both for victims and offenders, defending the principles of the rule of law, and recognizing the multifaceted nature of insecurity and violence. It is a paradigm that advocates for comprehensive strategies and preventive actions based on evidence, which today continues to inspire the design of policies and programs.

Hence, citizen security is defined as the capacity of the States, in partnership with the private sector, individuals, academia, community associations, neighborhoods, and citizens to render and co-produce a framework for protecting the life and cultural heritage of its citizens that allows citizens to live together peacefully, without fear, in order to achieve a better quality of life.

Unfortunately, conceptual and doctrinal advances have not been incorporated with the desired speed into the functioning of institutions and in the formulation of public policies because they pose demands of a certain complexity to the institutions and their management processes. From our findings, there are four main institutional challenges to the new paradigm of citizen security (Table 2.)

2.1 The challenge of comprehensiveness

A comprehensive or holistic approach to violence and crime is based on recognition of the multi-causal nature of the problem and promotes interventions that combine preventive and control actions, including social prevention, situational prevention, and those of the police, the justice administration and the penitentiary sector (Inter-American Development Bank, 2012; 2014b).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2. INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO CITIZEN SECURITY</th>
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<td>Source: Elaboration of the authors.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CHALLENGE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Comprehensiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multisectorality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rigor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sustainability and Scalability</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

17 It refers to the notions of citizen security developed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2009), the United Nations Development Program (2010a) and the Inter-American Development Bank (2012).
18 IDB, 2018, Leaders Course for the management of citizen security and Justice, Module 1.
Hence, the notion of comprehensiveness is central to the new paradigm of security and has been gaining ground both in public discourse and in official documents that support diagnostic and programmatic proposals. However, the effective incorporation of this notion to the institutional framework remains limited because:

1. The call to comprehensiveness invites the incorporation of various agencies and sectors to the management of security that traditionally were not seen as part of the sector—specialized agencies in education, recreation, health, urban planning, childhood and youth, gender, among others. However, the comprehensive approach to security goes beyond the simple addition of new institutions and approaches, since it proposes a shared vision of the problem and a communion around guiding principles and programmatic priorities, independent of the fact that each actor has different capabilities and ranges of intervention. This is something that is not being properly addressed.

2. Although there is agreement on the part of different organizations to work with a focus on the prevention of violence, staff does not have the knowledge, techniques nor necessary tools to impact the variables of social risk associated with crime and violence. In general, policies of a social nature in the areas of education, health, urban planning and others do not necessarily have as their main objective the reduction of crime, but the improvement of certain conditions of the population. Hence, social policies’ effect on crime rates will never be direct but rather diluted over time.19 For example, social programs of a selective nature that serve specific groups in vulnerable situations have the potential to impact risk factors associated with crime. However, it is very common for leaders of these programs to object to the association of poverty and exclusion with crime and violence - what is known as criminalizing poverty - which makes it difficult to integrate them into security management.

2.2 The challenge of multisectorality

Associated with comprehensiveness, notions such as multi-sectoral and inter-institutional management are linked, which refer to the necessary participation of various social and institutional actors at the national and subnational—sometimes even international—levels, the management of security. However, the incorporation of public entities at the national and local levels, civil society, academia and the private sector poses several challenges, such as:

1. With regard to government institutions, the call for concerted action on the basis of integral programmatic platforms is a major challenge for public administrations accustomed to working in isolation, reluctant to share information and resources, and with little inclination to coordinate (Beliz, 2012). The resistance can be greater depending on the coordination mechanisms that are used, and the level of government or the type of organization that assumes the leadership. This raises the need to design organizational structures that facilitate coordination and inter-institutional cohesion.

2. The relationship between the political-territorial administrations is one of utmost importance, yet at the same time, very complex to articulate. Approaches to situational prevention and the management of risk factors have increased the importance of regional and local governments in the management of citizen security. Indeed, aspects such as the recovery of public spaces, the urban design for social integration, the promotion of recreational activities, among others, have meant that a fundamental part of policies for the prevention and control of violence and crime is transferred to the subnational level. However, the emphasis on local issues poses important challenges in the design of complementation and coordination mechanisms between national, state and municipal authorities that must transcend changes in the government (Wilson Center, 2015).

3. Civil society has gained prominence as a relevant actor in the management of public policies. However, citizen participation poses two important challenges to the governance of security. The first is associated with the difficulty of public institutions to work with models of participatory management, given the lack of experience. The second is the difficulty of achieving an effective and lasting participation of citizens that resists the temptations of politicization, repression, and improvisation. The latter makes it necessary to consider the need to transform the bureaucratic culture and create instruments and working methods that promote the articulation of institutions with social groups, as well as address issues related to the organization and training of civil society.

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19 Chiода (2016) states that it has been widely documented how certain social policies - among them, attention to early childhood, compulsory education, poverty reduction, among others - result in benefits for the prevention of crime, despite the fact that haven’t been designed to reduce crime rates. Given this environment, the author recommends redesigning existing policies by introducing a more deliberate approach to the prevention of crime and violence, in order to improve and broaden the scope of their impact.
4. The private sector also plays an important role in the co-production of security and crime prevention, especially linked to productive activities that are directly impacted by the deterioration of security - trade, tourism and transport. This is how security has become a priority issue in the agendas of business chambers, whose representatives are part of specialized commissions convened by governments, and participate in the implementation of measures and in the complementary financing of programs. In addition, the private sector has become a direct provider of security both through companies that offer services and products for surveillance and protection, as well as participating in concession schemes for the administration of prisons. Although the private sector's integration into security management offers great potential for strengthening public policies, it also involves challenges such as controlling the increasing privatization of security services with weak regulatory frameworks, and buffering the economic disparities in access to quality security services.

5. One of the most frequent responses to the challenge of multisectorality is the creation of councils for security and crime prevention. They differ in their level of action (national, regional, local), attributions, structure, financing, and dependence. These structures have proven useful for the definition of policy guidelines, the establishment of programmatic priorities, and the allocation of resources and coordination. In spite of the advances that they propose, however, problems and limitations exist in relation to excessive bureaucratization and the absence of rigorous mechanisms for the monitoring of actions and the fulfillment of goals. In addition, the guidelines do not always permeate the operational levels of the institutions, identifying serious coupling problems.

2.3 The challenge of rigor

One of the most critical aspects of the new approaches to security is related to the need to design and promote public policies based on empirical evidence and with scientific rigor (Inter-American Development Bank, 2012). This approach requires the fulfillment of three conditions: (i) availability and management of reliable and timely information, (ii) existence of human resources with technical capacities to manage policies associated with the new paradigm of security - both in institutions and in civil society; and (iii) access to information and communication technologies (ICT) that facilitate the management of information for the design, implementation and monitoring of policies and programs. Each of these aspects faces important limitations, as discussed below.

1. Reliability and availability of information is fundamental in the decision-making process since it allows us to determine with greater rigor the magnitude of the problem and diminishes the effect of subjective criteria associated with political discretion, the perception of insecurity, public opinion, and the effect of the media. It also facilitates the construction of baselines to measure the success or failure of the actions that are implemented, and of criminal predictors to estimate trends and anticipate actions that seek neutralization and containment. Despite the progress made in this area, problems persist that affect the reliability and the timely availability of statistics associated with crime and violence. Among them are: (i) the absence of information systems that integrate statistics from different sources and that respond to uniform and comparable categories over time, (ii) the difficulty of updating information periodically especially in real time, (iii) the sporadic use of victimization surveys, (iv) the weak incorporation of georeferencing tools for incidents and other relevant variables, and (v) the difficulty of coordinating the various public agencies that must sustain the information systems.

2. The multicausal approach to security involves the consideration of a large number of variables in all phases of the decision-making process and, consequently, a staff with specific technical and professional capacities and transversal competencies like the ability to work in a team, have a proactive and decisive attitude, and demonstrate skills to communicate horizontally and vertically. The lack of these skills in public officials and representatives of civil society becomes a great limitation. However, the outlook is encouraging as we have seen how Jamaica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama have made valuable efforts in the selection, training and evaluation of professionals for the execution of violence prevention projects (Inter-American Bank of Development, 2014a).

3. Undoubtedly, ICT have become a critical element for the management of citizen security. Their incorporation into the decision-making process makes it possible to strengthen efforts at all levels, from information management, to sizing up problems and designing and
evaluating policies and programs, to the implementation of actions and their monitoring, especially those associated with programs of situational prevention. The most frequent applications of ICT have to do with systems of georeferencing, video surveillance and biometrics, which have already been incorporated into security management in various countries. However, there are two scenarios that are worrisome. On the one hand, there are countries with a weak incorporation of ICT to the tasks of citizen security, due to lack of awareness or financial resources for their acquisition. In that scenario, it is essential to educate the operators in the areas of security about the critical role of this type of technology and the cost-benefit of investing in it. On the other hand, there are countries in which the absence of rigorous technical criteria has led to failed processes of the integration of technologies that do not respond to the needs of citizens. In the latter case, it is imperative to promote technical criteria that supports the processes of ICT integration and strengthens technical units specialized in security issues -within agencies or digital government programs- that advise and guarantee quality controls.

2.4 The challenge of sustainability and scalability

The best proof of the success of a public policy is its capacity to project itself into the future (sustainability) and to expand its levels of coverage and impact without losing the essential conditions that guarantee its quality or identity (scalability). These characteristics are still far from being achieved in terms of citizen security policy in the region, mainly because:

1. Some of the projects that are being executed face the difficulty of overcoming the test of time, like surviving the appointment of a new program director or surviving the electoral cycle of local or national governments. This limits the likelihood of receiving financing by an international cooperation agency. Guaranteeing the sustainability of these programs calls for at least three key factors: (i) the professionalization of the personnel in charge of the program, to create a critical mass within the public administration capable of advocating for the continuity of the efforts and their institutionalization; (ii) the effective leadership of civil society in the decision-making processes, mainly by social groups willing to contribute constructively and autonomously so that they take ownership of the projects and become sentinels and guarantors of the continuity of the program; and (iii) a permanent financing mechanism. The last requirement can act as a counterpart to the funds of international cooperation, but the financing mechanism must be sustainable via the administrations’ own resources, duly stipulated in development plans and committed to in public budgets.

2. Scaling the experiences beyond a restricted geographical space—neighborhood or commune—or a small segment of the target population—schools, youth groups, women’s groups, among others—remains a challenge from which two scenarios emerge. The first is the “trap of pilot experiences”, which consists of pioneering initiatives—commonly financed by international cooperation—that, although they have the potential of generating a demonstrative effect, fail to be replicated and scaled up given the original limitations in the design. The second refers to the weaknesses in the design and planning processes of policies and projects that do not receive sufficient resources, conditions, or time horizons to reach larger dimensions and survive in the long term.

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22 The term comes from computer engineering. It differs from scaling, which suggests the rise but does not necessarily require the condition of quality.
23 The Brazilian Forum for Citizen Security is a good reference. It was created in 2006 with the aim of promoting dialogue between key actors in security, applied research and technical assistance (Leeds, 2013).
Before the nineties, the security sector was synonymous with national defense. Its main actor was the police, which in many cases was an appendix of the armed forces. With the introduction of the paradigm of citizen security in the context of the processes of democratization, various changes took place such as: (i) the transformation of the police to organizations of a civil nature, (ii) the incorporation of new institutional actors to the security mechanism, especially in the area of crime prevention and investment in training and specialization of human capital, and (iii) the promotion of legal, institutional and programmatic instruments more aligned with the new characteristics of the security sector (Rico, 1996). All these components—laws, institutions, professional and specialized human capital, plans and programs—have shaped the governance that today characterizes the security sector in the countries of the region.

### 3.1 The legal frameworks of the new institutionalization

One of the most significant advances that the security sector experienced in the 1990s was the enactment of numerous laws that gave legal sustenance to institutional transformations (Table 3). The reform process has been particularly intense in the last ten years, and in countries like Brazil and Mexico it continues to this day. In general terms, the legal frameworks of the new institutionalization of the security sector share the following characteristics:

- They seek the protection of the rights of the entire population, with emphasis on vulnerable population groups such as children, adolescents, women, and indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples.
- They establish a clear distinction between national defense duties and those of citizen security, and grant the leadership of the latter sector to the ministries of internal security, in some cases called government or justice ministries.  

- They prioritize the academic training and professionalization of the security forces and civilian personnel in charge of functions related to citizen security.
- They recognize the importance of democratic controls of the institutions of the sector, especially the police, which may be administrative, political, jurisdictional or social.
- They recognize the importance of subnational levels in security management and assign active roles—although in different degrees—to state and municipal governments.
- They validate the role of various institutions in the social field in the co-production of security, not just police institutions.

### Table 3. Legal frameworks that support the new institutionalization of citizen security

Source: Elaboration of the authors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>LAWS ON POLICE, PREVENTION AND SECURITY</th>
</tr>
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</table>

24 With the exception of Colombia, where the National Police is part of the so-called Public Force that includes the Armed Forces and is attached to the Ministry of Defense.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Laws</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Law by which regulations on the National Police are issued, a public establishment of social security and welfare is created for the National Police and the Superintendence of Citizen Security and Surveillance, No. 63–Arts. 14 and 15 (1993). Decree modifying the objectives, the organizational structure and functions of the Ministry of the Interior and Integrating the Administrative Sector of the Interior, No. 2893 (2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>General Police Law, No. 7410 (1994). Law that modifies the Organic Law of the Ministry of Justice so that from now on it is called the Ministry of Justice and Peace, and creates the National System for the Promotion of Peace and Citizen Coexistence, No. 8771 (2009).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Law created by the Ministry of Public Security, No. 15 (2010).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
They incorporate new instruments to strengthen security management. The most significant have been the creation of bodies of coordination and planning instruments, and the authorization of special taxes and fees for the financing of security, as well as funds for their administration.

Some countries have already begun recognizing the need to update legislation—especially that which dates back two decades or more since enactment—to adapt to the dizzying changes regarding the issue of security in the region. However, some of the reform processes that have taken place recently have caused more concern than relief. This is the case in Mexico, where the approval of the Internal Security Law in 2017 was harshly criticized by human rights organizations as it granted broad powers to the Armed Forces to intervene in public security activities and lacked a precise definition of the concept of internal security (Human Rights Watch, 2017). The Sovereign Security Law of Nicaragua in 2015 also raised alarms, which according to the Institute of Strategic Studies and Public Policies (2015) “introduces a totally new juridical-political concept—sovereign security—that merges the concepts and missions related to the internal order with the concepts and missions of national defense. This concept opens a wide and dangerous margin of discretion over its future interpretation and application by the Executive and the other institutions that would make up the National System of Sovereign Security, especially to resolve social and / or political conflicts, which would receive the same treatment as an external territorial aggression.”

These examples warn us that legislative reforms in the area of security have the potential to alter important conceptual advances, as well as previously agreed political and social agreements. Therefore, it is imperative to submit them to the consultation process. They also warn us that doctrinal advances in matters of citizen security reflect changes that do not necessarily imply progress.

### 3.2 The institutional arrangement of the sector

Regarding the way in which the security sector is organized—or the institutional arrangement—it is important to note two characteristics. First, a definition of the hierarchy of the sector, usually delegated to the ministries of internal security, or ministries of governance or justice. Second, the creation of categories like systems and of figures such as councils and commissions (See Table 4 on next page).

The notion of systems has been adopted in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico and Nicaragua. In these countries, the constitution or laws consider national security systems, although with different components. While some only integrate national entities (Guatemala and Nicaragua), others also include regional and local public bodies (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), and even representatives of population groups such as indigenous peoples (Bolivia).

Beyond the nuances of each one, the desire is to promote a systemic vision of security and incentivize more coherent organizational structures that respect the principles governing actions and activities to be carried out. An example of the above is the Brazilian Public Security System created by Law 13.675 in 2018, whose objective is to “promote a joint, coordinated, systemic and integrated action of the public security and social defense bodies of the Union, the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities, in articulation with society” (Article 1). Likewise, Law 264 in 2012 that creates the National System of Citizen Security “For a Safe Life” in Bolivia places special emphasis on the concepts of “institutional co-responsibility of citizen security” and adds the interest of “citizen participation and social control” (Article 5).

Despite the advances that come from the system concept, there is criticism of its limited impact. For the most part, criticism is aimed at recommending a greater legal development of the concept of the system, and complementing it with institutional arrangements that promote articulated and coordinated actions among all the actors that affect the security sector. This is the case of Argentina, for example, where Buenader (2016) concludes that it is necessary to promote a better articulation and functionality of the bodies, activities and rules that govern the country’s Internal Security System. He also suggests a reformulation of the structural laws of the country, so that its objectives and principles are connected to other relevant laws.

Among the main instruments that allow the systemic vision of the sector to materialize are the coordination bodies that are incorporated in the legal instruments of all the countries of the region—with the exception of Panama and Uruguay—in the form of of councils or commissions. These authorities constitute an institutional, instrumental and functional framework of a collegial nature, created to face the challenges that the public administration faces regarding security, through meetings and inter-institutional work at the highest level. Depending on the country, these authorities vary in aspects such as the powers granted to them, their integration, and the normative, institutional and financial resources that support them.

Regarding the attributions that are granted to them, these authorities all fulfill basic functions of consultation, deliberation, and coordination, even assuming broader responsibilities in some countries. In Brazil, for example, the National Public Security Council (CONASP) has the
### Table 4. Institutional Arrangement of the Security Sector

*Source: Elaboration of the authors.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Laws on Security, Police and Prevention</th>
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</thead>
</table>
Internal Security Council, composed of: Minister of the Interior, Minister of Justice, Secretary of Programming for the Prevention of Drug Addiction and the Fight against Drug Trafficking, Undersecretary of Internal Security, holders of Federal Police, Airport Security Police, Naval Prefecture, National Gendarmerie, and five police chiefs of the provinces. The participation of non-permanent members is contemplated, among them: the Minister of Defense; the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces; the provincial governors who so request, as well as the legislators who are members of the Internal Security Commissions of both Houses. |
National Council of Public Security (CONASP), composed of: entities of the federal, state and municipal governments, Police Force Directorates, and organizations of public security workers and civil society entities related to security issues and crime prevention. |
Interministerial Committee on Citizen Security, composed of: Minister of Government, Minister of Defense, Minister of Justice, Minister of Health and Sports, Minister of Education and Communication.  
Sectoral Coordination Council for Citizen Security, composed of: government minister, state attorney general, general commander of the Bolivian Police, the nine department governors, the highest authorities of the Executive Bodies and Regional Autonomous Regions, the nine mayors of the capital cities of the Department and the mayor of the city of El Alto, representatives of the Federation of Municipal Associations of the municipalities, representatives of the Indigenous Peasant Native Autonomy, duly accredited representatives at the national level of the social organizations and neighborhood councils. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Institution and Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>National Public Security Council, composed of: Minister of the Interior and Public Security, Minister of Justice, Undersecretaries of the Interior, Crime Prevention, Justice, representative of the Supreme Court, National Prosecutor of the Public Ministry, National Defender of the Ombudsman Public Criminal, general director of Carabineros de Chile, general director of the Investigative Police of Chile, national director of Gendarmerie of Chile, national director of the National Service of Minors, national director of the National Service for the Prevention and Rehabilitation of Drug Consumption and Alcohol, president of the Chilean Association of Municipalities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>National Council of Police and Citizen Security, composed of: President of the Republic, Minister of Government, Minister of Defense, Minister of Justice, Director General of the National Police, National Commissioner for the Police, a Governor and a Mayor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Council of Public Security and of the State (COSEPE), integrated by: president of the Republic, vice-president of the Republic, president of the National Assembly, president of the National Court of Justice, minister of National Defense, minister of the Interior, minister of Foreign Relations, head of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, general commander of the Police. Representatives of public entities and representatives of civil society that the President of the Republic considers necessary to convene may also participate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
National Security Council, composed of: President of the Republic, Vice President of the Republic, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Interior, Minister of National Defense, Secretary of Strategic Intelligence of the State, and Attorney General of the Nation. |
National Council of Public Security (CNSP), composed of: President of the Republic, Secretaries of the Interior, National Defense, Navy, the Attorney General of the Republic, the governors of the states, the head of the government of Mexico City, the national commissioner of Security, and the executive secretary of the SNSP. |
| Nicaragua | National Sovereign Security System, composed of: President of the Republic, Army -through the Information Directorate for the Defense of the Army of Nicaragua, which in turn has the role of Executive Secretariat of the System-, National Police, System National for the Prevention, Mitigation and Attention of Disasters, Public Ministry, Attorney General of the Republic, and Ministries of State that have competence in food and nutritional security. |
| Panama    | There is no instance of specialized coordination in matters of citizen security or crime prevention.                                               |
| Peru      | National Council for Citizen Security (CONASEC), composed of: Minister of the Interior or designate, Minister of Justice or designate, Minister of Education or designate, Minister of Health or designate, Minister of Economy and Finance or designate, a representative of the Supreme Court of Justice, the prosecutor of the Nation or designate, the ombudsman or designate, two regional presidents or their designates, the metropolitan mayor of Lima or designate, and the mayors of the two provincial capitals of departments with the greatest number of electors (or their designates). |
There is no instance of specialized coordination in matters of citizen security or crime prevention.

Both scenarios raise questions for consideration. On the one hand, the calls made by the president tend to be more effective than those of a minister, but the frequency of them and, consequently, continuity is put at risk. On the other hand, with the president, the management of the bodies can take a more political course, while with the ministers there may be more space to deploy more technical activities.

Finally, there is great variation in the normative, institutional and financial resources that support the councils and commissions. In some countries there are serious regulatory deficiencies. For example, El Salvador’s CNSCC was created by Executive Decree and, as a result, lacks legal backing because it can be easily reversed by any future government. In other cases, the laws are not clear about the scope of the functions and powers, leaving the bodies at the mercy of the discretionary criteria of the authorities in charge. A recent case that exemplifies this scenario is when the National Security Council of Guatemala, which recommended banning from the country the head of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), Iván Velásquez, "...considering him a person who infringes on public order and safety; affecting the governability, institutionality, justice and peace of the country" (Chumil, 2018).

The most frequent deficiencies suffered by these collegial bodies are those of a material and financial nature. Very few have a technical secretariat to accompany their work, and even fewer have been assigned a reasonable and permanent source of funding. As a result, their operation is commonly subject to the political will of the current authorities and any continuity that is being promoted is lost. This is the case of the Costa Rican Security Council, which was created in 1994 but convened irregularly, with the exception of one administration that convened it regularly. It is also the case of CONASP in Brazil, which was reconvened in 2017 after almost two years of inactivity in the context of an accelerated deterioration of citizen security.

Taking into account the main factors that determine the management capacity of the security systems and their coordination capabilities, one of the best designed structures is that of the National Public Security Council.

power to formulate security policies, issue guidelines for their execution, supervise the allocation and use of resources, and propose changes in the relevant legislation. It also supports the work of Public Safety Councils at the state and municipal level (Law 13.675 of 2018, Art. 19). The support to the local authorities is also addressed by the Internal Security Council of Argentina, when proposing the coordination and integration of the different jurisdictional levels of action (Law 24,059 of 1991, Art. 10). In addition to the above functions, the Council for the Sectoral Coordination of Citizen Security of Bolivia promotes mechanisms for participation and coordination with civil society (Law 264 of 2012, Art. 17); and the National Council for Citizen Security and Coexistence (CNSCC) of El Salvador is credited with research activities and documentation of good practices, organization of territorial, sectoral, and technical committees for the formulation of policies, and support for initiatives at the community level (Executive Decree 62 of 2014).

On the integration of these coordination bodies, there are three models in the region. In the first, participation is limited to the main institutions of the national level with an impact on security - this is the model that is applied in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Paraguay. In the second, the integration and articulation of bodies at the subnational level (state and municipal) is promoted, as in the case of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The third one also seeks the participation of civil society actors as in Brazil, Bolivia, Honduras, Ecuador and El Salvador. Determining the best model to follow requires considering aspects of the decision-making process such as (i) efficiency, typically associated with councils with few members and chaired by a high hierarchical authority, and (ii) legitimacy, linked to processes with broad intersectoral and inter-institutional participation.

It is also true that determining the model of integration of these collegial bodies goes hand in hand with the decision on who presides over them, which usually falls to the governing ministers of the area; although in Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua the responsibility rests with the president of the republic.

25 The sessions of the Council of Brazil have united twenty-six public entities and social organizations, as reported by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (2017).
The truth is that the institutional arrangements that are being tried in the region to improve the governance of security deserve to be considered a priority in strengthening institutional policies. They have the potential to positively impact the management of the sector, especially considering that there is space to optimize their performance.

3.3 Human capital as the key to security reforms

At the regional level, much of the debate on security reforms, specifically police, has revolved around the issue of the democratization of the police. In a context where a few years ago many countries were governed by authoritarian systems, and where the police played a fundamental role in the functioning of these systems, the discussion has focused on how to transform that authoritarian police into a democratic one [see, for example, Ungar 2011]. In the new political context the police must respond to the law and not the government, protect human rights, limit the use of force, and prioritize citizen protection. In recent years, even though this debate does not seem to have ended, Latin America and the Caribbean are now facing an additional conflict: how to reform the police in a context of high violence. Although in most countries democracy exists in electoral terms, it was never consolidated, and the fragility of institutions and the rule of law opened the space for illegal actors to take control of territorial and social spaces. These actors exercise control and power through violence, bribery, and provision of basic services. It is clear that in the context of crime and violence in the region, and given the conditions of the police, there is a strong motivation for police reform. However, the recurrent questions in some cases have been: where to start? Is it necessary to do away with existing institutions and start from scratch? Is it necessary to generate new institutions, parallel to the work of the police force on prevention and investigation?

While these questions are valid, there are no absolute answers that apply to the specific needs of all the countries of the region. What can be affirmed is that Latin America and the Caribbean need to create a force according to guidelines similar to the precepts of Peel. But at the same time this initiative has to operate in a context of high violence and weak institutions that are complementary to police work (e.g. the justice system, the prison system, etc). This makes the problem of reform more complicated, together with the problems related to access to resources, historical-cultural factors, and political economy limitations, such as the costs that represents the change and the problems of inertia (path dependency) [Mota Prado et al. 2012].

In recent decades, governments in LAC have engaged in a series of reforms to modernize the police and the criminal justice system, typically focused on reducing police abuse and corruption, increasing transparency and efficiency, and at the same time attacking crime in effective way. These have come from global reforms of the system to small reforms to deal with context-specific problems. The literature shows that it is a great challenge to achieve lasting reforms of the police and the criminal justice system, while at the same time ensuring and integrating democratic and rule of law principles [Uildriks, 2009: 2].

Many reforms seem to have been motivated by specific events and have generated an increase in public demand for immediate, short-term solutions, which tend to be visible. Meanwhile, the important reforms are long-term and invisible. Many reforms also face considerable resistance from groups that perceive change as threatening, or difficult to maintain over time because they require a considerable flow of resources. To make lasting reform, it is particularly important to find mechanisms that generate virtuous cycles that involve changes in central elements (institutional framework, resources and social legitimacy). One of

(1) The main mission of the police is to prevent crime and disorder as an alternative to the repression of crime and disorder by the armed forces and the severity of legal punishment. (2) The ability of the police to perform their duties depends on the public approval of their actions. (3) The police must ensure the voluntary cooperation of the public in the observance of the law to be able to maintain respect. (4) The degree of collaboration of the public decreases proportionally with the need for use of force. (5) The police maintain a favorable public opinion not by satisfying different desires but by the constant demonstration of absolute impartial service to the law. (6) The police should only use force to maintain law and order when absolutely necessary and only when the use of persuasion, council and warning has been insufficient. (7) The police, at all times, must maintain a relationship with the public that makes true the tradition that the police is the citizenry and the citizen is the policeman. The police are simply members of the public who are paid to give full dedication to the duties incumbent on each and every citizen for the sake of the welfare and coexistence of the community. (8) The police must strictly restrict their actions to their specific functions never usurping the powers of the judiciary. (9) The proof of the effectiveness of the police is the absence of crime and disorder, not in the apparent action of the police dealing with crime.
these virtuous cycles is undoubtedly the normative reform that alters the institutional framework. Another, of great potential, is one that changes the police profile, that dignifies and increases the prestige of the police work, making it more attractive through greater income and that facilitates and encourages the accumulation of human capital, and generates more solid social capital. A change in income and in the process of police training in itself encourages an increase in legitimacy and generates confidence, confidence that increases prestige, and thus makes police work more attractive. In other words, these changes will transform police work into a real profession. Another crucial point is the strengthening of the system of police integrity in strict adherence to the rule of law to help build trust.

Reforms can arise in different contexts, even in the midst of a security crisis. This was the case in Honduras, when in 2011, the country faced one of the worst crises in its history, and one of its weakest institutions was the National Police. The Government faced the dilemma of strengthening the existing institution or starting from scratch to create a new institution. Honduras opted to strengthen the existing institution of the National Police and recover the moral stature of this institution, with strong support from civil society. In Honduras, the Police Reform process began in 2012, driven by the political will of the Government of the Republic. The main components of this reform are: academic training and professionalization of the police at a basic level, promotion of gender equality, the removal of police officers compromised by crime and corruption, improvement of academic infrastructure, professionalization of criminal investigation, information, technology and communication systems, and improvement in coordination with other entities. (For more details see https://vimeo.com/133496789)

3.4 The tools for planning and financing

Another instrument that helps to improve the governance of the security sector are plans and programs that allow us to define a strategic route, establish programmatic priorities, unite actions and assign resources and responsibilities for the execution of the plans. Most of the countries in the region seem to have a national plan or program in place regarding security; although Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay have not developed plans of this nature (Table 5).

These types of instruments tend to be designed on two levels. First, as part of a national development plan or government plan, within which a space is designated to create the strategic lines and actions in the area of security—as in the case of Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala and El Salvador. Second, as an exclusive instrument for the security sector, in the form of specific policies, plans and programs.

As for national development plans, those from Colombia and Costa Rica stand out. They have been institutionalized as planning tools for each government, with a four-year duration They list the programs of each of the action areas with their respective objectives, goals, compliance indicators, and baselines. In the case of Costa Rica, the plan indicates the institution responsible for each action and the estimated resource allocation of the national budget.

In Argentina, the current national plan of 2015-2019 is less detailed and only includes a set of objectives associated with combating drug trafficking and improving security. Some of the objectives have been developed more broadly in specific action plans, as in the case of drug trafficking (Argentina Without Drug Trafficking) and violence against women (National Plan of Action for the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of Violence Against Women 2017-2019); or in programs such as the recent Federal Citizen Security Program that aims to reduce robberies and malicious homicides in the regions with the highest incidence (Inter-American Development Bank, 2017).

The main limitation of the national plans associated with the constitutional period of a government is the discontinuity of the efforts once the administration completes its term. Therefore, it is important to develop planning instruments that contemplate broader time horizons. The National Public Security Policy (PNaSP) recently approved in Brazil is a good example, since it establishes a set of principles, guidelines, objectives and institutional arrangements to be complied with by all levels of government during the next four years, despite the fact that the government that promulgated it will complete its term in 2019. Likewise, Paraguay’s National Citizen Security Strategy (ENSC) covers a period of more than ten years.

The current Integral Policy of Coexistence and Citizen Security of Honduras is another interesting example of a planning instrument with a long-term vision and a good level of disaggregation. Designed for a period of ten years (2011-2022), it not only covers the strategic aspects of the principles and the main components of the country’s institutional security system, but also maps the joint and coordinated programs and projects through which policy is created (more details in Secretary of State in the Security Office, 2011).

A distinctive element among the different plans and programs is how the planning process is carried out. In most cases, the traditional method of leaving planning in the hands of experts in the respective planning units of the security sector is followed. However, in recent years there
### TABLE 5. PROGRAMMATIC INSTRUMENTS OF THE SECURITY SECTOR

Source: Elaboration of the authors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>PROGRAMMATIC INSTRUMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Federal Citizen Security Program (since 2017). |
| Brazil      | National Public Security Policy (since 2018).  
| Bolivia     | No instruments of this nature were identified. |
| Chile       | Government Program 2018-2022, chapter III: “A safe and peaceful Chile to progress and live in peace”.  
National Policy for Security and Social Peace (since 2011).  
| Ecuador     | National Citizen Security Plan (in the process of consultation and formulation, with a seven-year horizon). |
| Nicaragua   | National Security Plan. |
have been increasing examples of policies and plans that have been developed through participatory processes and citizen consultation mechanisms. This is exemplified by the Integral and Sustainable Policy on Citizen Security and Promotion of Social Peace (POLSEPAZ) of Costa Rica, the National Strategy for Citizen Security (ENSC) of Paraguay, and the National Agreement for Public Security of Chile.

Special funds for financing security is another distinct instrument that has gained ground in the region. Without denying its existence in other countries, the review carried out in the framework of this study showed that these instruments are or have been employed in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Mexico (Table 6).

Some of these funds were created through laws that have imposed new fiscal obligations with the specific goal of financing programs on citizen security. Such is the case of Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica and El Salvador. Particularly in Costa Rica, the collection of taxes established for the financing of the police and the penitentiary system has ended up being part of the State’s general fund.

In other cases, funds were created from existing resources in national budgets to guarantee financial sustainability. For example, the Public Security Contributions Fund (FASP) of Mexico operates as a budget fund through which resources are transferred to states to finance initiatives regarding citizen security (Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System, 2018).

The most interesting example in this matter is the case of Colombia, where through the same Decree 2170 of 2004 two types of mechanisms were created: (i) the special contribution equivalent to 5% of public works contracts that are channeled and administered through the National Fund for Citizen Security and Coexistence (Fonsecon), and (ii) the Security Funds of the Territorial Entities that receive the resources from the former and are administered by the Governor or the Mayor.

In general terms, special financing funds are an important resource to guarantee the sustainability and scalability of security programs and to free them from the restrictions and budgetary swings so frequent in the countries of the region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>INSTRUMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Contributions from departmental autonomous territorial entities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>National Public Security Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>National Fund for Citizen Safety and Coexistence (Fonsecon).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Territorial Security and Citizen Coexistence Funds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Taxation of Casinos and Companies Act of Electronic Betting Call, No. 9050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Special Contribution Law for Citizen Security and Coexistence, Legislative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decree No. 162 (2015).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Contributions Fund for Public Security (FASP).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 As stipulated in Law 264 of 2012, the departmental autonomous territorial entities of Bolivia must allocate at least 10% of the resources stemming from the coparticipation and leveling of the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (Article 38, numeral 2).
4 Innovations and good practices in public policies

The process of developing public policy involves a sequence of dynamic, changing and interdependent stages. It is precisely this cyclical pattern that is used in this section to enrich the analysis of public policies on security in the region and to elucidate key factors that explain the most promising and innovative results of some initiatives. For our purposes, there are four stages of the cycle of public policies to consider: (i) definition and recognition of the problem, (ii) design of the public policy, (iii) implementation, and (iv) evaluation.

4.1 Definition and recognition of the problem

This first stage refers to the process of defining a problem and recognizing it as one of a public nature. According to Theodoulou and Kofinis (2004), a problem receives attention from the public when it has generated a significant cost on a percentage of society. Faced with this problem of a public nature, Parsons (1995) warns that in the middle of the process various factors intervene such as pressure groups, the media, and the perceptions and values of the people involved, among others.

In terms of citizen security, there is a risk that due to the dramatic consequences associated with the problem—among them, loss of human lives, serious injuries, great material losses—its definition will be strongly conditioned by emotional elements such as the feeling of alarm in the population and the “red news” of the media. Although these factors are difficult to neutralize, with more rigorous analysis of official criminal statistics, victimization surveys, citizen consultations, and diagnostics endorsed by specialized sources, baselines can be constructed.

The urgent need for timely and reliable information to properly define public problems has led to the creation of statistical information systems that regularly collect and publish data on crime incidence and victimization. The National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) of Peru and the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) of Mexico are some examples. Additionally, computer platforms contain administrative records as primary sources of information. Recently, a platform of violence against women was created in Mexico with the purpose of grouping the information coming from administrative records, surveys and social networks and developing VCM indicators that are useful for generating public policies and research with a gender perspective.

Victimization surveys are one of the most used inputs to complement statistics, although they have the disadvantage of lacking recurrence in their implementation (Wilson Center, 2015). This is not the case in Chile, where since 2003 the National Statistics Institute (INE) has been carrying out the National Urban Citizen Security Survey (ENUSC) -on an annual basis since 2005-; nor in Mexico, where INEGI has conducted the National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Safety (ENVIPE) every year since 2011. In particular, the IDB has financed the application of surveys to study the problem of violence against women in several countries of the Caribbean.

At the local level, significant advances can be observed in the systematic and reliable collection of information, relying on zoning and stratification techniques for the construction of georeferenced maps (Wilson Center, 2015). This is exemplified by the National Plan for Community Vigilance by Quadrants (PNVCC) of Colombia, in which the georeferenced system of criminal data provides access to real-time information on social, political, and economic dynamics of each quadrant. The plan also has a local reporting system (Muggah et al., 2016).

Progress has also been made in the creation of information systems designed to optimize the administration tasks of the penitentiary centers and, in particular, to improve the development of social reintegration programs. In 2010, El Salvador designed and implemented the SIPE Penitentiary Information System at the national level. Currently SIPE is being used in 26 prisons and 10 administrative facilities, simultaneously. It should be noted that this system functions on the internet and with high IT security policies. Some countries have also begun collecting penitentiary information through censuses and self-report surveys. As for the surveys, they were applied in 2013 at the local level to subsequently replicate and scale up in Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and nationally in Peru and El Salvador. More recently and with the support of the IDB, surveys have been conducted in Costa Rica, Honduras, the Bahamas, Guyana, and will soon be conducted in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.

In addition to government entities, representatives of civil society, the private sector and academia are becoming increasingly involved in defining and elucidating public problems. This is demonstrated by the progressive trend of creating citizen observatories of crime and violence in the region, which reached the figure of 198 as reported by
These observatories mainly perform the task of collecting and analyzing information on insecurity at the national and local levels. For example, Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) of Brazil has collected and published data quarterly since 2009 to measure institutional effectiveness, citizen confidence and participation in the justice system. Another example is the Confidence Index of the Brazilian Justice System (IJC Brazil). Likewise, the Institute for Research and Development for the Prevention of Violence and the Promotion of Social Coexistence (CISALVA) of the Universidad del Valle in Colombia has designed a comprehensive system to monitor homicides and other standard indicators of citizen security that was adopted by the public administration of the cities of Bogotá and Cali (Avelar, 2015). In Honduras, 30 Observatories of Coexistence and Citizen Security were installed and are operating in the municipalities that present the highest rates of crime, including the Central District and San Pedro Sula. The observatories’ information is concentrated on a server in the security ministry, and is validated three or four times a week by a committee composed of representatives of the primary data sources, such as the prosecutor’s office, the department of investigation of the police, the Institute of Forensic Medicine, etc.  

Given this panorama, the elaboration of diagnoses has been consolidated as an important tool to identify and measure the problems of insecurity (Hernández, 2015, Loría, 2014, Muggah et al., 2016, Tapia and Mohor, 2014). The diagnosis is valued as a baseline of reliable information that accounts for the specific situation of the problem that requires a solution (Wilson Center, 2015). With the help of technical, theoretical and statistical analysis tools, the diagnosis is complemented with increasingly sophisticated data, such as data related to the direct costs of violence (Jaitman, 2017).

The truth is that the construction of public policies is becoming a more participatory and inclusive process, where the opinions, expectations and proposals of citizens, the academic community, the private sector and even international organizations are valued as inputs for design and as tools to build consensus. This concept is exemplified by the construction of the Integral and Sustainable Policy of Citizen Security and Promotion of Social Peace (Polsepaz) of Costa Rica because it had the support of international agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). It not only took into consideration the analysis of the main indicators of insecurity in the country but also the results of a broad consultation process carried out at a national level that integrated institutions, social and business organizations, communities and citizens in general (Frühling, 2012). Another example is the program Todos Somos Juárez in Ciudad Juarez (Mexico) where communities, civil society organizations and the private sector were incorporated early on into the construction of the program (Hernández, 2015) and were therefore able to inform its content.

When participatory methods are integrated from the beginning of the public policy cycle, the community becomes not only a valuable source of information, but also a validator of the findings and a key partner for future implementation (Muggah et al., 2016). This improves public management, strengthens democratic governance, and promotes social empowerment.

### 4.2 Design of public policies

Once the problem is identified, the design or formulation phase of the public policy begins, with a focus on the search for viable solutions. This is where the objectives are determined, feasibility analyses are incorporated, possible intervention recommendations are discussed, and the action plan for the implementation of the policy is determined. Not much systematized information on this stage in the area of citizen security exists. However, the review of evidence of specific interventions and practices in the field allows us to identify some positive trends.

The first thing to note is that the process of designing public policy depends on the institutional context of each country. The dynamics tend to vary between a federal political system—as in the case of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina—and a centralized one–like in most other countries in the region. Both systems have advantages and disadvantages.

In the federal system, prioritizing the incorporation of subnational entities into the design and formulation of policies becomes advantageous, since a large part of the factors associated with problems of insecurity - and their respective responses - are local in nature. This is exemplified by the programs of situational crime prevention, prevention based on risk factors, and community prevention programs. However, under this system there is a common problem of limited access to resources, which restricts the scope of policies and programs.

On the other hand, the centralized system guarantees the design of policies more consistent with certain strategic principles of the national order, as well as the incorporation of considerations for equality of opportunities for access to security services. However, this system suffers from lack of an appropriate understanding of the risk factors from which...
action must be taken at the local level to mobilize resources. This results in responses that can be very general, limited and insufficient.

The alternative to the design of public policies on security seems to be a combination of both systems through a two-tier process. The first takes place at the central or national level to formulate the principles and values that will guide the policies, establish the legal and constitutional framework in which they will be framed, and identify the financial and institutional resources that will be provided at the national level for implementation. The second corresponds to the subnational level–regions, states, municipalities, among others–to address the design of concrete actions to be executed, and identify the financial, institutional and human resources that will be mobilized at the local level. At the subnational level, efforts should focus on the design of interventions aimed at impacting risk behaviors and the groups most vulnerable to violence and crime (Wilson Center, 2015) without neglecting the participation of the various sectors in the process.

To date, there have been advancements in security policies at one level or another but there has been little success in making them compatible. Public policies and good practices in Chile are part of the philosophy of national plans and are developed at the local level by different actors. Particularly, within the framework of the Integral Plan for Barrios Seguros of the municipality of Peñalolén, a crime prevention strategy was designed focusing on five neighborhoods, the implementation of which was articulated through different national security plans (Hernández, 2015). Similarly, the creation of a national security policy framework, along with the development of municipal strategies and the design of inter-institutional coordination mechanisms, have supported the establishment of programmatic priorities and the allocation of resources in Brazil (Muggah et al. al., 2016).

4.3 Implementation

This stage refers to the succession of actions aimed at achieving expected results. For this reason, they are mainly interested in (i) the aspects related to the way in which the designed policy is put into practice and (ii) the instruments and institutions that would be involved (Pützl and Treib, 2006). Regarding the former, different perspectives have been conceptualized, but for the purposes of our analysis we will consider descending and ascending hierarchical models–commonly known as “top-down” and “bottom-up”.30 Secondly, we will focus on the coordination mechanisms by the different agents involved in the implementation of the policy.

As in the design stage, the model of implementation of public policies on citizen security varies according to the political system.31 Since most of the countries in the region have a centralized system of government, there is a predominance of the “top-down” model. In this, local governments have limited opportunity to take initiative, since their powers and capacities in terms of police and social service provision, which are key for the prevention of violence and crime, are limited. In countries with a federal system, implementation schemes tend to be implemented from the local level–more of the “bottom-up” approach–which combines coordination mechanisms with state and federal level institutions. Under this system, the high degree of autonomy of the subnational governments in terms of security and police generates complex challenges for the compatibility of efforts in the different levels of management and, consequently, affects the successful implementation of the programs and interventions (Hernández, 2014). That being said, some experiences have demonstrated success.

One of the most documented examples is that of Brazil, where the state and municipal governments of Belo Horizonte and Rio de Janeiro combined innovative police intervention strategies –to promote greater effectiveness in law enforcement–with social assistance programs–to transform the relationship between the affected communities and the government. In other words, an integral policy was implemented combining control and prevention measures with the participation of the different territorial levels, which in turn promoted the creation of new institutions / units with specific mandates. Among them is the Integration of Management in Public Safety, the Specialized Police Group for High Risk Areas and the Pacifying Police Units and the implementation of recognized programs such as Fica Vivo (Muggah et al., 2016). Another successful case is the aforementioned Mexican strategy Todos Somos Juárez, which, under a multisectorial approach and with a strong component of citizen participation, achieved coordination between the three levels of government–federal, state and municipal. The three levels worked jointly to implement interventions in education for the prevention of violence, the recovery of public spaces, the fight against poverty in areas of social risk, capacity-building for work, granting credits for micro and small businesses, and many others (Hernández, 2014; Muggah et al., 2016).

30 Delgado (2009) explains that the “top-down” model conceives the development of a policy as a process that flows from the apex of public organizations to lower hierarchical positions, and in which the role belongs to public decision-makers. On the contrary, in the “bottom-up” model, the flow that allows adapting the initial situation to the multitude of implementation contexts is valued more, and the implanters are given more control of the process (p.8-9).
31 The current literature suffers from a deeper analysis in this particular topic, which opens spaces for research.
Beyond the implementation of the model, it is clear that the quality of coordination mechanisms between the national and subnational levels play a decisive role in ensuring fluidity in issues such as the transfer of budgetary resources, police deployment, the presence of key social services, among others. However, promoting and guaranteeing the participation of the multiplicity of sectors and institutions poses a challenge of great proportions. Nonetheless, this does not mean it is impossible to achieve coordination effectiveness, as demonstrated by the aforementioned programs in Brazil and Mexico.

4.4 Monitoring and Evaluation

The last stage of the public policy cycle is monitoring and evaluation, which has to do with obtaining information to assess the results of public policy and using the feedback to guide adjustment and reformulation processes (Wollmann, 2006). The evaluation methods are diverse—evaluation of processes, of results, of impact, and of cost-benefit are some examples—as well as the stages to carry them out—previously, during and / or after the implementation (Parsons, 1995).

In practice, this stage is one of the weakest and least widespread in the region. The few evaluations carried out have been done by projects financed with international cooperation funds, which require it as a condition, or have been the result of initiatives from academia and civil society in their effort to document good practices and extract lessons.32

Meanwhile, evaluations carried out by public institutions tend to be isolated cases with little systematization and transcendence.33 To increase the effectiveness of interventions, it is necessary to create an empirical knowledge base for project management using well-defined and rigorous analysis methodologies.

For example, documentation of field work and monitoring of the implementation processes generates useful information for decision-making during the development of the project, since it allows researchers to determine to what extent the operational plans are being followed. It also clearly establishes the functions and the role of the different actors involved in the project, and recognizes the details of the arrangements and mechanisms that are being implemented. The systematization of the models generates valuable lessons to adjust the design of the intervention either for the subsequent stages of the project or to improve future interventions since its purpose is to identify the achievements and challenges of the project as well as to reflect on the lessons learned and good practices. Finally, the results and impact evaluations provide information regarding the results, effectiveness, efficiency and benefits of an intervention. The objective of outcome evaluations is to uncover if a program has achieved the planned objective, as well as to examine the relationship between costs and benefits. An impact evaluation aims to highlight the desired and undesired effects of a project or program and, especially, to figure out if the observed effects can be attributable to the intervention. Our research demonstrates that the monitoring and evaluation of public policies is a pending task and of special urgency in the region, one that must be undertaken to be able to move towards the production of knowledge and decision-making based on scientific evidence. It would provide the tools to analyze the cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness of policies and program in order to maximize the impact of ever limited public budgets. In this regard, Beliz (2012) proposes that it is also necessary to strengthen the social coproduction of monitoring and evaluation through mechanisms such as community impact evaluation.

32 Among those of the first type, the work of the Program for Citizen Coexistence (PCC) of the United States Agency for International Development (US-AID) in Mexico, which has been documenting and systematizing interventions from civil society organizations to (i) identify good practices and promising practices for the prevention of violence and crime through pre-established criteria; and (ii) generate and disseminate knowledge that can be incorporated or adapted to other contexts (United States for International Development, 2015). Among the evaluation initiatives conducted by academic and research centers, those developed by the Center for Studies in Public Safety (CESC) of the Institute of Public Affairs of the University of Chile (INAP) stand out, on various projects executed in that country (Frühling, 2012), and the efforts made by the Igarapé Institute to maintain a mapping of innovative practices in the area of citizen security in Latin America and the Caribbean (Muggah et al., 2016).

33 The Quadrant Plan of Colombia is one of the few projects that has been subjected to a rigorous impact evaluation, whose results showed that it reduced the homicide rate by 22% (Muggah et al., 2016).
Recommendations

The progress made in the management of citizen security in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the evolution in the field of public policies, is undeniable. This allows us to affirm that, despite the dimensions of the problem and its complexity, the governance of security today is closer to the new paradigms that opt for a comprehensive, multisectoral approach and that respect the principles of the rule of law. The integration of knowledge and actions is becoming more widespread, although still insufficient, and efforts are increasing to document experiences and perform comparative analyses to extract lessons and improve the decision-making process. Even so, some of these changes remain latent, and citizen security policies still echo those doctrines that in the past inspired flawed and counterproductive policies for the consolidation of safe and democratic societies. In the face of fear, public impatience, and populist temptations, these doctrines threaten to resurface.

Against this background, efforts to address the challenge of insecurity in the region should aim to develop actions that exponentially accelerate the transformation of security governance. The main recommendations that, in our opinion, favor progress in this direction are:

1. **The evidence indicates that citizen security and justice require a specialized management system with strategic vision and leadership.** These systems must be comprehensive (Homel and Homel 2012) and include a set of established processes that link public and private actors, both vertically and horizontally, and social and community organizations, both national and local, for decision-making. (Revesz, 2006; Velásquez, 2006). On this "strategic level", several countries in the region have organized their own National Systems of Public Safety, in which they have articulated several institutions and actors, defined a structure, a methodology and a flow of decision making within a normative framework. Countries such as Chile, Colombia, Panama, Peru, El Salvador, among others, have formed national "cabinets" or "councils" of citizen security, including not only the participation of traditional security and justice entities, but also incorporating key sectors linked to the prevention of violence, such as health institutions, education, social development. This multisectoral approach allows for a comprehensive response to a challenge with multi-causal characteristics. Promoting the adoption of the system concept in national and subnational legislations is critical and can be improved by effective coordination and consultation mechanisms aimed at improving the articulation and functionality of all its components. In this sense, a comparative analysis is recommended to evaluate the effectiveness of the most developed systems that exist in the region, and to derive lessons to enrich future support and cooperation programs.

2. **Public security and justice policies with a balance between preventive and control actions have a greater effect in reducing crime.** The crime prevention approach has emerged as an essential component within comprehensive strategies to reduce crime (Waller 2006). Several recent studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of different types of prevention programs, (Sherman et al., 1997, 2006; Welsh and Farrington 2006) which are also more cost-effective (Drake, Aos, and Miller 2009).

3. **Accountability mechanisms are key elements in generating legitimacy.** The literature highlights the need for personnel to have accountability mechanisms as a critical element to generate legitimacy (Homel and Homel 2012; Fixsen 2005). This requires a new vision for evaluating performance, for which it is important to establish goals, clear tasks, and define indicators and results to evaluate the performance and generated impact of programs (Mertz 2013). The fidelity, and therefore the quality, in the implementation of the policies is achieved with efficient mechanisms to monitor their execution (Fagan and Eisenberg 2012). This highlights the need for national strategies for citizen security, which define goals and mechanisms for monitoring results. Some examples of this are the "security contracts" promoted under the leadership of local authorities in several European countries such as France, Holland, Belgium, United Kingdom, and replicated in Colombia and Chile, in order to define specific security objectives, under the premise of a public and systematic accountability. An important characteristic of these experiences is the emphasis on continuity, the permanent updating of the evaluation systems and the periodic updating of the programmatic contents, based on the results of evaluations. (Castro Vargas 2011; CEACSC 2013).

4. **The quality of public policies on citizen security and justice depends on the effective allocation of human and financial resources.** The experience in LAC has shown that the lack of sustained investment has prevented attracting qualified human resources...
in this area. Empirical evidence points to the positive correlation between the level of economic incentives (salaries) and the capacity of the selected personnel (Dal Bo, Finan, Rossi 2011). In the absence of international standards to compare the allocation of public spending in this area, it is not yet possible to determine whether a country is spending too much or too little, relatively (Coelho 2012). In some cases the existing level of public expenditure may be sufficient but not effectively used or efficiently allocated. This lack of resources, which in some cases results in a lack of State presence, more intensely affects the population of vulnerable areas and increases the risk of victimization. Finally, lack of funds also prevents high operational effectiveness in this sector, good management at the local level and productive dissemination of knowledge. For example, there is a consensus that in the US the evidence on effective preventive interventions has improved significantly in recent years thanks to the investment in scientific research aimed at evaluation (Fagan and Eisenberg 2012; National Institute of Health). Recently, financing mechanisms at the local level such as conditional transfers to local communities to implement programs with evidence-backed results and support from federal agencies (endorsement) to banks for evidence-based projects have emerged (Blueprints for Violence Prevention Project, Center for Disease Control’s Community Guide, the Child Trend LINKS database, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration’s The Communities That Care Prevention Strategies Guide, the National Registry of Evidence Based Programs and Practices, and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Model Program Guide). We recommend the development of mechanisms that guarantee the financial sustainability of citizen security policies beyond the funds that come from national or local budgets or from international cooperation. Alternatives include taxes with specific destination and special funds or trusts. The adaptation of social investment models such as the Social Impact Bonds (BIS) that offer alternative schemes and incentivize evidence-based interventions (Alberro, 2017) should also be evaluated.

5. The efficient management of public policies in the sector depends on the quality of the information and access to applied knowledge. The international literature identifies a lack of high quality, available and timely information and empirical knowledge as the biggest obstacle to developing SCJ policies in LAC. (Mertz 2014). Likewise, the main agencies responsible for the management of crime and crime statistics (police, public ministries, forensic medicine institutes, etc.) collect separate statistics using different methodologies, generating unreliable data. In several countries these statistics are not even available to the public, lacking periodicity and detail (Di Tella, Edwards and Schargosdisky, 2010). It is critical to promote the creation—where it does not yet exist—and strengthen unified systems of criminal statistics that provide data in real time. In systems that already allow it, we must move towards the integration of Big Data into information systems and decision making. It is necessary to define technical criteria that guide the integration of information and communication technologies (ICT) and their incorporation into the management of decision-making processes regarding citizen security. In countries where there is a dependency or a specialized unit in digital government, the incorporation and quality control of ICT to the security sector must have priority. Technical-operational barriers also exist, related to the lack of technical capacity (Homel and Homel 2012). In other words, financing "what works" does not only mean basing public sector policies on examples or types of programs that have proven successful elsewhere in supporting the prevention of violence and crime, but it also implies making use of rigorous methodologies to design and implement new approaches and projects. With special attention to evaluation, this leads, consequently, to a generation of regional evidence (Abad and Gómez, 2008; Frühling, 2012). This task also involves efforts to coordinate and ensure the technical capacities of the institutions responsible for the collection and / or disposition of information, so that it is standardized and comparable. It is also important to ensure that this data is freely accessible.

6. Promote the use of the cycle policy approach for the analysis of citizen security decisions and plan their sustainability and scalability. This permits the systematization of analysis according to the stages of the process—definition of the problem, design of public policy, implementation, evaluation—and, consequently, extracting more precise information—about what works, why it works and how it works. This cycle nurtures the learning, feedback and production of knowledge. So far, analytical efforts have predominated in terms of good practices. Although they have been useful in suggesting what kind of programs succeed or fail, they do not have enough detail and contextualization to determine why and how these results were achieved. It is important to plan projects with guarantees of sustainability and scalability from the beginning, and avoid getting caught up in the experimental logic of the pilot projects. The...
7. Promote the training of specialized managers in citizen security and justice, who are empowered to integrate a comprehensive, multisectoral, and sustainable approach to interventions. It is important to intensify the execution of programs aimed at providing specific technical and professional skills, and transversal competences to those involved in public decision-making. In this regard, initiatives such as the Operational Guidelines, the Citizen Safety Clinics and the Good Practices Contest, promoted by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) within the framework of the Citizen Security Week, and online books sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), hold content on good practices in the design, implementation and evaluation of initiatives for officials of the three levels of government and civil society organizations.

8. Strengthen the learning and exchange of experiences among peers, especially between representatives of subnational governments and civil society organizations working at the local level. Use systematized methodologies that effectively guide the comparative analysis of good practices and the extraction of recommendations. The science of the implementation of social services, and for the prevention of violence and crime in particular, is a field of recent research (Fixsen et al, 2005), but one that is growing rapidly (Homel and Homel, 2012). In this sense it is necessary to review and identify with caution some points of convergence between the academic community and “practitioners” about the definition and adoption of precise central concepts, approaches or models of analysis, that have been more effective. The above identification of the processes involved in the management and delivery of services must take into account that its effectiveness is conditioned to the particular reality of the regions. For example, Chile’s Prevention Policy is Chile specific (Tudela 2013). At the same time, we must encourage the design of mechanisms to stimulate, articulate and adequately manage the participation of social and business sectors in decision-making processes, and train them in the tasks associated with security management to enhance their impact and leadership. This not only improves public management, but also strengthens democratic governance and promotes social empowerment.

9. Promote and facilitate the exchange of successful experiences that have proven to be efficient in overcoming disconnects and promoting inter-institutional and intersectoral coordination at all levels. Knowledge of some of the models that operate in different countries under the notion of councils or committees is insufficient to determine the keys to success considering the different contexts in which they must operate, for example, the system of government. In this sense, it is important to highlight the converging elements in the good practices of SCJ programs, such as having: (i) Targeted interventions. Various investigations have shown that SCJ policies are most effective when they address specific problems, with specific populations and spaces (Bauman, 2003). In this sense, citizens expect that policies of coexistence and citizen security are developed and implemented specifically where they live, and contribute to solutions to specific problems, in public spaces of social and territorial interest (Beck, 1999; Borja and Castells, 1999); (ii) Citizen participation. Specialized literature has found that the participation of citizens in the processes of diagnosing insecurity, and the identification of prevention and control actions, significantly improves the effectiveness of the programs and contributes to generating conditions for their sustainability. The role that “social control” plays in the intervened areas, depending on the different levels of community organization (or partnerships) that have been reached, could be an inhibiting factor of crime in the community (“collective efficacy”) (Sampson 2004). It is essential to map the functions and interrelationships of different actors involved with the prevention of violence at the neighborhood level, and strengthen and consolidate these alliances and contribute to improving their level of effectiveness and (iii) Public and private sector cooperation and partnerships. The private sector plays a preponderant role in the governance of the SCJ and in the identification of programs and resources for the prevention and control of violence and crime. Among the promising programs in the region are strategic public-private partnerships with chambers of commerce and organized guilds.

10. Promote participatory governance that encourages the incorporation of civil society in all stages of the public policy cycle, through institutional arrangements duly designed for that purpose. The concern about citizen

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35 Citizen Security Week is an annual event organized by the IDB, which brings together public security policy makers from the region, academic researchers, and civil society activists to exchange ideas, experiences, and best practices.
security generates sufficient incentives to promote citizen engagement in the search for solutions. This also becomes an opportunity to strengthen social capital, educate civically and counterbalance negative trends in the security sector such as abuse, opacity and authoritarianism. In the end, citizen participation brings legitimacy to the construction of public policies, something that the region urgently demands.

Conclusions

The shortage of successful outcomes to resolve the problem of crime and violence in the region has led to a conceptual change in the treatment of the issue. This is how the new paradigm of citizen coexistence and prevention was born, characterized by a human rights approach, both for victims and offenders, respect for the principles of the rule of law, and recognition of the multifactorial nature of insecurity and violence.

Hence, in the last decade the region has advanced the conceptual definition of citizen security and justice to provide for the attention and prevention of the phenomenon and create new institutional organization. Unfortunately, conceptual and doctrinal advances have not been incorporated with the desired speed in the functioning of the institutions, their management processes, and in the formulation of public policies. The four main institutional challenges brought about by the new paradigm of citizen security are a) the comprehensiveness that recognizes the multi-causal nature of the problem of violence and crime and promotes interventions that combine crime prevention and control actions, b) the multisectorality that makes reference to the multisectoral and inter-institutional management of security management at both the national and subnational levels; c) the rigor that highlights the need to design and promote public policies based on empirical evidence and scientific rigor; and d) sustainability and scalability.

Before the 1990s, the police were the dominant actor in the security sector. With the development of processes of democratization, several changes in the governance of security occurred. The first modernization efforts were aimed at the revision of legal, institutional and programmatic instruments, the transformation of the police into civil organizations and the professionalization and specialization of the human capital involved in the tasks of crime control. The governance that characterizes the security sector today in the countries of the region begins to recognize the need to update regulations—especially the ones that date back two decades or more—to adapt them to the dramatic changes that the region has experienced in the security area. This governance highlights the desire to promote a systematic view of security, although most of the recommendations are oriented towards recommending a greater legal development of the system concept, without taking into account aspects associated with implementation.

Efforts to address the challenge of insecurity in the region should aim to develop actions that exponentially accelerate the transformation of security governance. We outline ten recommendations to move in that direction:

1. The evidence indicates that citizen security and justice requires a specialized management system with strategic vision and leadership.
2. Public security and justice policies with a balance between crime prevention and control have a greater effect in reducing crime.
3. Accountability mechanisms are key elements in generating legitimacy.
4. The efficient quality of public policies on citizen security and justice depends on the effective allocation of human and financial resources.
5. The efficient management of public policies in the sector depends on the quality of the information and access to applied knowledge.
6. Promote the use of the cycle policy approach for the analysis of citizen security decisions in order to plan their sustainability and scalability.
7. Promote the training of specialized managers in citizen security and justice, who are empowered to integrate a comprehensive, multisectoral, and sustainable approach to interventions.
8. Strengthen the learning and exchange of experiences among peers, especially between representatives of subnational governments and civil society organizations working at the local level. This analysis should be based on systematized methodologies that effectively guide the comparative analysis of good practices and the extraction of recommendations.
9. Promote and facilitate the exchange of successful experiences that have proven to be efficient in overcoming disconnects and promoting inter-institutional and intersectoral coordination at all levels.

10. Promote participatory governance that encourages the incorporation of civil society in all stages of the public policy cycle, through institutional arrangements duly designed for that purpose.
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Established in 2015 with support from the Ford Foundation and named in honor of a founding Dialogue co-chair, the Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program aims to elevate policy discussions around corruption and transparency, democracy and human rights, and citizen security in Latin America.