

Migration and Development in Central America: Perceptions, Policies, and Further Opportunities

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Introduction¹

Although migration has been a powerful factor in Central America's economic growth for some time, government responses—particularly to trends resulting from the migratory cycle—are relatively recent, limited, and diffuse. There is little proportionality, in scope and depth, when it comes to the magnitude of the migration links, the investment allocated to the issue, and the implementation of government policies.

This report offers an analysis of migration and development in Central America. Migration's impact on development, and vice-versa, is significant. Over 60,000 people emigrate from Central America each year, facing difficulties in the process. Once they settle in the host country, they establish links back home of different kinds. Family remittances—personal investments and private donations—are among the main transnational economic activities in which migrants and their families engage. These remittances amount to nearly 15 percent of many countries' gross domestic product.

Migration's economic influence goes far beyond money transfers, however. A wide range of economic² activities, including trade, transportation and telecommunications unfold at the intersection of migration and development.³

¹ Research for this project included work by Beatriz Slooten.

² It is important to note that economic activities account for a portion of a wide spectrum of transnational activities through which migrants and their families shape development and social change.

³ For a more in-depth discussion of these activities, see Orozco et al, "Transnational Engagement, Remittances, and their Relationship to Development in Latin America and the Caribbean."

The challenge now is to spur greater economic advantage from migration by increasing financial access, promoting small business ventures, providing social services that meet a wider range of demands, and offering incentives to integrate into the formal labor force. Unfortunately, public officials' response to migration and development is not always adequate. In most cases, responses are reactive and focus on only the most visible marks of migration: money transfers and undocumented mobility.

This report offers recommendations for a preliminary agenda for governments seeking to leverage the economic activities of migrants in a more integral manner. By prioritizing, considering overall impact, and examining whether initiatives can be replicated and grown to scale, governments can design and implement effective policies. These policies can forward goals that are proportional to the magnitude of the migration-development nexus.

I. Understanding the Links Between Migration and Development

The intersection between migration and development consists of interactions linked to economic development during the three stages of migration: prior to migration, during migration, and after migration. Foreign labor mobility is tied to political, economic, social, and security processes, all of which are associated with development. Moreover, labor mobility may be connected to government policy in multiple and complex ways at each stage of the migration process. Migration management, development, and diplomacy are pathways that link

FOREWORD

The Inter-American Dialogue is pleased to publish this working paper by Manuel Orozco, director of our program on Migration, Remittances, and Development, and Julia Yansura, program associate at the Dialogue. Our aim is to stimulate a broad and well-informed public debate on complex issues facing analysts, decision makers, and citizens concerned about Latin America's policy agenda.

Orozco and Yansura examine the interplay between migration and development in Central America. Migrants abroad have been a strong source of economic growth for nearly every country in the region, generating significant volumes of remittances and transforming international trade through telecommunications, transportation, and the purchase of nostalgic goods. Public officials, however, have been largely unable to develop policies that effectively leverage the economic activities of migrants and harness their full economic potential. By analyzing the multifaceted and complex relationship between migration and development, Orozco and Yansura develop a framework by which governments can better evaluate the migration-development nexus and integrate the migrant economy with development policy.

This paper is part of a series of studies carried out through the Dialogue's initiative on security and migration in Central America and Mexico. The project works with leading think tanks, research centers, and independent journalists in Mexico and Central America on these two pressing policy challenges. Our work seeks to influence the policy and media communities in the United States, Mexico, and the nations of Central America; introduce Mexican and Central American viewpoints into policy debates and discussions in Washington; and promote fresh, practical ideas for greater cooperation to address security and migration challenges.

This major Dialogue initiative has featured three important meetings. The first, in Washington, focused on the challenges posed by current migration and security crises in the region and examined the prospects for shaping US policy on these issues. The second meeting in Guatemala—featuring special guests, President Otto Pérez Molina and Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz—addressed increasing criminal violence in the northern triangle countries and cooperative strategies for future action. In October 2012 in Managua, the Dialogue held the third meeting in Nicaragua to compare that country's security situation to the rest of the region and to examine its unique police model. This paper provides background for the fourth meeting of the initiative in Tegucigalpa, Honduras in November 2013.

We are pleased to recognize the generous assistance provided by the Tinker Foundation for the production of this paper.

Michael Shifter

President

mobility and policy. Their impact varies depending on the scope and depth of government engagement. The migration-development nexus is also affected by workers' legal and social status, workforce skills, levels of remittances, access to financial institutions, asset-building opportunities, human capital position, circumstances for return to the home country, and means of reintegration.

Lessons from countries around the world show that migration has the greatest development potential when it is *normalized, protected through diplomatic cooperation, integrated with development strategies, and accompanied by return and reintegration policies or incentives*. The table below offers a preliminary (and incomplete) depiction of these dynamics and policy issues.

Table 1: Dynamics and Policy Issues on Migration and Development

Dynamics	Policy Issue	Management	Development	Diplomacy
Prior to Migration or Departure				
Extent of regulated labor migration	Bilateral government policies	Visa processing and issuance, migrant protection	Workforce training and awareness	Bilateral cooperation on labor migration and immigrant protection
Skilled and unskilled migration	Presence of skills capacity and labor rights			
Migrants' social condition	Risk mitigation against threats to human rights			
During Migration (stay in host country)				
Nature or quality of immigrant insertion into host country	Social and economic vulnerability	Regularization of status	Social and economic inclusion	Bilateral cooperation on labor migration and immigrant protection
Remittance and other payment costs	Money transfer marketplace	Institutional links with formal labor migration efforts	Leveraging of development tools by government	Joint development partnerships with governments, diaspora communities, and private sector
Access to financial institutions and asset building, both at home and abroad	Financial access and education; Immigrant host country integration			
Health and education	Social protection			
Investment and philanthropic activities back home	Diaspora outreach and transnational engagement			
After Migration				
Voluntary and involuntary return; retirement return for older migrants	Legal reintegration	Return laws and institutional support	Reintegration tools and incentives	Bilateral development cooperation programs for returning migrants
	Social reintegration			
	Economic and Labor Reintegration			

Source: Manuel Orozco.

II. Regional Policies and Perceptions on Migration and Development

How do the region’s institutions embrace development policy while addressing the realities of outward migration, such as the economic interplay that comes from migrant interaction with the homeland? How do policymakers perceive, interpret, and respond to this interaction?

Central American governments have designed policies related to migration and development, but in many cases they are limited in scope and depth. Most deal with the process prior to migration or with reinsertion after migration but not with transnational engagements while living abroad. This section comprehensively reviews the extent to which the region addresses migration and development in the policy sphere and identifies how government officials see the link between the two.

Policies on Migration and Development in Central America

Central American governments, particularly in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, have invested important resources in implementing policies that address factors at the intersection of migration and development. We find that governments where emigration occurs have adopted policies on:

1. **Prevention:** addressing prospective migrants and discouraging emigration
2. **Communication:** providing outreach to migrant and diaspora communities
3. **Operational engagement:** promoting migrant development partnerships
4. **Insertion:** facilitating migrant reintegration or return

Table 2 illustrates the range of government policy initiatives in the aforementioned countries. In migrant host countries like Costa Rica and Panama, the approach is focused on migrant legal status and protection. While the

Table 2: Main Policy Areas Addressed by Central American Governments, 2013

Policy Area	El Salvador	Honduras	Guatemala
Prevention through economic opportunity	X	X	X
Prevention through education	X	X	X
Youth-targeted prevention	X	X	X
Diaspora outreach councils	X		X
Cultural outreach programs	X		
Political outreach	X		
Health outreach		X	
Educational outreach	X		X
Remittance matching		X	
Remittance cost initiatives			
Diaspora aid projects	X	X	X
Diaspora investment promotion		X	X
Diaspora knowledge transfer	X	X	
Diaspora nostalgia trade			
Diaspora telecommunications			
Diaspora tourism promotion			
Basic services upon return	X	X	X
Legal reintegration	X	X	X
Educational reintegration	X		
Labor force reintegration	X	X	X
Youth-targeted reintegration	X		X

Source: Manuel Orozco.

list in the table seems extensive, the initiatives are limited to relatively few projects, small in scope and impact. Table 3 summarizes these initiatives.⁴

Most of these initiatives focus on prevention and reinsertion; relatively few address migrant economic engagement.

When it comes to prevention, Central American governments have grown worried about emigration and its associated risks. Each year an estimated 60,000 Central Americans (see Table 4) leave their countries. Many head to the United States without documentation. These migrants—especially those who are unskilled and without the means to legally migrate—face great risks and challenges. Migrant women are particularly vulnerable to a range of abuses.

Some governments have implemented policies to prevent mass emigration or to inform their citizens about the dangers they face, including at border crossings and as victims of crime. El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala support educational programs that provide prospective migrants with rudimentary knowledge of the issues they should consider when deciding to cross a border without documentation.

Most governments also believe that diaspora outreach is essential and, as a result, they seek to integrate policies that validate the reality of a Central American Diaspora. Some governments have also consciously sought partnerships with diaspora organizations as a means to promote development. The Salvadoran government pioneered these efforts by promoting diaspora partnerships on small agricultural projects. More recently, the government of Honduras established a diaspora partnership program for local development projects. For the most part, however, these efforts are limited in scope.

Some policies in Central America have also responded to the challenges of migrant reintegration, particularly with regard to deportations. While some migrants come home by choice, the majority returning from the United States in the last decade were deported to their home countries due to lack of proper documentation. This is significant in Central America, which represented 15 percent of deportations in 2011; more than 40 percent of Central American deportees had some criminal background. The policy approach by most governments has focused on how to reinsert these individuals into society.

⁴ See the appendix for a more detailed description of specific policies.

Table 3: Main Policy Efforts in Remittances and Development, 2013

Country	Areas of Action	Main Policy Initiatives
El Salvador	Prevention	“Concientización sobre los Riesgos de Migrar de Manera Indocumentada;” “Desarrollo Humano y Migraciones;” Programa Apoyo Temporal Al Ingreso (PATI); Migrant Rights’ Trainings for Consulates
	Communication	CONMIGRANTES; Casa El Salvador; Right to Vote Abroad
	Operational Engagement	Salvador Global
	Reinsertion	“Bienvenido a Casa;” Centros de Atención
Honduras	Prevention	“Desarrollo humano juvenil via empleo, para superar los retos de la migración”
	Communication	Catracho Seguro; La Semana Binacional de Salud
	Operational Engagement	Honduras Global; Remesas Solidarias y Productivas
	Reinsertion	Centros de Atención; Fondo de Solidaridad
Guatemala	Prevention	“Política Nacional de Generación de Empleo Seguro, Decente, y de Calidad;” “Programa de Generación de Empleo y Educación Vocacional para Jóvenes de Guatemala”
	Communication	CONAMIGUA; Literacy Programs
	Operational Engagement	Remesas Productivas; Encuentro al Migrante (Investment)
	Reinsertion	Guatemala Repatriates; Job Matching; Nuestras Raíces (youth reintegration)

Source: Manuel Orozco.

Particularly since 2009, when deportations increased substantially, the region’s governments have felt pressured to deal with these massive return flows of migrants. These returns surpass the annual migration outflow and cause the labor force to grow.

The Case of Migrant Host Countries: Costa Rica and Panama

Costa Rican officials consider migration important to their country and they aspire to integrate new residents into the community, the education system, the public health service,

the security arena, and the justice system. The Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería (DGME) is a strong institution, attached to the Interior Ministry. However, Costa Rica’s official policy of migrant integration is not well received across all institutions and all sectors of society. Migrants may face xenophobic attitudes or ignorance.


The singularity of the Costa Rican case evolves from years of experience dealing with incoming migrants. In the 1980s, the region’s large-scale political turmoil pushed migrants into Costa Rica from neighboring countries. New migrants continue to arrive today, while those who have already lived

Table 4: Estimated Migration to the United States, 2010

	Flow of migrants in 2010 ^a	Immigrant visa approved at post ^b	Undocumented ^d [C+D]	US-Mexico cross border individuals w/o papers	Visa overstay ^e	Non-immigrant visas issued ^b	Deportations at border ^c
	A+B	A	B	C	D	E	F
Costa Rica	2,226	949	1,277	217	1,060	45,323	133
El Salvador	18,615	7,640	10,975	1,623	9,351	30,455	995
Guatemala	15,550	4,860	10,690	4,896	6,830	59,368	3,001
Honduras	11,965	3,236	8,730	2,532	6,197	38,057	1,552
Nicaragua	6,380	1,432	4,948	354	4,594	16,518	217
Panama	2,984	602	2,382	162	2,220	31,502	99
Region	60,268	18,719	41,549	9,785	31,764	221,223	5,997

Sources: ^a Author’s estimates (see methodology); ^b U.S. Department of State, Report of the Visa Office 2012; ^c 2012 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics; ^d migrants who are not immigrant visa holders.

Graph 1. Deportations from the United States by Country of Origin, 2002–2011



Source: 2012 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

in the country for an extended period have found ways to manage their irregular status. Nicaraguans currently make up an estimated 20 percent of the labor force.

In Panama, policies affecting labor migration are set within a framework designed to protect migrant rights and to strengthen security by controlling who enters the country. One of its most important components is a guarantee that migrants have access to the judicial system; this helps prevent crimes against migrants, according to officials.

Perceptions of the Intersection of Migration and Development

Public officials in Central America generally perceive that there is a link between migration and development, and that remittances are one of the clearest manifestations of this link.⁵ Moreover, there is general consensus that the conditions under which migration occurs affect development.

Officials in El Salvador expressed concern with how insecurity affects the migration process and how migration depopulates communities. They also feel that “migration has a very high human cost... There are no policies in place that enable regulated, safe migration.” They agree that migration plays a role in development strategy but deny that it constitutes development in and of itself. “Development is not equal to migration,” one government official noted. In El Salvador, this perception has led to the promotion of “belonging” or “rootedness” programs to prevent further migration, particularly among youth.

In Honduras, public officials believe the intersection between migration and development is defined by factors that are interwoven with migration: lack of opportunities in the homeland and economic resources that migrants send back to the country, particularly remittances. Some public officials think that while remittances are connected to development insofar as they increase disposable income, their impact can be enhanced through good policies. However, there is also concern that, within this migratory process, there are emerging development issues such as human rights violations and family disintegration.

⁵ Honduran, Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Costa Rican government officials were asked what informed their thinking about migration and development. This project made several attempts to contact and interview public officials working in Nicaragua. However, the Nicaraguan Foreign Relations Ministry, Ministry of Labor, and the Office of Immigration did not respond.

Guatemalan officials see migration as connected to economics. To them, the link is evident, and remittances are the clearest bridge between these two dynamics. They see their government’s role as facilitating and strengthening the existing linkages between migration and development. However, they expressed concern over the impact of migration on families and women. For example, one official stressed that, “migration offers an opportunity for many Guatemalans who do not have opportunities at home, where remittances bring in much-needed income for food, education, or housing. However, migration is extremely hard on families that are separated.” One official explained, “women [sometimes] don’t receive remittances directly, so they feel financially controlled by men in their community.”

Costa Rican officials tend to have a one-way view of migration that excludes the emigration of Costa Ricans abroad. In general, public officials value immigrants’ contributions to cultural diversity and the labor force. One official said that immigrants “allow Costa Ricans to work in other jobs. The ones who best know this are the employers.”

Public officials’ views of migration and development are as mixed as the perceptions within research circles. Both cases are shaped by an immediate reaction to the visible marks of migration: money and undocumented mobility.

A Lack of Proportionality

There is no proportionality when it comes to the magnitude of migration-related economic activities, policy implementation, or ideas surrounding migration and development. For example, although international migration from Central America is not new, few government institutions in the last 15 years have created mechanisms to address economic or development issues linked to migration.

Moreover, these initiatives are not fully commensurable to the economic magnitude of the migration-development nexus. By way of comparison, Guatemala’s coffee-production subsidies in 2008 accounted for nearly 10 percent of all government subsidies within an agricultural budget of US\$100 million. The government makes little to no investment in remittance transfers.

Clearly, there is a disconnect among policies, perceptions, and what occurs on the ground. This disconnect may be informed by what officials see as the most visible aspects of migration: remittances and unsafe undocumented migration. For the most part, policies connecting migration

and development are limited in both scope and depth in host countries. They do not cover all levels of engagement with the communities living abroad, and the level of effort (financial and human) is also restricted.

Seeking to fill this gap, there are more than 50 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in the region on migration-related issues. In many cases, their activities are more comprehensive and financially substantive than those of the governments. A review of the work performed by Central American NGOs shows that they are more engaged in advocacy, research, and support services for both prospective and returned migrants. Interestingly, these organizations generally eschew development projects.

Though some programs and initiatives are promising, the overall impact has not been adequate, owing to limited resources and insufficiently ambitious goals.

Governments are not necessarily neglecting to act on the migration-development nexus, but there is a problem of proportionality when it comes to the realities, the perceptions, and the initiatives. The realities include substantial unregulated and unmanaged international labor mobility that generates significant economic exchanges. There is a mixed perception of the importance of these exchanges, as well as a mixed view of the implications of systematic migration, given difficult circumstances and mass deportations. There is a gap in understanding the link between migration and development and a constraint when it comes to mobilizing resources.

The magnitude of the economic dynamics alone calls for greater attention from policymakers.

Table 5: Issues of Proportionality, 2010

	Guatemala	El Salvador	Honduras	Nicaragua
Value of Coffee Exports	\$770,000,000	\$240,000,000	\$760,000,000	\$370,000,000
Value of Remittances	\$4,127,000,000	\$3,539,500,000	\$2,527,000,000	\$966,000,000
Value of Nostalgia Trade Exports	\$992,800,000	\$667,250,000	\$382,500,000	Unknown

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity (<http://atlas.media.mit.edu/>) and central banks of each country

Table 6: Central American NGOs and Their Approach to Migration Issues

Focus	Costa Rica	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Nicaragua	Total
Communication and advocacy	6%	19%	20%	12%	21%	16%
Human rights	18%	5%	8%	16%	11%	12%
Research	12%	10%	11%	8%	14%	11%
Legal support	9%	5%	11%	8%	4%	8%
General education	6%	10%	4%	8%	7%	7%
Training and research	3%	14%	22%	8%	7%	10%
Emergency assistance (shelter, etc.)	0%	5%	7%	8%	0%	4%
Health and psychological counseling	6%	5%	0%	8%	0%	3%
Reintegration and return	0%	10%	2%	4%	4%	3%
Other	39%	19%	13%	20%	32%	24%
Average year founded	1988	1981	1990	1991	1994	1988
Number of NGOs	9	6	14	5	6	40

Percentages refer to the percent of NGOs focused on a given issue in each country.

Source: Conferencia Regional sobre Migraciones.

III. An Issue That Matters: Migration and Central American Economies

In Central America, the relationship between migration and economic growth has systematically deepened. The more than 4 million Central American migrants working abroad have forged a network of economic relationships that directly influences growth and policy in their home countries. This reality is not going away. Rather, it is likely to grow.

It is important to note that among Central American migrants, 10 percent have moved within the region, mainly to Costa Rica, Panama, and El Salvador. Of particular importance are Nicaraguan migrants in Costa Rica, nearly 20 percent of whom are female domestic workers.⁶

⁶ See Slooten, 2012.

The significance of migrants' economic engagements is illustrated in Table 8.

Remittances reflect ongoing developments in migration and economic growth in Central America. As such, they advance the shift away from agro-exporting economies. The volume of remittances to this region is a byproduct of the transnational ties formed between Central American diaspora communities and family members in their countries of origin. Remittances, most of which come from the United States, have grown significantly from US\$100 million in 1980. In 2012, remittances to Central America surpassed US\$13 billion.

However, it is important to note that the magnitude and effects of remittances vary among countries. For example, recent remittances to El Salvador and Guatemala surpassed

Table 7: Geographic Distribution of Migrants from Six Central American Countries, 2010

Countries of Origin	Countries and Regions of Destination						
	United States		Costa Rica		Rest of Central America		World
	(#)	(%)	(#)	(%)	(#)	(%)	(#)
Costa Rica	127,035	70			55,689	30	182,588
El Salvador	1,168,000	85	9,926	1	195,990	14	1,373,916
Guatemala	781,000	75	4,196		257,666	25	1,042,862
Honduras	447,000	72	7,179	1	168,616	27	622,795
Nicaragua	236,000	36	316,658	48	103,685	16	656,343
Panama	146,371	84	1,027	1	27,735	16	175,133

Source: United Nations, obtained from the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (Migration DRC).

Table 8: Key Indicators in Central American Economies

	Leading Indicators as Percent of Gross Domestic Product						
	Merchandise Exports (%)	Total Exports (%)	Foreign Direct Investment (%)	Tourism (%)	Foreign Aid (%)	Five Previous Indicators (%)	Remittances (%)
Costa Rica	25	37	5	6	0.1	50	2
El Salvador	23	28	1	3	1.3	49	16
Guatemala	22	27	2	3	0.9	43	10
Honduras	41	48	6	4	3.8	78	16
Nicaragua	54	41	8	4	7.4	72	12
Panama	24	81	9	11	0.3	103*	2

Note: Official data from Panama have total exports exceeding the reported GDP.

Source: World Bank Data, 2011.

Table 9: Remittances to Central America (US\$)

	1980	1990	2000	2010	2012
Costa Rica	\$4,000,000	\$47,703,000	\$120,383,770	\$509,000,000	\$530,000,000
El Salvador	\$10,880,000	\$322,105,088	\$1,750,700,000	\$3,539,500,000	\$3,650,000,000
Guatemala	\$26,000,000	\$106,600,000	\$563,438,700	\$4,127,000,000	\$4,377,000,000
Honduras	\$2,000,000	\$50,000,000	\$409,600,000	\$2,527,000,000	\$2,862,000,000
Nicaragua	\$11,000,000	\$73,554,000	\$320,000,000	\$966,000,000	\$1,053,000,000
Panama	\$65,000,000	\$110,000,000	\$160,000,000	\$297,000,000	\$592,000,000
Central America	\$118,880,000	\$709,962,088	\$3,351,911,619	\$12,065,500,000	\$13,064,000,000

Source: Central Banks of each country.

Table 10: Key Impact Indicators in the US–Central American Corridor, 2012

Current trend	Central America	Guatemala	El Salvador	Honduras
Central American migrants abroad	4,054,000	1,043,000	1,374,000	623,000
Number of immigrants in the US	2,912,000	785,000	1,168,000	450,000
MIGRANT ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES				
Remittances sent from US	\$8,254,551,000	\$3,237,696,000	\$2,373,840,000	\$1,209,600,000
Value of nostalgic trade exports	\$2,475,545,000	\$992,800,000	\$667,250,000	\$382,500,000
Telecommunications—minutes and texts	\$1,495,155,600	\$448,512,000	\$471,000,000	\$270,000,000
Value of international telecommunications	\$163,744,734	\$53,821,440	\$42,390,000	\$32,400,000
Share of calls outbound to the US from Central America	54%	94%	29%	72%
Tourism: visits by migrants to home country	\$1,164,962,400	\$467,200,000	\$314,000,000	\$180,000,000
Value of transfer of capital (personal investments)	\$658,851,500	\$222,750,000	\$127,000,000	\$43,250,000
Value of philanthropic donations	\$58,248,120	\$23,360,000	\$15,700,000	\$9,000,000
RECIPIENT ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES				
Savings accumulation among recipient households	\$2,096,932,000	\$840,960,000	\$565,200,000	\$324,000,000
Investments in real estate and businesses	658,851,500	127,000,000	222,750,000	43,250,000
Income dependence on remittances	0.55			

Source: Manuel Orozco.

Table 11: Receiving Remittances and Savings

	Guatemala		Nicaragua		Honduras	
	Does not save	Saves	Does not save	Saves	Does not save	Saves
Savings Behavior	27.5%	72.5%	55.2%	44.8%	57%	43%
Annual average amount received	Q28,332	Q39,964	C\$49,125	C\$69,594	US\$2208	US\$2928

Source: Manuel Orozco. Financial literacy projects in Guatemala and Nicaragua, 2011.

US\$3 billion annually in each country while in Panama and Costa Rica they averaged US\$500 million each.

These remittances help alleviate poverty and address other socioeconomic issues. However, money transfers are not the only manner in which migrants engage with their home countries. Previous research has shown that immigrant phone calls and text messages, visits to the homeland, and consumption of imported foods, for example, translate into additional income for the home country.⁷ To this, add migrants and families building assets through savings or investments, as well as migrant philanthropic activities.

Households that receive remittances are able to build significant savings over time. *Remittances have a direct effect*


in terms of increasing disposable income, which typically turns into savings accumulation. This does not mean that, as a matter of planning, people set aside their remittances to save. Rather, it means that out of all income earned, including remittances, savings are set aside and accumulated. Savings increase as disposable income increases.

Of remittances to Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, more than 40 percent go into savings.⁸ A substantial number of recipients save, regardless of gender, rural location, age, or income. The percent of remittance recipients saving is higher in Guatemala than in Nicaragua, even though Guatemalans are more remittance dependent. The remittance recipient population in Nicaragua has lower income overall and, therefore, a higher need for remittances to cover basic consumption, particularly among those receiving transfers from migrants living in Costa Rica. (These transfers are smaller in value than those from migrants who are living in the United States.) In all cases, those who save are among those receiving more remittances.

Not only do those who receive more remittances tend to save more, but the amount saved increases with an increase in remittances. In other words, as people receive more remittances, their savings increase. Graph 2 shows that savings vary in the case of Nicaragua. The increase is in part relative to where the remittance is coming from.

These numbers suggest that increases in remittances—in amount or in frequency—lead to increases in savings. This

⁷ See Orozco, 2013.



⁸ The data for this information comes from two sources. First, from financial education to remittance recipients in Guatemala and Nicaragua, and second, from a household survey in 2009 to Hondurans.

Table 12: Remittances Received and Amounts Saved

Annual Amount Received (\$)	Stock of savings (US\$)			
	Guatemalans	Nicaraguans from US	Nicaraguans from Costa Rica	Hondurans
Under 1,500	268	510	311	386
1,500 to 2,500	336	730	420	1014
2,501 to 3,500	414	570	366	846
Over 3,500	788	1099	504	855

Source: Manuel Orozco. Financial literacy projects in Guatemala and Nicaragua. Stock of savings is the amount of money saved as reserve to meet a financial goal.

is an important consideration for policymakers seeking to increase financial access through savings mobilization.

The trends identified here have a significant impact on development and economic growth. They translate into a force that both influences development policy and is influenced by development policy. For example, asset accumulation has an effect of reducing poverty among remittance recipients. Similarly, the presence or absence of policies that leverage these asset-building strategies can further impact economic growth in a country.

When comparing the existing policies to these dynamics, the lack of proportionality is clear.

IV. Options and a Policy Agenda: Prioritize, Replicate, Escalate, Impact

Countries in the region should consider adopting a multi-layered approach that incorporates a more informed understanding of how migration and development interact, seeks to replicate existing good practices, leverages scalable strategies to bring about a concrete development impact, and prioritizes needs and policies.

1. Informed and Realistic Understanding

Whether because of urgency, perception, or assumptions, there is a disconnect between the opportunities emerging from migration and the policy choices made in response to migration. One mechanism to bridge the gap is to better inform policymakers and the private sector about the broader dimensions of the intersection between migration and development, particularly as they apply to each country. This exercise can unfold in various ways: through in-depth research commissioned by governments, through workshops with experts in the field, and through partnership with international institutions engaged in the topic. Since development is affected by and affects migration, governments need to consider intervening in all stages of migration and investing the political capital and resources needed to integrate this into national policy.

2. Replication of Good and Scalable Practices with an Eye for Impact

When considering development projects, it is first important to align a project's expected results with its goals and identify a measureable set of indicators to determine if desired outcomes are achieved. Results can be measured in two ways. The first way looks at the correspondence between expected

Table 13: Framework for Measuring the Development Impact of Diaspora Projects

Ownership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community members participate in decision making • Community members participate in implementation • Community members control project after completion
Correspondence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project meets basic needs • Needs met are a development priority • Implementation occurs in association or coordination with other institutions
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project enables development goals • Does not constitute a burden or entail added costs to beneficiaries • Has a long life cycle
Replicability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resources for the project are easily available in other communities • Institutional environment facilitating implementation is available in other communities
Accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diaspora leaders respond to their membership base • Organizational structure includes checks and balances of its operations and decisions
Partnerships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk sharing • Resource Commitment • Trust
Risks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investment not assessed against the reality • Partners do not fully participate in the implementation • Host government is not committed to support the initiative

deliverables and the actual product delivered. The second examines the impact on local development. This latter point is crucial: Delivering a product is not a *sine qua non* ensuring a positive impact on local development. A road can be paved or a school can be equipped, but the impact of such a project depends on whether it changes the quality of life and improves the material circumstances of people in the community.⁹

With this in mind, we present an analytical framework for assessing the extent to which remittance or diaspora¹⁰ development projects enhance lives. Research has found that, for a development project to be successful, it must meet five criteria:¹¹ local ownership, correspondence to community needs, sustainability over time, replicability in other contexts, and accountability to stakeholders.

When partnerships are involved, there is another set of indicators to consider. These refer to the quality of the partnership and serve as a means to control for the partnership's value-added. Partnership quality can be measured in several ways, but three critical approaches include risk sharing, resource commitment, and trust.¹²

Ownership

When considering remittances or a diaspora's contribution to development, local ownership of projects is key and providing tools for that ownership is essential. Projects led by migrant associations, NGOs, or microfinance institutions (MFIs), for example, must encompass not only a collective good, but also a means to transmit ownership or control of the projects to the members. Ownership of a project can occur through participation in the project's inception,

decision-making and implementation process, or through direct transfers to the community.

One central consideration includes an approach that integrates gender. A farmworker remitting to his mother in Zacatecas or a young Tajik construction worker in Moscow remitting to his mother in Dushanbe significantly influences the expenditure his mother can afford. In Latin America, most remittance recipients are women and half are homemakers. Policy initiatives that include them—such as savings programs—enhance the impact on this population.

Community involvement varies based on the type of project. Projects that require outside technical assistance but little input from community members often lack a strong sense of ownership. Projects bearing the greatest sense of ownership are often income or employment generating. Small enterprises that provide jobs for local community members are one example. Some projects require ongoing participation in meetings, which leads to a greater sense of ownership. Creating space for community members to voice their priorities, or even vote, can advance this goal. Appointment of a community liaison to communicate with diaspora association members abroad is another mechanism that facilitates project ownership.

Correspondence

The more a project addresses basic community needs, the greater its contribution to development. To assess correspondence in diaspora projects, we considered three indicators. A project must: (1) respond to the broad social, economic, and cultural needs of a community; (2) be based on a clear understanding or diagnosis of the need (for example, the status of health-care delivery, education, public and financial infrastructure) and the economic base of the community; and (3) allocate its resources to those areas defined as being of highest priority for the community.

Government agencies can often assist in identifying development needs. Here, diaspora awareness of the home country's national and local development agendas is an important step in matching a project to development needs.

⁹ The concept of development used here is taken from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which characterizes development as “creating an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their needs and interests” (UNDP 2006). In addition, we can consider development as a condition that enables individuals and society to enjoy a healthy quality of life, be free, have opportunities for upward mobility, and improve their material circumstances (Orozco 2007).

¹⁰ Jenny Robinson (2002) wrote about the relationship between diasporas and development as being three-pronged: (1) development in the diaspora, (2) development through the diaspora, and (3) development by the diaspora.

¹¹ Manuel Orozco and Kate Welle, “Hometown Associations and Development: Ownership, Correspondence, Sustainability and Replicability” (2006). Web Anthology on Migrant Remittances and Development: Research Perspectives. March, 2009.

¹² See in particular, Orozco, Manuel. *In search of options and solutions: Family remittances, diaspora partnerships and development opportunities in Africa*. Madrid: FILAPP, 2010.

Sustainability

A project is sustainable when it can improve a community's quality of life and material circumstances beyond the project lifespan. Sustainability also requires that the investment yield a long-lasting impact that does not create a burden for the community or its future generations. Conditions that create burdens include projects with increasing maintenance costs or projects left unfinished.

When diaspora-led projects rely on partnerships to provide public or private funding, one way to help ensure sustainability over time is to assess how the project will continue without such outside funding. With income-generating projects, another way to improve the chances of sustainability is to develop a clear plan for how revenue will be reinvested.

Table 14: Scorecard for Development Impact

	Metric*	Narrative justification
Ownership		
Participation in decision making		
Participation in implementation		
Control of project after completion		
Correspondence		
Project meets basic community needs		
Needs met are a development priority		
Implementation in association or coordination with other institutions		
Sustainability		
Enables development goals		
Does not constitute burden or entail added costs		
Long life cycle		
Replicability		
Resources are easily available in other communities		
Institutional environment is available in other communities		
Accountability		
Organizational resources		
Responsiveness to activities		
Project evaluation and reporting		
Risk		
Extent of investment considerations		
Level of commitment among partners		
Government support, buy in, or engagement		
Partnership		
Risk sharing		
Resources commitment		
Trust		
Total		

*Measurement indicator. Rate each indicator on a scale of 1–5.

Replicability

A project makes a successful contribution to development when its attributes and functions may be replicated with ease and are not dependent on a community’s local or unique circumstances or an institutional donor’s unique situation. A replicable project opens the way for regional strategies that go beyond the effects on a single community.

Often the essential inputs for a project are simple, such as an organized group of individuals and access to capital. Institutional support can be found when members of diaspora associations take the initiative and are well organized. However, in places where projects could be replicated, members of the community may not be aware that resources are available. That means a well-documented process is necessary for replicating projects. A communication strategy is also necessary, as well as initiative on the part of residents who seek to create similar projects. While diaspora associations may have their own capital to fund projects, a lack of access to or awareness of public and private financing can be an obstacle to development projects.

Partnership

An alliance of remittance-related projects considers a minimum set of elements, including stakeholders’ common

ideas and goals and a commitment to joint and pooled resources. (Key stakeholders may include diaspora communities, recipient families, local leaders, government officials, local or national financial institutions, and civil society organizations.) These characteristics are maintained by recognition among stakeholders of partnership symmetry, resources, and risk sharing; commitment to a timeline; trust and accountability in the implementation of the project; and access to information and knowledge on the issues and solutions at stake.

Risk

Participants’ recognition of challenges and obstacles prior to and during project implementation is central if a project’s impact is to be evaluated. The risks can be related to resources commitment, as well as to unexpected occurrences, such as emergencies or drastic changes. It is important to lay out a basis for what would constitute a project risk, while at the same time identifying in advance possible ways to reduce the risk.

3. Prioritization

Project prioritization is central to the efficient mobilization of resources, and it should be based on a study of three

Table 15: Issues Intersecting Migration and Development

Issue	Policy issue	Issues	Problem	Strategy	Impact	Resource
Prior to Migration or Departure						
Labor Migration	Bilateral Government Policies					
	Skills and Labor					
	Risk Mitigation					
During Migration (stay in host country)						
Family Remittances	Money Transfer Marketplace					
	Financial Access and Education					
	Social Protection					
Diaspora	Diaspora Outreach and Transnational Engagement					
	Immigrant Host Country Integration					
After Migration						
Return	Legal Reintegration					
	Social Reintegration					
	Economic and Labor Reintegration					
	Reintegration					

main factors: clarity of the problems and solutions, cost of project implementation, and impact.

Clarity of problems and solutions: Informed decision makers can better address particular needs since they are aware of what to do and how to do it.

Cost of project: In tandem with an awareness of the issues is the ability to calculate the cost of a project and evaluate its financial feasibility. This controls for undertakings that are too ambitious to succeed.

A scorecard for development impact: Because projects vary considerably in the degree to which they meet the criteria outlined above, decision makers may consider using a scorecard that makes the strengths and weaknesses of project easily visible. A scorecard also allows comparison among multiple project proposals. In this way, both financial cost and development cost are factored.

The criteria attempt to convey the critical components that must be present if a project is going to improve the standard of living of the target community. The project-selection process and ongoing evaluation are critical steps to achieving that end.

The scorecard can be used by diaspora associations, governments, donors, and other partners to assess specific project proposals for specific target communities. It can also be used as a more general framework to outline policies on the types of projects eligible for a certain kind of partnership or funding. For example, in addition to illuminating project strengths and weakness and enabling comparison among projects, the scorecard’s “total” (maximum 55) can help develop a baseline or benchmark score to evaluate future projects.

Table 16: Addressing Issues and Leveraging Opportunities

Problem	Solution	Scalability: Numbers	Impact
Market intermediation: failures, opportunities			
Current cost at 3.5%	Increase competition, introduce technology, provide transfer oversight	10 million transfers (Mexico and Central America)	Reduction to 3% generates US\$360 million in savings to migrants
Informality	Competition, technology, regulation	1 million transfers	Formalizing transfers reduces costs to 4% (from 5%) and increases access to financial institutions
Limited competition	New players outbound and inbound	Double the payment networks	Closer access, value-added opportunities.
Assets and leveraging opportunities			
25% of households have at least 80% Income dependence on Remittances	Financial access; money Management	2.5 million households	Improved administration of income and savings generation in long term
60% of remittance recipient households save informally	Financial empowerment/capability	6 million have a stock of savings of US\$1000	Annual savings mobilization of 30% of informal savings: US\$1.8 billion mobilized
60% of remittance recipient households don't have financial access	Regulation, partnerships, financial advice	6 million without financial access	Increase financial access by 30%
Limited economic independence among women	Financial advice, access, empowerment	25% migrants are unprotected domestic workers	Improve their survival and livelihood through financial access
10% have a demand for credit and investment	Microfinance and Reinvestment opportunities	1 million have demand for loans and credits on micro and small businesses (US\$10,000)	Job generation, formalization, revenue

Source: Manuel Orozco.

Table 15 presents a preliminary list of issues intersecting migration and development. Governments can learn to understand the various dimensions and characteristics of each in order to become better informed. This list positions each issue in relationship to the problem, a strategy, its development impact, and resources needed.

A review of remittance-related activities and issues illustrates how to put knowledge and best practices to work. For example, when it comes to increasing financial access through financial education, 6 million households in Mexico and Central America can be served through the mobilization of billions of dollars in savings. Table 16 provides an outline for addressing issues and leveraging opportunities.

Interviews Conducted

Name	Title	Organization	Country
Ricardo Estrada	Minister Counselor	Embassy of Honduras in Washington, DC	Honduras/United States
Daniel de Gracia	Chief of International Affairs	Dirección de Migración	Panama
Doris Rivas	Director, Consejo Nacional para la Protección de la Persona Migrante y su Familia	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores	El Salvador
Fredy Viana	Director, Dirección General de Migración	Ministerio de Gobernación	Guatemala
Jocellyn Ramírez	Coordinator, El Salvador Global	Dirección General de Migración y Desarrollo Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores	El Salvador
José Arturo Rodríguez Díaz	Director, Asuntos Migratorios	Dirección General de Asuntos Consulares y Migratorios	Guatemala
Juan José García	Vice Minister for Salvadorans Outside the Country	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores	El Salvador
Aida Escobar	Assistant to the Vice Minister for Salvadorans Outside the Country	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores	El Salvador
Lídice Gonzalez Murillo	Coordinator, Remesas Solidarias y Productivas	Dirección General de Asuntos Consulares y Política Migratoria	Honduras
Lissette Ordoñez Saenz	Counselor, Despacho Viceministerial	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores	Guatemala
Cynthia Mora Izaguirre	Counselor	Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería	Costa Rica
Ubaldo Villatoro Rodríguez	Counselor to the Executive Secretary, Consejo Nacional de Atención al Migrante de Guatemala	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores	Guatemala

Appendix A: Methodology to Estimate Migrant Population

Various sources are used to estimate the migrant population. For all migration, we use monthly remittance transfer flows adjusted to survey data from those remitting the same year they entered the host country (typically 3 percent). We factor that number to a coefficient of an immigrant's propensity to remit. Additional sources for estimating come from the US State Department and the CIS *Annual Yearbook of Immigration* that completes the entire migration process. Comparing estimates of annual migration to legal forms of migrating, as well as examining figures on those detained and deported at the border, helped to establish the size of the population that moves without papers. The number of migrants equals those receiving immigrant visas at Consular offices plus those undocumented individuals. The number of undocumented is obtained from an estimate of people caught at the border and those crossing it. According to Cornelius, "fewer than half are caught [38 percent], and those caught eventually cross,"¹³ thus *undocumented border crossers* = $\{[number\ of\ deported \times 62\%] / number\ of\ people\ caught\}$.

Appendix B: Central American Government Policies on Migration and Development

Programs for Prospective Migrants: Reducing Emigration

In El Salvador, the Funes administration has sought to establish a policy to prevent further migration, recognizing that continued outward flows have affected population growth within the country. The government has implemented several programs around specific migration issues, notably public education and information campaigns focused on the risks of migration and labor integration and training programs targeting areas of high migration. The program *Concientización sobre los Riesgos de Migrar de Manera Indocumentada* aims to teach youth about the dangers of undocumented migration. Similarly, the public education component of the joint UNDP project *Desarrollo Humano y Migraciones* has reached out to thousands of Salvadoran

youth to educate them about the challenges of immigration. The four-year program funded by the US Department of Labor, USAID and the Salvadoran Institute of Professional Training is a US\$7.5 million effort (ending in 2013) that provides training opportunities for Salvadorans, improves the Labor Market Information System, and promotes public-private partnerships on labor market integration. To date, more than 4,000 young Salvadorans have benefited from the program. The government also established a US\$37.5 million cash transfer initiative, *Programa Apoyo Temporal Al Ingreso (PATI)*, that has so far benefited 15,000 people. The program seeks partnerships with the organized Salvadoran diaspora. On more specific immigration issues, the government established the *Dirección General de Derechos Humanos* to help monitor and protect the rights of migrants crossing borders. It also implemented the *Migrant Rights' Trainings for Consulates* in partnership with the local UNDP office.

Similarly, the Honduran government has taken a two-pronged approach to reducing emigration: by educating the public about the dangers associated with transit migration and by trying to provide adequate employment opportunities at home. In 2011, Honduras worked with Mexico to develop a public information campaign warning Hondurans of the "risks and threats that they may encounter on their trajectory through Mexico if they decide to migrate to the United States."¹⁴ The campaign operates under the premise that migrants do not always have complete and accurate information of what transit migration entails and, once given this information, some Hondurans may decide not to migrate. Honduras has also taken steps to improve job opportunities for youth at risk of migrating. *Desarrollo humano juvenil via empleo, para superar los retos de la migración* is a US\$6.3 million program developed by the Honduran government in collaboration with seven UN agencies.¹⁵ It seeks to "create entrepreneurship and decent work for youth so that they can overcome the obstacles that make it hard for them to escape poverty—such as insufficient work and educational opportunities, irregular migration, a sense of disconnectedness, and loss

¹³ <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/mexico704/interview/cornelius.html>; <http://ccis.ucsd.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/WP181.pdf>.

¹⁴ "Honduras y México Preparan Campaña de Seguridad para Migrantes," *La Tribuna*, Honduras, January 22, 2011. <http://old.latribuna.hn/2011/01/22/honduras-y-mexico-preparan-campana-de-seguridad-para-migrantes/>

¹⁵ "Youth, Employment and Migration 2010 First Semester Fact Sheet," Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund, p. 1.

of identity.¹⁶ As a result of the program, more than 1,500 youth participated in business development workshops.¹⁷ In addition, the program created a fund to finance youth entrepreneurship, with more than US\$1 million in capital for startups, business loans, and business improvements.¹⁸ The program includes initiatives that support young women in the workforce,¹⁹ engage municipal governments in youth employment efforts, and build a youth labor database.

As in El Salvador and Honduras, Guatemala's government has launched a number of initiatives to prevent migration. From 2008–2011, the Guatemalan Education Ministry implemented an in-school plan to address migration as part of a teaching unit on citizenship and equity. A curriculum was provided so that teachers at all levels could incorporate discussion of migration into their classrooms.²⁰ The objective is to ensure that Guatemalan students “have access to open and responsible discussions about Guatemalan migration, and have information to understand and assert their right to migrate and not to migrate.”²¹ In addition, programs have sought to generate jobs in Guatemala so workers do not need to migrate. In 2012, the Pérez Molina administration laid out the *Política Nacional de Generación de Empleo Seguro, Decente, y de Calidad*, which aims to expand the number of Guatemalan workers earning at least a minimum wage, increase opportunities for young workers to enter the formal labor market, and broaden the technical capacity of Guatemalan workers through job training programs.²² The *Programa de Generación de Empleo y Educación Vocacional*

para Jóvenes de Guatemala, launched in February 2013, operates on a budget of US\$15 million from the European Union and aims to generate 40,000 new jobs for youth.²³ While these programs may indirectly curtail emigration, they unfortunately do not appear to directly link their strategies to migratory dynamics.

Diaspora Outreach Programs: Seeking Communication

El Salvador's government has been among the most active in the region in reaching out to its citizens living abroad. The outreach policy was underscored through the *Viceministerio para los Salvadoreños en el Exterior*, which represents the highest body of state policy and outreach to the diaspora. The vice ministry, created in 2004, has forged ties with many organizations representing the Salvadoran community abroad and has promoted partnerships for local development projects and put into place policies benefiting migrants. Through the vice ministry, the government has put into place *CONMIGRANTES*, the *Consejo Nacional para la Protección de la Persona Migrante y Su Familia*. Established through the vice ministry, *CONMIGRANTES* is a council entrusted with drafting and confirming implementation of a strategic plan to protect and support immigrants and their families. The plan includes policies integral to migration and development.²⁴ The council has representation from the Salvadoran diaspora. These two institutions, the vice ministry and *CONMIGRANTES*, furthered the goals of the Funes government in enabling the right to vote outside the country; Salvadoran citizens abroad will be allowed to vote for the first time with the 2014 presidential elections. In addition, the government has established a cultural identity program, *Casa El Salvador*, which promotes Salvadoran cultural identity through the country's consular offices.

The Honduran government has only recently begun to develop diaspora outreach programs. Where the Salvadoran government's outreach has focused around political and cultural engagement, the Honduran efforts have concentrated on health issues and the provision of basic services. *Catracho*

¹⁶ <http://www.undp.org/content/honduras/es/home/presscenter/speeches/2013/insumos-para-la-participacion-en-el-programa-de-remesas-solidari/>

¹⁷ Juana Henao, “Youth, Employment and Migration Mid-Term Evaluation Report,” Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund, 34.

¹⁸ Henao, 34.

¹⁹ Henao, p. 5.

²⁰ “Resumen Ejecutivo del Proyecto Colaborativo MINEDUC – INCEDES Promoción de la Gobernabilidad de las Migraciones en los Procesos Educativos a Nivel Nacional.” N.D. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/59324072/Resumen-Ejecutivo-Proyecto-Mineduc-Incedes-AI-17-de-Junio-de-2011>

²¹ Luis Edgar Arenas G. and Silvia Irene Palma C., *Guía de Uso del Libro “Análisis y estudio de las migraciones según el Currículo Nacional Base (CNB). Una visión desde la perspectiva de Guatemala.”* Guatemala. Proyecto colaborativo Ministerio de Educación, MINEDUC-Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Sociales y Desarrollo, INCEDES: Apoyo a la gobernabilidad de las migraciones en los procesos educativos a nivel nacional, 2011.

²² Gobierno de Guatemala, “Generación de Empleo Seguro, Decente, y de Calidad 2012-2021.” http://www.segeplan.gob.gt/downloads/clearinghouse/politicas_publicas/Politica_Nacional_de_Empleo.pdf

²³ Gobierno de Guatemala, “Mineco y UE firman convenio para Generación de Empleo y Educación Vocacional,” February 5, 2013. <http://www.guatemala.gob.gt/index.php/2011-08-04-18-06-26/item/2862-mineco-y-ue-firman-convenio-para-generacion-de-empleo-y-educacion-vocacional>

²⁴ Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de El Salvador, “El CONMIGRANTES celebra su primera reunión de trabajo,” November 6, 2012. <http://www.rreee.gob.sv/conmigrantes/>

Seguro, which was launched in 2011, allows migrants to pay into and receive social security abroad.²⁵ Under the program, they can also ensure that their families have access to medical and surgical care.²⁶ Through another program, *La Semana Binacional de Salud*, the Honduran government has extended its outreach on health issues, offering health education workshops and free vaccines and screenings.²⁷ In 2012, Honduran communities in Houston, San Francisco, Miami, Atlanta, and New York participated. The Honduran government has also taken steps to improve the efficiency and transparency of consular services through the *Nueva Ley de Servicios Consulares y Actos de Protección Consular* of 2012.²⁸

Guatemala is beginning to develop diaspora outreach programs addressing advocacy and education. The *Comision Nacional de Atencion al Migrante de Guatemala (CONAMIGUA)*, launched in 1997, seeks to bring together diaspora groups, government agencies, civil society groups, and community leaders to address issues of migration. It has focused on areas such as human rights and education. CONAMIGUA offers vocational training, high school equivalency classes, and English language classes to migrants living abroad.²⁹ It also recently launched an initiative to improve literacy rates among Guatemalans abroad. Through CONAMIGUA, Guatemalans abroad who do not know how to read and write can earn a third and/or sixth-grade equivalency.³⁰ Despite these efforts, there are indications the Guatemalan diaspora seeks greater engagement than the government is currently able or willing to provide. CONGUATE, a powerful coalition of 28 Guatemalan community organizations in the United States, has consistently

lobbied for greater recognition of Guatemalan migrants.³¹ CONGUATE has petitioned for Guatemalan migrants to be given temporary protected status (TPS) and lobbied for the right of Guatemalans abroad to vote in Guatemalan elections, something that has not yet been granted.³²

Promoting Migrant Development Partnerships (Operational Engagement)

The Salvadoran government has also explored at various points in time the establishment of partnerships with the diaspora for local development. Originally it implemented a series of investment projects in the early 2000s through the governmental entity *Fondo de Inversión Social para el Desarrollo Local (FISDL)*. Under the Funes administration, these efforts continued on a smaller scale by promoting diaspora private investment initiatives and knowledge transfer. An example of the latter is *El Salvador Global*.

El Salvador Global was created to facilitate knowledge transfer from Salvadorans abroad, especially in science and technology, which have traditionally been weak areas for the country. It was launched in November 2011 and currently has a network of 22 members working with a *comité promotor*—a committee made up of representatives from the public, private, and academic sectors. Since its launch, the program has focused on planning workshops and conferences featuring Salvadorans abroad. Its activities have included:

- A workshop on micro-businesses
- A mobile technology workshop for youth entrepreneurs
- A conference on native plants and their medical and business uses
- A congress on renal health

Though its efforts are not as well-known as those of its neighbors, Honduras has been active in promoting migrant development partnerships, particularly in the areas of remittances and knowledge transfer. Under the program *Remesas Solidarias y Productivas*, the Honduran government and a number of UN agencies have instituted a fund-matching

²⁵ Departamento 19, “Inmigrantes Hondureños en los Estados Unidos podrán afiliarse al Seguro Social,” September 25, 2011. <http://www.departamento19.hn/index.php/economia/economia/1488-migrantes-hondurenos-en-estados-unidos-podran-afiliarse-al-seguro-social.html>

²⁶ *El Tiempo*, “Pretenden bajarle costos al envío de remesas familiares,” June 8, 2013. <http://www.tiempo.hn/portada/noticias/pretenden-bajarle-costos-al-envio-de-remesas-familiares>

²⁷ Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores de Honduras, “2012 Annual Report,” p. 16.

²⁸ Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores de Honduras, “2012 Annual Report,” p. 16.

²⁹ CONAMIGUA, “Objetivo y Población Meta de Acuerdo a las Funciones de CONAMIGUA: Programas de Capacitación y Alfabetización del Consejo.” http://prezi.com/mkc5ggjy_xc/untitled-prezi/

³⁰ “Gobierno Guatemalteco Impulsa Programas de Ayuda para sus Inmigrantes en EEUU,” *Viva Colorado/Denver Post*, May 12, 2011. http://www.vivacolorado.com/ci_18045173?source=bb

³¹ Marta Altolaguirre, “Bienvenido CONGUATE: La hora de actuar con seriedad,” *El Periodico* (Guatemala), November 13, 2012. <http://www.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20121113/opinion/220547>

³² Reginaldo Arredondo, “Voto en el Exterior,” CONGUATE, N.D. <http://www.conguateus.net/voto-en-el-exterior/>

program for remittance projects.³³ In its pilot stage, the program completed six community projects and 10 infrastructure projects in Comayagua, Olancho, Choluteca, and Atlantida.³⁴ The project has garnered relatively strong diaspora support³⁵ but, according to some accounts, it has struggled with delays in project implementation.³⁶ Honduras has also encouraged diaspora development partnerships through its knowledge transfer program, *Honduras Global*. The program has built a network of 29 diaspora members with technical skills and expertise, particularly in areas such as science, business, and technology.³⁷ Since its start in 2012, the network has offered on-site trainings and workshops in Honduras, internships abroad, mentorships, and access to a virtual educational portal.³⁸ In 2013, for example, a diaspora member helped to implement hospital IT systems.³⁹ *Honduras Global* has directly benefited 2,643 Hondurans and aspires to indirectly benefit many more as it channels diaspora expertise toward the development of the country.⁴⁰

The Guatemalan diaspora has been engaged in a number of development efforts, but the Guatemalan government has taken more of a sideline role. In 2005, the government asked the Center for International Migration & Integration (CIMI) to provide technical assistance, training, and support to diaspora groups interested in conducting

development projects.⁴¹ Since that time, CIMI has assisted diaspora groups on a variety of projects, including diaspora business investments and infrastructure improvements.⁴² In 2005, the Ministry of the Economy launched *Encuentro del Migrante*, designed to match “successful migrants” with investment opportunities in Guatemala.⁴³ In 2012, *Remesas Productivas* was unveiled to provide further incentive for diaspora investments in the country by offering startup capital, microcredit, and entrepreneurial training for small and medium businesses.^{44, 45}

Migrant Reintegration or Return (Insertion)

El Salvador has implemented a few programs addressing the issue of deported migrants. The migration office is in charge of “arrival services,” which creates a record for each deported person and helps them with meals, local phone calls, lodging for two days, and transportation costs to their former home or a destination in El Salvador. The *Bienvenido a Casa*⁴⁶ reintegration program, meanwhile, provides job advice and training, personal counseling, necessary medical services (including tattoo removal, if desired⁴⁷), and educational support. In 2007, the government created the *Centro de Atención al Migrante*; by 2008, it had worked with 144 returning migrants. The government has also implemented

³³ “Con el aporte de las remesas de migrantes reparan escuela primaria en Juticalpa Olancho,” UNDP, June 20, 2013. <http://www.hn.undp.org/content/honduras/es/home/presscenter/articles/2013/06/20/con-el-aporte-de-las-remesas-de-migrantes-reparan-escuela-primaria-en-juticalpa-olancho/>

³⁴ “En Apacilagua, Choluteca, reparan y equipan centro de salud con aporte de migrantes,” UNDP, June 4, 2013. <http://www.hn.undp.org/content/honduras/es/home/presscenter/articles/2013/06/04/en-apacilagua-choluteca-reparan-y-equipan-centro-de-salud-con-aporte-de-migrantes/>

³⁵ Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de Honduras, “2012 Annual Report,” p. 13.

³⁶ Henao, p. 5.

³⁷ Honduras Global, “Antecedentes,” <http://hondurasglobal.org/quienes-somos/antecedentes>

³⁸ Honduras Global, “Red de Conocimiento para el Desarrollo,” brochure, p. 4.

³⁹ Honduras Global, “Segundo Aniversario: Actividades de Honduras Global,” June 4, 2013. <http://hondurasglobal.org/noticias/142-segundo-aniversario-actividades>

⁴⁰ Honduras Global, “Segundo Aniversario: Actividades de Honduras Global,” June 4, 2013. <http://hondurasglobal.org/noticias/142-segundo-aniversario-actividades>

⁴¹ Rebecca Bardach and Raviv Schwartz, “Guatemala Diaspora Development Efforts and Lessons from the Israel-Jewish Diaspora,” Presentation, the International Conference on Diaspora for Development, The World Bank, July 13-14, 2009. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/Bardach_Schwartz.pdf

⁴² Bardach and Schwartz.

⁴³ “Análisis Descriptivo de las Instituciones Responsables de la Gestión de las Políticas Migratorias en México y Guatemala,” FIIAPP-UE, 2011. http://www.migracion-ue-alc.eu/documents/keydocs/ES/Analisis_institucional-Mexico-Guatemala.pdf

⁴⁴ Elder Interiano, “Encuentro con el Migrante Busca Invertir Remesas en Guatemala,” Siglo 21, Guatemala, December 10, 2012. <http://www.s21.com.gt/pulso/2012/12/10/encuentro-migrante-busca-invertir-remesas-guatemala>

⁴⁵ Gobierno de Guatemala, “Encuentro con el Migrante Concluye con Negocios por Más de Q50 millones,” N.D. <http://www.mineco.gob.gt/presentacion/2013/encuentromigrante/Resultados%20ECEM%202012.pdf>

⁴⁶ Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería de El Salvador, “Programa Bienvenido a Casa,” N.D. http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/IDM/workshops/return_migration_development_070708/pres_alvarez.pdf

⁴⁷ Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería de El Salvador, “A qué servicios tengo acceso en mi condición de repatriado?” http://www.migracion.gob.sv/index.php?view=items&cid=5%3Aservicios-a-repatriados&id=33%3Aia-que-servicios-tengo-acceso-en-mi-condicion-de-repatriado&option=com_quickfaq&Itemid=213

a US Department of State-funded program addressing the return and reintegration of unaccompanied minors, helping 62 deported children to enroll in school in El Salvador.

As Table 4 illustrated, relatively large numbers of Hondurans are deported from the United States each year. The Honduran government has sought to reintegrate returning migrants, particularly those who are returning involuntarily and may face complex economic, legal, and social dynamics. Since 2000, *Centros de Atención al Migrante Retornado* (CAMR) have been receiving returning migrants. At a minimum, these centers interview each migrant and process his or her paperwork. They provide medical treatment, counseling, lodging, food, clothing, and transportation as needed. They also offer resume writing and printing services.⁴⁸ Another initiative, the *Fondo de Solidaridad para el Migrante Retornado* (FSMR), dedicates foreign exchange profits made by the Central Bank toward an emergency fund for migrants in distress, including victims of human trafficking and missing migrants. It also repatriates the bodies of migrants who have died abroad.⁴⁹ In 2011, it helped 31 Honduran migrants in distress⁵⁰ and repatriated 292 bodies.⁵¹

Like its neighbors, Guatemala has multiple programs and services to reintegrate citizens returning both voluntarily and involuntarily. The *Guatemala Repatriates Project*, launched in 2010 by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), offers basic services to citizens arriving by air from the United States and by land from Mexico. These services include transportation, hygiene kits, counseling, and legal advice. Economic reintegration support is provided through vocational training and job placement. The initiative will work with companies in Guatemala that are willing to take on returnees with specific skills, such as English language fluency.⁵² Another program, *Nuestras Raíces Guatemala*, launched by Guatemalan first lady Rosa Leal de Pérez in 2013, helps deported children reunite with

their families.⁵³ CONAMIGUA, too, links deported people to organizations that provide employment and training, including *Un Techo Para Mi País* and the *Instituto Técnico de Capacitación y Productividad* (INTECAP).⁵⁴

Appendix C: The Literature on Migration and Development: An Unfinished Exercise⁵⁵

The intersection of migration and development is a relatively new academic and policy area. It emerged from an observation in the late 1990s that migration affects economic and development issues. A review of 20 studies on migration and development reveals a range of perspectives on the subject, including contributions to and limitations on understanding and explaining how migration and development act on one another.

At a minimum, an understanding of these issues requires a conceptual framework, a definition of units and levels of analysis, a methodology, and a policy perspective. There remains a lack of consensus about whether to analyze the intersection through the migration cycle or to focus on a single stage of the cycle.⁵⁶ Moreover, the conceptual framework that shapes the intersection between migration and development is neither clear nor predetermined. The research lacks consistent methodologies or fieldwork; its units and levels of analysis are often undefined, and its policy prescriptions are limited.

A look at how the intersection is framed shows differing approaches. Some researchers choose a practice and generalize the key factors that intersect. Remittances, transnational and diaspora engagement, labor mobility, and brain drain are examples (see Table 17). In other approaches, scholars and practitioners are not in agreement in looking at the entire migration cycle but, rather, focus on the moment of migration, rather than departure or return.

⁴⁸ Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería de Honduras, “Centros de Atención al Migrante Retornado (CAMR).” http://www.migracion.gob.hn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=39&Itemid=250

⁴⁹ “Crearán Fondos para Migrantes Retornados,” *El Heraldo* (Honduras), June 6, 2011, <http://archivo.elheraldo.hn/Ediciones/2011/06/06/Noticias/Crearan-fondo-para-los-migrantes-hondurenos>

⁵⁰ Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de Honduras, “2012 Annual Report,” p. 11.

⁵¹ Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de Honduras, “2012 Annual Report,” p. 10.

⁵² “Press Conference on the Guatemalan Repatriates Program,” IOM, June 3, 2011. <https://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/news-and-views/events/events-listing/press-conference-on-the-guatemalan-repat.html>

⁵³ “Primera Dama Inaugura Casa Migrante ‘Nuestras Raíces Guatemala’ Para los Niños Migrantes,” Secretaría de Obras Sociales de la Esposa del Presidente, April 26, 2013. <http://www.osep.gob.gt/index.php/noticias/allcategories2013/abril2013/item/398-pdmigrante>

⁵⁴ “Para el Guatemalteco Deportado que Permanecerá en Guatemala,” PlazaPública, Guatemala, June 20, 2012. <http://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/consejo-nacional-de-atenci-n-al-migrante-de-guatemala-conamigua>

⁵⁵ Includes work done by Estefanía Ortiz.

⁵⁶ The migration cycle is comprised of several different stages: prior to departure, during migration, and voluntary or involuntary return.

Table 17: Perspectives on migration and development

Subject addressed	Number
Remittances and development	5
Transnational engagement	3
Labor mobility and brain drain	4
Theoretical Background	2
Mix of theoretical approaches	3
No theoretical focus	3
Grand Total	20

Source: Authors' analysis of 20 leading studies on migration and development.

Methodology

On the methodological side, several authors base their conclusions on theoretical reviews (Ellerman 2003, Portes 2009, Glick-Schiller 2009, De Haas 2010, Black and Skeldon 2009) rather than empirical research and methodological tools. De Haas celebrates empirical research, including his own, that embraces a pluralist approach. There are few investigations that employ fieldwork and carry out the methodological research. Black and Skeldon (2009) conduct a review focused on available data sources for the study of migration and development through retrospective and continuous data collection systems; they recognize the advantages of census data as a useful and inclusive source. They also emphasize the need for individual data at the micro-level, recommending the use of ethno-surveys. In the case of Newland and Agunias (2012), although most of the work is not supported by data, the authors rely on past project experiences and explain the reason why their suggestions would be beneficial.

When presenting data to sustain their conclusions, several authors rely on secondary sources (Fischer 1997, Portes 2009, Nyberg-Sørensen 2002, Phillips 2009, Skeldon 2010, and Orozco, 2011). Other authors use official national data to produce original empirical analyses. Ratha (2006) elaborates his own statistical analysis based on macroeconomic data collected by the International Monetary Fund and estimates from the World Bank. Sanderson's methodology (2013) is very detailed; it uses GDP per capita as a dependent variable and the stock of international migrants per capita as an independent variable, with cross-national data for 122 countries to prove three different hypotheses.

Finally, Adams (2006) uses an empirical study with very transparent methodology based on national data from Guatemala. His work develops “counterfactual income estimates for migrant and nonmigrant households by using econometric estimations to predict the incomes of households with and without remittances.”

Levels of Analysis

Among authors who look at migration and development at a multilevel approach, there is no consensus as to levels of analysis. However, most of them draw their conclusions at a transnational level. Certain academics focus only on national indicators to make conclusions at a global level (Ratha 2007, Sanderson 2013, Portes 2009, Fischer et al. 1997, and Phillips 2009). Others use the North-South categorization—developed-developing countries—to analyze the phenomena at a global level (Ellerman 2003).

Some scholars advocate for multilevel analysis with a structural approach (De Haas 2010, Glick-Schiller 2009). De Haas proposes an analysis of the structure—local, national, international—at the macro level and its interaction with agency—of transnationally active migrants—at the micro level. Glick-Schiller agrees with an analysis at the structural level but advocates for positioning it in terms of political and economic power, combined with microanalysis of specific localities and relationships among natives, migrants, and families.

Certain studies have a clear transnational scope (Orozco 2011, Orozco et al. 2005, D. Wise and M. Covarrubias 2009, Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002). As that research falls in the national/transnational level, it is complemented with analysis at the individual level (Orozco et al. 2005, Newland and Agunias 2012) and community level (Orozco et al. 2005, Newland and Agunias 2012, Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002) or under a clear distinction among the local, national, regional, and global levels. Some studies have an unclear transnational scope, with analysis between migrant-sending and/or migrant-receiving countries, using households as units of observation (Yang 2009, Boccagni 2011, and Adams 2006).

For empirical purposes, Black and Skeldon (2009) recommend analysis of migration and development at the macro level, using large samples and census for an analysis at the national level, complemented with investigation at the micro level (i.e. observing individuals, households, and communities).

Policy Approaches

Inside the study of the migration-policy analysis, most studies (11) follow an academic finality (Adams 2006, De Haas 2010, Fischer et al. 1997, Phillips 2009, Sanderson 2013, Glick-Schiller 2009); others include a policy approach with varied levels of strength in the analysis (Boccagni 2011, Ellerman 2003, Newland and Agunias 2012, Orozco 2011, Orozco et al. 2005, Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002, Ratha 2007, UNDP 2010, Yang 2009). Among policy recommendations, some recurrent topics include remittance-related access to financial services for migrants and their families (Orozco 2011, Yang 2009, Newland and Agunias 2012), expanding the rights of migrants (Orozco 2011, UNDP 2010, Boccagni 2011), and embracing temporary work programs (Ellerman 2003, UNDP 2010, Skeldon 2010, Portes 2009). Other proposals include the promotion of tourism and nostalgic trade (Orozco 2011, Orozco et al. 2011).

Some authors advocate a stronger governmental role in increasing migrants' access to financial services (Ratha 2007, Orozco 2011, Orozco et al. 2005, Yang 2009). Ratha (2007) underscores four points on the international remittance agenda: understanding the size, corridors, channels, and costs of remittance (and migration) flows; requiring greater disclosure on fees from remittance service providers and promotion of financial education; including micro-finance institutions, credit unions, and saving banks in the remittance market to increase access in rural and remote areas; and leveraging remittances for capital market access of financial institutions or countries. Orozco (2011) proposes strategies and instruments that can be applied to policy issues because "as migration increasingly interplays with development, integrating policies within national plans is a key factor to ensure economic and social growth." Among the initiatives he analyzes are: providing education on migrant rights, increasing financial access to migrants and families, reforming laws to improve competition, introducing new payment technologies, promoting trade and tourism, and partnering with diasporas to work in development. Orozco provides a table that analyzes the correspondence between each policy issue and the policy instruments he studied, followed by a description of the decision-making process undertaken to choose policies and their instruments. Yang (2009) is also a strong advocate of increasing migrants' access to financial services, as well as extending absentee voting rights to overseas citizens.

Other authors (UNDP 2010, Boccagni 2011, Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002) are particularly concerned about the state's protection of migrants' rights. After extensive analysis of institution and policy building in a remittance-receiving country, Boccagni (2011) is skeptical about the success of political and economic participation programs. He advocates for "more supportive programs and legislation to ensure the well-being of migrants and their families." The UNDP (2010) recommends liberalizing and simplifying regular channels that allow people with low skills to seek work abroad, ensuring basic rights for migrants, reducing transaction costs associated with migration, improving outcomes for migrants and destination communities, enabling benefits from internal mobility, and making mobility an integral part of national development strategies. Nyberg-Sørensen et al. (2002) criticize the contradictions within many policies relating to humanitarian relief, migration, and refugee protection. They are wary of more stringent immigration policies, which they argue could benefit smugglers and employers of undocumented immigrants.

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Dialogue activities are directed to generating new policy ideas and practical proposals for action, and getting these ideas and proposals to government and private decision makers. The Dialogue also offers diverse Latin American and Caribbean voices access to US policy discussions. Based in Washington, the Dialogue conducts its work throughout the hemisphere. A majority of our Board of Directors are from Latin American and Caribbean nations, as are more than half of the Dialogue's members and participants in our other leadership networks and task forces.

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