What does China stand to gain from investing in Latin America’s energy projects? Where is China looking next in the region?
Despite slowing growth on both sides of the Pacific, China’s policy bank finance to Latin America reached $30 billion in 2015.
The year 2016 was the third highest on record for Chinese state-to-state finance in Latin America.
Estimates of the volume, composition, and characteristics of Chinese lending to the region since 2005.
China’s economic footprint in the region is expanding at a rapid pace. Can Latin American societies keep up?
The year 2019 was among the lowest on record for Chinese state-to-state finance in Latin America, with only approximately $1.1 billion in loans from China Development Bank and China Eximbank to Latin American governments and state-owned enterprises.
Future Chinese engagement with Latin America will be carefully justified on the basis of economic and/or political return on investment.
China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China issued no new finance to Latin American and Caribbean governments or state-run companies in 2020.
Again this year, China’s policy banks—China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (Eximbank)—issued no new finance to Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) governments or state-run companies, according to findings from the Inter-American Dialogue’s Asia and Latin America Program and the Boston University Global Development Policy Center (GDP).
In September 2022, Ecuador and China reached an agreement this week to restructure $4.4 billion of Ecuador’s debt with Chinese banks, which is estimated to provide $1.4 billion worth of debt relief to Ecuador through 2025.
China’s record of lending in LAC continues to surpass that of other banks, even though policy banks issued only $9 billion to the region in 2017.
Chinese investment and lending in the region declined last year, in part reflecting skittishness over the deteriorating situation in Venezuela. Despite the drop, Chinese state-to-state finance continues to outstrip the World Bank, IDB and CAF.
La fuerte disminución en el 2017 se debe a que los bancos estatales chinos se abstuvieron de hacer préstamos a Venezuela, de lejos el mayor receptor de financiamiento del gigante asiático en la región desde el 2005.
China provided relatively little state finance to Latin America in 2018, but China remains a key source of credit for some countries in LAC.