Colombia and Ecuador in 2009: The Rocky Road to Restoring Relations

By Michael Shifter and Adam Siegel
EFE Anuario Iberoamericano 2010, March 23, 2010

Una versión de este articulo en español está disponible aquí.

The isolated and sparsely populated border region between Colombia and Ecuador has long been notable for its underdevelopment, poverty, high degree of lawlessness, and little access to important government services.  Yet on March 1, 2008, all of South America (and indeed, much of the world) turned its attention to this relatively obscure region as it became the staging ground for a deadly Colombian military raid that crossed borders and ignited an extraordinary diplomatic crisis. The tense dispute led to a severing of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Ecuador, putting an abrupt halt to a relationship that had intermittently grown strained as a result of persistent disagreements on fundamental policies. 

This article explores the stormy state of Colombia-Ecuador relations in the past year, but suggests that the many problems between the two countries are longstanding and stem from diverging interests that began years before the March 2008 crisis. The standoff derives from many causes, including the negative and unintended consequences of Plan Colombia; the role of Colombia’s armed insurgents in Ecuador; and the divergent national interests being pursued by each country’s leaders, all of which have made a productive relationship difficult throughout the past decade.  As of this writing in late October, Colombia and Ecuador appear to be moving slowly towards a rapprochement, jointly engaging tentative steps that will likely evolve into a significant diplomatic process.  Understanding how ties between these neighboring countries deteriorated will be crucial for pursuing a peaceful and more stable relationship in the coming years.   

The Colombia-Ecuador relationship, after all, has been marked by rapidly changing ups and downs, influenced by a degree of mutual dependence and shared culture but ultimately driven by each country’s sovereignty, security, and national interest.  The key clashes of the past decade have been centered on these three themes—Colombia, determined to protect its citizens and prepared to apply military force to do so,  and Ecuador, equally determined to prevent Colombia’s internal disputes from spilling over their shared border and putting its security at risk.  A major reevaluation of this interaction—properly focused on mutual respect and an appropriate balance between security and sovereignty—is crucial as both countries inch towards improving upon their rocky relations of the past years.

An International Controversy: Colombia Raids Ecuador

Colombians live in the midst of a four-decade long war that mainly involves the country’s chief guerilla organization Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Colombian security forces, and right-wing paramilitary groups.  This armed internal conflict has substantially shaped both Colombian priorities and the country’s interactions with its neighbors, particularly Venezuela to the east and Ecuador to the south.  These relationships were significantly altered, however, just after midnight on March 1, 2008, when the Colombian military raided a FARC camp two miles into Ecuadoran territory, in the densely forested region of Sucumbíos.  Colombia’s incursion into Ecuador was a breach of sovereignty, criticized as such by the Organization of American States (OAS) and for which Colombian President Alvaro Uribe publicly apologized. 

Colombian officials authorized the raid to assassinate one of the highest-ranking members of the FARC, Raúl Reyes (ne Luis Edgar Devia Silva), who was a member of the Central High Command and often acted as the organization’s official spokesman.  Reyes was tracked to a FARC encampment purposefully situated within what was assumed to be the safer confines of Ecuador’s border.  The FARC had long been known to operate from within Ecuador, where they used the sanctuary provided by the border to train and regroup.   It was not exceptional for Colombian troops to pursue the FARC across the border—during one period between November 2005 and March 2006, for example, Colombian forces breached Ecuadoran territory in pursuit of the FARC four times —but there was no precedent for such a large-scale military operation aimed specifically at one individual. 

In the months prior to the raid, Colombian intelligence officials had identified what they believed were over 30 separate FARC camps operating freely in Ecuador and within miles of the Colombian border,  but no military action was authorized until credible intelligence verified Reyes’ presence in one of the camps.  Reyes was most likely located when he briefly used a satellite phone that the Colombian government had been tracking with the help of American intelligence.   The Uribe administration was no doubt aware that any use of military force within Ecuador would arouse condemnation and anger from its neighbor, but Reyes—often referred to unofficially as FARC’s second-in-command—was an alluring target due to his stature and prominence in the FARC leadership.

The Colombian operation, which involved both air and ground forces, proved efficient and deadly.  Twenty-three people at the camp in addition to Reyes were killed, including one Ecuadoran citizen.  The forces seized laptop computers from the campsite, which contained explosive but disputed evidence of FARC collaboration with Ecuador.  Among the documents later presented by Colombia was a letter from Reyes to other FARC leaders about a meeting he had with Ecuador’s Security Minister Gustavo Larrea.  The notes detailed ways in which Ecuador’s government was prepared to assist the FARC.  Though Larrea admitted to the meeting, he called the allegations “false,” insisting instead that he had met with the FARC to negotiate the release of hostages.  The Correa administration later charged that despite being close to an agreement on the hostages following this meeting, the raid had ruined chances of a resolution. 

Yet while Colombia succeeded in killing Reyes (a tactical and morale loss for the group), the border-crossing raid also simultaneously generated a new set of diplomatic challenges that could not be solved with military might.  Uribe called Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa in the early morning following the raid to inform him of what had transpired, but this gesture only underscored that Colombia had acted unilaterally and had not trusted the Correa administration enough to alert them or ask permission. Uribe initially explained the raid as stemming from the Colombian army’s pursuit of FARC rebels who fled into Ecuador, even though the Ecuadoran army arrived at the campsite to find that many of the dead had probably been asleep when the attack began.  This prompted Correa to question whether Uribe had been honest in their phone call, stating that the Colombian president was “either was poorly informed or brazenly lied” during the conversation.

Explaining Colombia’s actions in the days following this breach of sovereignty, Uribe argued that “terror has no borders.”  This echoed the ideology driving the concurrent “War on Terror” being waged by the United States, Colombia’s strong ally.  Uribe had staked out this justification before; in an October 2006 interview in Colombia’s El Tiempo, he said that “[t]errorism does not respect borders.”  Correa has always been skeptical and concerned about this premise, and he rejected the “no borders” explanation following the raid, instead labeling it an “aggression.”  To demonstrate his extreme displeasure, Correa recalled Ecuador’s ambassador, expelled Colombia’s from Quito, and ordered troops to the border region where the raid occurred.  He then embarked on a regional tour to unite other countries in their support for Ecuador and for an OAS resolution rejecting Colombia’s actions.  In his visits Correa managed to secure public condemnations of the raid from a variety of the region’s leaders.

Colombia’s operation hit a nerve in Latin America.  The final OAS resolution, accepted by Colombia, stated that never again “under any circumstances” would Colombia deploy its military outside of its borders in preemptive attacks.  Nevertheless, this public veneer of diplomacy and contrition barely hid the intensely negative feelings between Colombia and Ecuador that had manifested after the raid.

Diplomatic relations between Colombia and Ecuador have remained suspended since March 2008, and although low-level contacts were restored by June of 2008, signs pointing to a thaw have been mixed and often contradictory.  Feelings of antipathy and great mistrust continued to predominate throughout much of 2009, and there have been many disputes as each country postures politically and domestically.  Colombia seized and then released eleven Ecuadoran troops who strayed over the border in August;  Uribe and Correa have engaged in an often harsh war of words conducted in the media and at regional meetings; punitive and criminal claims have been filed with the International Court of Justice and Interpol, with Ecuador suing over Colombia’s coca eradication policy and petitioning for the arrest of two former Colombian Defense Ministers involved with the raid; and most recently, a flare in tensions erupted over a U.S.-Colombian base deal. 

Yet, despite these and other continuing conflicts, the Foreign Ministers of both countries began a series of meetings on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in September 2009 to explore restoring full diplomatic ties.  This manner of engagement, alternating between confrontational and more accommodating gestures, is emblematic of the uneven relationship that has characterized Colombia-Ecuador relations for much of the last decade.

Cracks in the Relationship: Unintended Consequences Cause Resentment
 
Ties between Colombia and Ecuador have traditionally been strong and normalized.  Colombians and Ecuadorians have long shared cultural and familial bonds, and economic relations grew increasingly important after the construction of the Pan-American Highway, which facilitated lower costs of transportation between the two countries.   Ecuador is Colombia’s third most important export destination, and the business community in both countries has attempted to maintain a strong trade connection.

Colombia’s principal exports to Ecuador have historically been industrial (such as furniture and medical goods, along with gasoline and rice), and the restrictions (both explicit and implicit) caused by the diplomatic rift have disproportionately hurt Colombia’s important industrial production sectors, while Ecuador has had to rely on the European Union as Colombian imports dropped by over 40 percent in 2009.   The connection between Colombian producers and Ecuador had become comfortably entrenched since the mid-twentieth century; over 1,000 Colombian businesses operate in Ecuador, and Colombian exports to Ecuador grew substantially even throughout Colombia’s periods of elevated violence in the 1990’s.  These economic ties were crucial in balancing what was otherwise a shaky partnership between the neighbors over the last decade.

Correa was never a personal favorite of the Colombian business community, and the imposition of tariffs on Colombian exports to Ecuador that he announced in July of 2009 did not help the normally-stable economic climate between the two countries.  In adding the tariffs on more than 1,300 Colombian products, the Correa administration maintained that the devaluation of the Colombian peso had cheapened imports and was also hurting Ecuadorian producers, but it was hard not to see post-raid political motives behind the move.  This type of economic protectionism is one component of Correa’s larger economic agenda, but given that many of the tariffs were later quietly withdrawn, they served mostly to spread feelings of antagonism into the economic sector.

By and large, however, the trade relationship between Ecuador and Colombia has managed to stay relatively routine given the abrupt break in diplomatic contact, which reflects a degree of pragmatism on the part of both countries and suggests that neither has planned for the stand-off to continue in the long term (something that would ultimately be damaging to the bottom line of each country).  Still, the lack of formal diplomatic connections has brought collaboration on a number of important projects—such as border security and environmentally-safe anti-narcotics operations—to a standstill, since governors of border states on both sides have ended their previous cooperation with each other.

Perhaps the most critical strains on the relationship have been caused by the policies and unforeseen outcomes of Plan Colombia and the U.S.-backed “War on Drugs,” which has made Colombia a central battleground in the past decade.  The introduction of Plan Colombia (a joint effort between the United States and Colombia approved by the U.S. Congress in 2000) significantly elevated the drug war in Latin America, and also provided assistance to the Colombian government’s related effort of controlling its internal armed conflict.  One key aspect of Plan Colombia (as well as Uribe’s domestic Democratic Security framework) has been the vigorous pursuit of the FARC and other drug producers in southern Colombia, just above the shared border.  This component of Colombia’s anti-insurgency, anti-drug strategy has been a major point of contention particularly since 2000, and helps account for many of the tensions that developed along the border region, highlighting Colombia and Ecuador’s divergent national interests throughout the last fifteen years. 

The most salient example is Uribe’s fight against the FARC once he took office in 2002, which engendered great praise in Colombia and strong resentment in Ecuador.  The FARC are directly involved in the drug trade and commit terrorist actions targeted against the government and non-combatant citizens of Colombia.  In Colombia, the Plan Colombia/Democratic Security strategy for controlling the group has been viewed as very successful, both politically and also demonstrably in terms of declining levels of violence.  Recent statistics reflect a significant drop in overall murders, kidnappings, and terrorist attacks since Uribe started his presidency.  For example, instances of terror attacks decreased 63 percent between 2002 and 2006.  In addition, Colombia’s cocaine production has also fallen to some of its lowest levels in a decade, although it is still a major producer of the cocaine and heroin that finds its way to the United States.

Nevertheless, these and other figures show that the operational ability of the FARC within Colombia has been weakened.  For Uribe, these measures have been critical to maintaining his popularity and reducing the rampant violence that plagued Colombia for much of the past two decades, and that had reached a particularly alarming level in the late 1990’s. 
Indeed, the reduction in violence has been the key component to Uribe’s significant political success as president.  At the same time, Plan Colombia and the Uribe administration’s overall security approach have resulted in two serious unintended consequences that directly affect Ecuador and have been a major contributor to the worsening of the Colombia-Ecuador relationship.

The first unintended consequence relates to the controversial component of Plan Colombia in which herbicides are sprayed from airplanes as means of eradicating large quantities of remotely located coca plants and opium poppy.  Aerial spraying was a key aspect of the Colombian government’s drug reduction strategy since its inception; Plan Colombia’s original blueprint called for anti-drug battalions to be based near Colombia’s Putumayo department (which borders Ecuador) in order to eradicate over 60,000 hectares of coca.  Within a year of Plan Colombia’s inception, however, Ecuador was already requesting that Colombia refrain from spraying near the border.  Colombia curtailed sprayings within six miles of the border in 2006 after complaints from Ecuador, but they were resumed sporadically in 2007.  Ecuador has maintained consistently that chemicals from the herbicides frequently drifted into its territory during periods of spraying near the border, adversely affecting non-coca crops, as well as human and animal health.  For many years the Colombian government rejected this claim, which only increased feelings of resentment in Quito and the rest of the country. 

Groups such as the Ecuadorian Interinstitutional Committee Against Fumigations (CIF), a coalition of eleven Ecuadorian non-governmental organizations (NGO’s), have sought to demonstrate that the chemicals from the herbicides affect people and crops located near the border.  Respiratory and digestive ailments, massive numbers of fish deaths, and high stress levels among border campesinos unsure of whether they can plant their crops have all been linked by these studies to the chemical sprayings.   In 2003, the Ecuadorian government appointed a commission to examine studies undertaken by concerned NGOs in the region like the CIF, and found that the chemicals being sprayed in Colombia were in fact penetrating up to three miles into Ecuadoran territory.  The commission also concluded that Ecuadoran border communities had experienced deaths “days after intense spraying had taken place in Colombia.” 

Others, like the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), have come to different conclusions.  CICAD, an entity affiliated with the OAS, disputed claims that the chemicals were harmful in a 2005 study, saying that those used by Colombia did not harm humans or the environment.  While the conclusions of scientists on both sides of the issue have been questioned, the spraying has proven, at the very least, to be politically damaging to Plan Colombia’s international stature, and the continuation or curtailing of spraying is a matter on which neither government wants to be seen as having capitulated.  Domestic and international sensitivity towards this issue has increased in recent years, and Colombia has reduced instances of spraying near the border.  Yet the process of each country producing competing studies, in which the independence and credibility of the others were called into question, only underscores the tense relationship that evolved as a result of this spraying policy.

The second unintended consequence of Plan Colombia for Ecuador has two facets: the forcing of terrorist and trafficking groups like the FARC towards the porous Colombia-Ecuador border, and the resulting displacement of many thousands of Colombian citizens fleeing their presence, as well as accompanying intimidation and violence.  This trend is a major humanitarian concern, and has been one of the most troublesome outcomes of Uribe’s military strategy against the FARC.  Estimates of Colombians displaced internally due to the FARC’s presence in these rural areas range from 2-4 million people, and of these millions, a portion has fled into Ecuador.  The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that by 2009 130,000 to 140,000 Colombians had migrated to Ecuador, with as many as ten people per day seeking refuge across the border.

This forced exodus has occurred for over a decade, notably increasing tension between the Colombian and Ecuadoran governments.  In this sense, Colombia’s domestic “success” has been costly for Ecuador, which, according to the UNHCR, now has the largest refugee population in Latin America.  Most of these refugees live under very difficult circumstances because their undocumented status means they have little recourse against mistreatment.  Considering that almost all arrive without visas, the refugees often find it extremely hard to support themselves and their families.  The resulting instances of crime and poverty have led to a certain degree of resentment among Ecuadorans living in these communities and Ecuadorans generally, where resources and jobs are already in short supply.  A United Nations report from 2008 identified three quarters of the Colombians living in northern Ecuador as in need of protection and financial assistance, asserting that “many host communities are being overstretched by the arrivals.”

This reality has led to mounting displeasure with Colombia’s aggressive measures.  Ecuadorans feel frustrated to see their country forced into Colombia’s internal war, which has now become a regional issue as accusations of collaboration with the FARC have been publicly leveled at both the Ecuadoran and Venezuelan government by Uribe.  In the most basic terms, Ecuadorans want to see the Colombians solve their own problems in a way that does not in turn lead to increased levels of violence, drug trafficking, and insecurity in their own country.

This has been a principal concern for years, and the message has been delivered publicly by many Ecuadoran government officials.  For example, in February 2006 Foreign Minister Francisco Carrion told El Comercio that “[t]he Colombian government and its Armed Forces should be concerned about acting in their own country rather than doing nothing about their own citizens who are carrying out illicit activities in their own territory, in areas where regrettably the Colombian state’s security forces do not have effective control.”  Prominent members of the Correa administration’s foreign policy team have voiced similar reservations.  Former Foreign Minister Maria Fernanda Espinosa stated directly that “Our country is an innocent victim of the Colombian conflict from several angles.”

Uribe and Correa have been unable to satisfactorily address the difficulties that stem from this issue.  The Ecuadoran government has not shunned the refugees or tried to minimize the problem, but it has few funds to fully tackle it.  The Ecuadoran government has been good at acknowledging the untenable situation of the refugees—current Foreign Minister Fander Falconí recently asserted that “[f]or Ecuador, there are no illegal people”—but the sense of urgency from the Ecuadorans for Colombia to assume greater responsibility on this issue has not been consistently reciprocated in Bogotá.  Carrion, one of  Falconí’s predecessors, succinctly expressed this sentiment in a February 2006 interview with El Comercio, saying, “We are in solidarity with Colombia, and have demonstrated it: there are over 10,000 refugees, and more than 500,000 Colombians who have been received... No greater solidarity could be asked of us.”

The aerial fumigations and elevated refugee flows have crystallized the distinct impression in Ecuador that the country has become involved, however unwillingly, in Colombia’s problems.  The U.S. use of the Manta Air Base in Ecuador from 1999 to 2009 to launch anti-drug operations was also a constant reminder of how Ecuador was specifically being incorporated into Colombia’s drug war.  Although former Ecuadorean President Jamil Mahuad had agreed that the U.S. could use the base for ten years, this rent-free deal was widely resented and criticized in Ecuador.  During this same time period, according to some analysts, Ecuadorans’ general perceptions of Colombians shifted somewhat, from the perspective that Colombians were “a naturally ingenious and hard-working people” to a perception more aligned with the “stereotype of dangerous individuals associated with illegal activities and a source of insecurity in [Ecuador].” 

Correa’s forceful reaction to the raid was motivated by increasing discomfort with these realities of the past decade.  While the intended target was not Ecuador itself, the literal extension of the battlefield into its territory raised the stakes to a higher degree than ever before.  As a high-ranking Ecuadoran diplomat said to the Director of the U.S.’s Office of National Drug Control Policy Gil Kerlikowske during an exchange at a conference in Washington, D.C. in September 2009, Ecuador does not want to become the equivalent of “a Cambodia” in the drug war waged by its neighbors.

Regional Grievances, Domestic Gains

Despite the rupture of diplomatic relations, public disagreements between the two administrations have continued as both Uribe and Correa use the impact of the raid as an impetus for increasing their domestic standing.  This deliberate heightening of tensions in the domestic political arena predates the Colombian military operation, although it has escalated in the months since.  There are political incentives for both leaders to perpetuate this antagonism despite the economic and diplomatic issues such a contentious relationship threatens to disrupt.  Polling data following the raid showed that a vast majority of Colombians approved of their government’s actions and a majority of Ecuadorans disagreed with the raid, but in neither country did a majority of people support the idea of suspending relations.   

Correa has expressed public dissatisfaction with specific aspects of Colombian policy since he was a presidential candidate in 2006, and he has consistently protested Colombia’s anti-narcotics strategy.  Correa spoke forcefully against Plan Colombia and visited Ecuador’s South American neighbors Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela after his election, though not Colombia.  Slights like these didn’t help the growing tensions between the two countries, but played well for the Ecuadoran electorate because it seemed as if Correa would publicly confront the underlying issues that had made his compatriots increasingly upset over the years.  Correa saw a surge in support even from the time he was elected to the day he took office—he won 56 percent of the vote, but enjoyed a 73 percent approval rating upon inauguration, reflecting increased confidence in his leadership abilities after a campaign in which the opposition attacked him as a “dangerous extremist” on issues relating to foreign policy.  This jump may not have been directly attributable to his positions on Plan Colombia, but it did show that Correa earned wider support after a period in which he sought to assert Ecuador’s demands on the regional stage. 

Despite Correa’s displeasure with aspects of Plan Colombia, the period between the beginning of his presidency and the March 2008 raid was marked by signs of general cooperation.  Uribe, in a show of respect, decided at the last minute to attend Correa’s inauguration in January of 2007, which was an auspicious beginning given Correa’s past slights.  A year later, just months before the raid, both Colombian and U.S. officials would publicly praise Correa’s efforts in cooperating with Colombia in the drug war.  In fact, Colombia-Ecuador relations had been showing improvements leading up to, and during, Correa’s administration after a rockier period at the beginning of the new millennium.  In January of 2006, for example, Uribe and Ecuador’s then-president Alfredo Palacio collaborated on a joint strategy to help free trade agreements with the United States.  Ecuador’s El Comercio newspaper reported that relations with Colombia were being restored to normal and respectful levels (“las relaciones con Colombia empiecen a recuperar la normalidad y el respeto”).  

Uribe and Correa maintained a cordial relationship overall, although even this wavered to some degree.  Despite the praise he would eventually earn from Colombia for collaborating against drug trafficking, Correa still played to his domestic base after receiving a promise that fumigation planes operating under Plan Colombia would not enter Ecuadoran airspace, claiming that he ordered the Ecuadoran Air Force “to intercept any Colombian or U.S. plane that dares to sully the Ecuadoran airspace.”  The March raid only increased the rhetoric coming from Correa, who highlighted the death of the Ecuadoran citizen at the camp and promised swift action, noting that “nothing justifies the murder of an Ecuadoran on Ecuadoran soil.”  He declared that the transgression was so bad that “[Ecuador] would not forget this case,” and he rejected some of Uribe’s initial diplomatic overtures, asking publicly “How can we renew relations if they keep trying to link us to the FARC to justify their aggression?”

Uribe, for his part, apologized to Correa at a Rio Group Summit in the Dominican Republic on March 7.  The Rio Summit was critical to defusing tensions between the countries, in part because it gave Uribe the platform to pledge that a similar type of raid would never be authorized again by Colombia.   This public mending was an important step in the week following the operation, and was followed by a handshake between Uribe and Correa.  This public showing led to a drop in the outward hostility that had quickly developed between the two countries, but it did not hide the personal animus between the two leaders.  Correa’s expression with Uribe was very stern, and the handshake was not exactly a heart-warming moment.  Correa called Uribe’s allegations that the FARC colluded with Ecuador “a pack of lies,” and he was later interrupted by Uribe, who called him “cynical” and accused him of “communist trickery.”

The Summit also helped tone down Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s strong rhetoric; he had talked quite directly of war in the days following the raid.  With the urging of Brazil, Chavez agreed to demobilize the troops he had promised to send to the border and he too shook hands with Uribe.  A critical component of this public rapprochement, however, was the information on the computers seized by the Colombian military.  The files, which were deemed authentic by Interpol, contained information about connections between FARC commanders and Chavez allies.  The combination of this evidence and Chavez’s declarations of possible war could have resulted in a much worse crisis had both presidents persisted in their attacks.  But by backing off Chavez did not provoke Uribe into revealing the contents of the files—and Uribe did not have to escalate the situation even further.

Uribe did describe evidence from the Reyes’ computers that allegedly showed Ecuadoran connections to the FARC, but he used it almost anecdotally.  Referencing it at the summit put Correa on the defensive, but more significantly for the long-term it served notice to the Latin American community that Colombia now possessed important and previously secret information that could potentially prove extensive links to the FARC.  Even though Uribe left the Summit having had to apologize for the raid, in some ways the mere mention of the files allowed him to come away with leverage as well.  Uribe’s apology was soon overshadowed, however, as his administration continued to criticize Correa, with his press secretary referring to the Ecuadoran president as “contradictory” and saying he demonstrated a “lack of seriousness.” 

A contentious war of words continued between Colombia and Ecuador, with various levels of both administrations seeking to play to the domestic base and public opinion as much as possible during the conflict.   It is clear that both governments and presidents were complicit in exploiting the worsening relationship for domestic political gain by rhetorically provoking nationalist sentiment towards the other.

Evolving Political Perspectives in Colombia and Ecuador

The key issues driving the Colombia-Ecuador relationship show that the most critical differences have transcended Correa’s presidency, and even Uribe’s.  So while it is tempting to interpret the fractured relationship as a product of ideological differences—the conservative Uribe versus the socialist Correa—in reality the conflicts began before the terms of either man.  Some of their recent actions reveal, however, the ways in which these two presidents attempted to use the passions surrounding the Colombia-Ecuador conflict for their own political gains.

Uribe and Correa both appear to have benefited domestically from their handling of the crisis that followed the raid, producing a political disincentive to quickly repair relations.  Correa assumed the presidency with an approval rating of 73 percent, but it fell closer to 50 percent in the months preceding the raid.  The week following the raid, however, the Ecuadoran newspaper El Universo found that his approval had already risen significantly, to 66 percent.  A Cedatos-Gallup poll also documented a rise in support, finding that Correa’s approval rating rose to 62 percent in March from a low of 54 percent in February.  Most analysis of these polls asserted that Correa’s actions had, at the least, “helped rebound” his numbers after a disconcerting dip.   By reacting strongly against the raid (Ecuador had tolerated more covertly executed incursions across the border by Colombian forces searching for the FARC in the past), Correa proved that he could directly challenge the Colombian policies that had upset many Ecuadorans for so long.  Correa was ultimately re-elected in April 2009 with 54 percent of the vote, avoiding the need for a second round of elections. 

Uribe similarly saw his approval ratings rise after the raid, from 80 percent to 84 percent, although given how high they were already, the change is not quite as dramatic as that of Correa.  It is also likely that the political rewards were not equal for both presidents. Even throughout the tense first week of the crisis, almost equal attention in Colombia was paid to Chavez’s provocations, and the Colombia-Venezuela relationship is of greater overall political concern for Uribe.  Still, like Correa, Uribe had reason to use the Reyes killing as a catalyst for coalescing domestic support.  He balanced his public apology with an insistence that the raid had been necessary for Colombia’s self-defense.  He also sent a clear—and domestically popular—message to the region that Colombia was not afraid to engage with the FARC and its alleged supporters throughout South America.

The resulting approval ratings underscore the divergent political outlooks that have come to define the Colombian and Ecuadoran populace in the decade since the implementation of Plan Colombia.  The main points of contention were most recently highlighted in August 2009, during the uproar in South America over U.S. plans to lease Colombian military bases in order to launch anti-narcotics operations in Colombia.  Although the initial objections revolved around the lack of transparency exhibited by the U.S. and Colombia in making the deal, the crux of the issue soon became regional fears about the expansion of U.S. military capabilities and the possible threat to countries in South America not allied with the U.S.  The controversy over the base deal was provoked by the same competing dichotomy of “sovereignty” and “security” that had divided Ecuador and Colombia following the raid.  The issue of using the bases was especially relevant for Ecuador, since it is an unverifiable but commonly held belief among “a large proportion of senior officers” in Ecuador that “the United States was an accomplice in the attack.”   Increased military collaboration between Colombia and the U.S., therefore, was seen as a possible future threat to Ecuador’s sovereignty; Correa commented that the regional implications of the deal “greatly worries me, and I can't accept that a U.S. document [describing possible strategic uses of the base] treats us like a back porch.”

The issue of security is similarly paramount in Colombia.  In the years directly preceding Plan Colombia’s implementation the internal armed conflict seriously threatened the country’s stability, and the violence severely tested the public’s resolve.  Under Uribe’s security initiatives, and with the consistent urging of the military to maintain a strong offensive, a consensus ultimately emerged about the most effective way forward for challenging the FARC and other insurgent groups: strengthening the military and police force, modernizing the justice system, and focusing manpower on conflict-ridden urban areas while simultaneously seeking to disrupt drug production in those places.   These security achievements are undercut, however, when the FARC receives support from sources outside of the country, so there is great hostility directed by Colombia towards any governments believed to be actively (or tacitly) supporting the group’s operations. 

Pursuing Personal Political Strategies

Correa’s dismissal of high-ranking military officials in the aftermath of the raid provides one interesting and less well-known example of how the diplomatic crisis created openings for pursuing previously-sensitive policy changes.  In the month following the raid, Correa took the bold steps of removing his defense minister, army chief of intelligence, and the commanders of the Army, Air Force, and Joint Chiefs.  Correa accused these high-ranking officials of sharing intelligence with Colombia, and also charged that they had been complicit in allowing Ecuador’s intelligence network to become infiltrated by the CIA. 

This accusation dovetailed convincingly with Ecuadoran concerns about sovereignty following the raid, as Correa insisted that his actions were necessary to ensure that Colombian and American intelligence interests in Ecuador received oversight—and not assistance—from the Ecuadoran chain of command.  Citing the case of Franklin Aisalla, the Ecuadoran citizen killed during the raid, Correa expressed anger that information about his death was shared by military personnel with Colombian and American intelligence officials, yet never communicated to him.   This oversight (whether purposeful or not) was an intelligence breakdown, but it also provided an opportune political justification for Correa to make changes at the highest levels of the powerful Ecuadoran army, which still retains a great degree of influence in the country and has major roles in education, medical care, customs, law enforcement, and telecommunications. 

Uribe has also used the tenuous post-raid situation to advance political goals.  In part due to his audacious strike at Reyes, Uribe has deftly cultivated the idea that he is the only one capable of sustaining the battle with the FARC and the foreign governments that protect its members. Uribe’s supporters have encouraged the perception that Uribe’s continued accusations of FARC collaboration with Ecuador represent bold, principled political leadership.  Stopping these accusations is one of Ecuador’s conditions for starting negotiations, so the references to FARC and Ecuador have diminished.  Still, as recently as July 2009, Uribe harshly accused Ecuador of being “abettors of a torturing, criminal, cynical and sadist group.” 

In this same time period, Uribe was using his domestic clout and political alliances to pave the way for a constitutional referendum that could ultimately allow him to legally run for a third term as president.  By September 2009, Colombia’s Senate and lower House of Representatives had both approved a referendum on altering the constitution so presidents could serve three consecutive terms.  

Pursuing difficult political goals—in these cases “aggressively confront[ing] Ecuador’s military” and changing the Constitution in Colombia—partly within the context of the raid is a precarious strategy for both presidents, as it could impact the coming diplomatic maneuverings necessary for rebuilding trust, and eventually, the Colombia-Ecuador relationship.  The latest round of meetings between the Foreign Ministers of Colombia and Ecuador were completed in September 2009, when the two countries announced that they would open direct talks and re-name diplomats at their respective embassies.  This announcement shows that neither administration wants to perpetuate the diplomatic standoff indefinitely or be accused of overreaching with their policies following the raid; after all, a September 2009 poll in the Colombian magazine Semana found that only 5 percent of Colombians were principally preoccupied by the situation with Ecuador, while 31 percent were worried about relations with Venezuela (46 percent found both situations equally worrisome.) 

This is specifically relevant to Uribe, who can see that the weight given to Ecuador by public opinion does not imply that he can expect to see long-term gains from sustaining the standoff as is.  Even the fraught situation with Ecuador has a limit for how much political benefit Uribe can derive from keeping up hostility.

The Road Ahead: Restoring Relations

It is in both Colombia and Ecuador’s advantage to eventually restore their relationship, and they have begun to move in that direction.   Repairing the damage from the raid is only one consideration, and both administrations intend to bring a wide range of issues to the table before resuming relations.  Colombian Foreign Minister Jaime Bermudez and his Ecuadoran counterpart Fander Falconi discussed a framework for beginning talks at the U.N. General Assembly meeting in New York, which was capped by the September 24 announcement that bi-lateral talks would begin.  This was their third meeting since relations had been officially suspended, and another was scheduled for early November 2009.

As small steps toward normalization are taken, it is becoming clearer which issues will receive the most focus in any negotiations.  Colombia comes into these meetings with less prior grievances but one major concern: the FARC, and specifically Ecuador’s role—whether due to active support or turning a blind eye —in allowing the group to operate from within its borders.  Colombia will look to Ecuador and the Correa administration for a full accounting of Ecuadoran contacts with the group, and will press the Correa government to uphold its promise to dislodge the FARC from within its borders.  An Ecuadoran commitment to use its intelligence and resources to dismantle FARC encampments near the border will be a desired condition. 

Ecuador too will focus on the FARC within their border, asking for an explicit guarantee that Colombia will “never again” undertake a unilateral and unapproved raid, even if other targets are identified in Ecuadoran territory.  The issue of sovereignty is of utmost importance and for the Ecuadorans no talks can move to other underlying issues without this Colombian commitment.  The Correa administration will look for a clear repudiation of the Colombian assertion that it had the right to bypass borders in an instance of extraordinary national security circumstances.  Correa has also made public a series of conditions for restoring relations, most significantly that Colombia should open its files on the raid to public scrutiny (including releasing video of the raid), that copies of the files recovered from Reyes’ computer be given to Ecuadoran intelligence for analysis, that Uribe stop asserting that Correa and his administration are linked to the FARC, and that the major Colombian political parties disavow any doctrine supporting preventative strikes outside of Colombia to fight the FARC.

The Ecuadorans have emphasized that they want to see a greater degree of respect and responsibility from the Colombians on issues like refugees and border security, implying that such issues will likely be considered.  In fact, the general attitude on the part of representatives from both countries appears to be that all major issues from the preceding decades are on the table for discussion.  Both Ministers also emphasized their preference for proceeding cautiously until a greater measure of trust was established between the two parties.

Still, after a year and a half of rocky progress at best, Colombia and Ecuador are visibly moving—slowly—towards re-engagement.  Given the increasingly-volatile nature of politics in Latin America, which experienced a military coup (Honduras) and a major crisis over U.S. involvement in the region (the base deal with Colombia) in the course of just a few months, the introduction of confidence building measures agreed upon by both countries will be necessary before any significant steps towards resuming relations can be taken.  Nevertheless, Falconi and Bermudez may find that both sides desire to address a wide range of problems that can be worked on in a bilateral fashion, including improving living conditions in the border region, bilateral development plans, commerce, immigration control, and tourism.

It is also worth noting the influence that outside actors and forces have had, and will continue to have, as Colombia and Ecuador take the first steps towards renewing their relationship. The U.S.-based NGO known as the Carter Center and the OAS have helped facilitate discussions between the two countries.  Their representatives were present in New York for the U.N. General Assembly in September 2009 when the foreign ministers met, and they have also been present at lower-level meetings.  The Carter Center effort to increase productive dialogue between the two countries actually began before the raid, in 2007, and both OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza and director of the Carter Center’s Americas Program Jennifer McCoy have attended meetings between Colombia and Ecuador in late 2009 to facilitate the discussion of sensitive issues. 

Events of the summer and fall of 2009 have highlighted the tension in South America caused by Colombia’s strong alliance with the U.S., and the repercussions of the base deal announced in the summer were especially pronounced in Ecuador.  The U.S. government has not publicly taken an active role in mediating the problematic relationship, and it seems that its Colombia policies of the past and future presence in that country have mostly served to exacerbate anxiety and anger in Ecuador towards Colombia. 

Brazil has been involved in mediating the conflict from the day of the raid, and has continually encouraged dialogue as a way to manage this dispute.  As the days-old conflict was reaching a dangerous level of tension, foreign affairs advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia promised publicly that “all the forces of the Brazilian diplomacy” would be called upon to “find a long-lasting solution to the problem,” and Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva visited Correa in Quito soon after the raid.  He has also seemed to earn the trust of Uribe, who otherwise has not found extensive support from South American leaders since the raid.  In general, Brazil has tried to play a moderating force throughout the conflict, and Lula has been clear in calling for peace in the face of Hugo Chavez’s provocations. 

The motivating factor for Brazil is maintaining regional stability, and calming the sometimes belligerent rhetoric that threatens the efficacy of cooperation among the South American countries.  This is especially true regarding the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), an institution that was a Brazilian initiative.  This is Brazil’s favored forum for dealing with a regional agenda, and it would be greatly undermined should regional polarization increase in the coming years. 

Venezuela and President Chavez have also asserted themselves in the aftermath of the raid and throughout the resulting diplomatic crisis.  Chavez has been consistent in his support for Ecuador and criticism of Uribe’s policies, although the degree of influence he has in Ecuador is hard to ascertain and likely varies depending on the situation (Ecuador did join the Chavez-backed Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, known as ALBA, in 2009).  Chavez immediately recalled his ambassador from Bogotá following the raid as a show of support for Ecuador, and threatened to amass troops at the Venezuela-Colombia border, which escalated the tense situation.  Relations were reinstated between the two countries within a week, although their relationship has notably reached an incredibly low point in the year and half since the raid.

Other issues (such as Colombian allegations that Chavez provides logistical and material support for the FARC, and the sharp rhetoric between Chavez and Uribe over U.S. base deal) have come into play and make the Venezuelan actions specifically in response to the raid hard to differentiate from its overall antagonistic posture towards Colombia.  Uribe and Chavez have met on a number of occasions to discuss the problems between their countries, and although agreements have been made between the two to pursue a better relationship, they still periodically clash over the FARC and U.S. involvement in the region.  Chavez has recalled (and then re-instated) his ambassador to Colombia repeatedly since the March raid for various perceived offenses by the Uribe administration.  A nuanced perspective shows the antagonistic relationship to be slightly contradictory; it is defined by mutual distrust but had been tempered by doses of economic pragmatism.  Chavez is convinced of a pending attack from Colombia supported by U.S. military power, and Uribe is convinced that Chavez gives military and financial aid to the FARC.  And trade between the countries, while at a record high in 2008, has now dropped precipitously after Chavez imposed restrictions as a punishment for the Colombian base deal with the United States.  Most observers in both countries agree that relations between the two have overall reached historic lows in 2009. 

Conclusion

For a crisis that officially began with a military raid, it is revealing that a resolution will look to much more fundamental issues of sovereignty and security.  The question of whether Colombia achieved its goals with the raid—whether the risk was worth it—is almost secondary.  It is also hard to answer, because it is unknown to what extent Uribe was prepared to tolerate the anticipated backlash.  By most accounts, this was a decision that Uribe would not take back.  Reyes’ death was important politically for Uribe, psychologically for the country, and tactically for the military; it was a major blow to the FARC. The raid also afforded Colombia some of its most important leverage in its war against the FARC—the computer and files said to belong to Reyes.  Colombia has used the contents of this computer, whose authenticity was corroborated by Interpol, to press its case against the FARC and put other governments it suspects of collaboration on the defensive. 

In this sense, both Reyes’ death and the possession of the tapes have allowed Colombia to press ahead with its strategy.  Plus, despite the vocal regional support for Correa following the raid, the evidence Colombia recovered at the FARC camp put a much brighter international spotlight on Ecuador’s alleged relationship with the FARC and on the group’s pervasive presence (politically, if not physically) throughout South America.  At most, this neutralized some of the harsh criticism directed at Colombia for the raid and polished Uribe’s image domestically.  Still, in Ecuador there are practical reasons to ignore the FARC as well as political ones—a major confrontation could possibly provoke violent retribution from the group.  

If Correa’s principal objective following the raid was to ensure that his country’s sovereignty was never again violated under the pretenses of Colombia’s national security, he too has successfully moved towards this goal.  For Ecuador, as we have seen, claims of sovereignty trump everything else.  Correa’s deft diplomatic maneuvering in the days after the raid demonstrated that there was clear regional support for his position.  It also helped isolate Colombia politically from most of the other South American governments.  Not only was he able to build support with natural allies like Chavez and Lula, but he was also successful in pushing the OAS towards official disapproval of the raid.  The OAS, after 14 hours of deliberation, stated that they “reject” the raid, although the report did not go so far as to “condemn” Colombia’s actions.  At the same time, it is interesting to note that the costs of this censure and regional disapproval were not especially high for Colombia apart from the ruptured relationship with Ecuador. 

Strengthening and building confidence in this pledge to never again conduct military operations in Ecuador remains a key component for creating a successful negotiating environment.  Given the expectation that diplomatic relationships will eventually be restored, Correa’s firm stance on the issue means he will probably be able to secure an agreement from Colombia that Ecuador was not previously in a position to obtain.  This new willingness of Colombia to engage on such an issue has become increasingly apparent.  At the August 2009 UNASUR meeting, Uribe asserted that Colombia had not sprayed within miles of the Ecuadoran border due to Ecuador’s demands, and requested a future “dialogue” about resolving the core components of the long-standing issue (“Desde febrero, marzo de ese año, no hemos fumigado esos 10 kilómetros en territorio colombiano contados a partir de la línea de frontera. Usted nos demandó. Quisiéramos poder tener un diálogo para hablar de los pleitos”). 

One thorny issue likely to remain unsolved, even with the resumption of relations, is how to address the problem of the FARC.  Colombia would of course like to see a full disclosure of any ties between Correa administration members and the FARC, and Uribe also wants a commitment from Correa to cooperate on actual operations that would attempt to push the FARC out of their sanctuaries near the border.  This is consistent with the Uribe administration’s larger strategy of trying to hold neighboring governments to strict account in their dealings with the FARC.  These goals will prove to be more difficult to achieve.  The truth of that matter is that several Latin American governments have maintained some level of contact with the FARC over the past decade, a reality of which the Colombian government is aware.  The recovered files showed that the FARC was connected to communist parties in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and even Spain.  Despite the FARC’s recent losses, it is still retains a strong military capacity and continues to be heavily involved in the drug trade.    

A more likely compromise might involve displays of good faith on the part of Ecuador to challenge the FARC in their territory, by conducting targeted military operations in border areas known to be frequented by the FARC.  Ecuador has been eager to invoke raids they have undertaken in the past, but these efforts have been sporadic and Colombia wants a more consistent commitment that the FARC will be pursued using all the capabilities of the Ecuadoran military and intelligence apparatus. As of this writing, Uribe has made claims of new FARC encampments discovered in Ecuador, and Correa has publicly responded by saying, “Let [Colombian intelligence] tell us where they are and we catch them.” He also added, “We can work together like we always have.”  This type of public dialogue shows that while neither leader is afraid to challenge the other, they are also exploring ways to engage on the absolutely crucial issue of FARC presence in Ecuador in a respectful, deliberate manner. 

Reconciliation between Colombia and Ecuador has reached an important stage, but it is unlikely to be a smooth path.  In 2010, each country will have to make good-faith gestures and follow through on at least some of the confidence-building mechanisms to show that it is serious about re-engaging with the other.  The meetings between Falconi and Bermudez have been encouraging, as are the recent exchanges between Correa and Uribe about aerial spraying and FARC bases in Ecuador.  On October 15, however, an Ecuadoran judge issued an arrest warrant stemming from the March raid for General Freddy Padilla de Leon, the commander of the Colombian armed forces.  Although Colombia does not concur that the Ecuadoran justice system has jurisdiction to investigate Colombian officials, this type of diplomatic fighting is not conducive to continued reconciliation. 

As of this writing, the issuing of the warrant caused a postponement of a planned meeting in Ecuador between Padilla and Ecuadoran General Fabian Varela.  The small spat temporarily scuttled what could have been a productive meeting about how the two countries’ militaries could cooperate in a new relationship, but it will not derail the reconciliation process.  The judge who issued the warrant is independent of the government, and Falconi indicated that the warrant was not requested by the Correa administration.  Nevertheless, this roadblock illustrates the difficulties and obstacles facing both countries as formal talks become more regular.  The issuing of the arrest warrant also emphasizes that despite progress in the closing months of 2009, there is still a great deal of anger about the raid and other key issues of Ecuadoran sovereignty waiting to be worked out.  

In 2010 it is important that Correa and Uribe maintain conciliatory gestures towards each other.  It will be interesting to see the effect that Uribe’s possible run for a third term as President will have on the progress between Colombia and Ecuador. Correa was re-elected to a four year term in April, which will also affect his conduct in this time period.  Uribe’s bid to extend term limits so that he can run again is viable partly because of his popularity from dealing with the FARC and Colombia’s neighboring countries aggressively, but it is not likely that Uribe will ratchet up tensions again with Ecuador to gain domestic support.  The public progress made to improve the relationship is already such that a worsening of ties would probably not help Uribe, nor would it resonate with the Colombian electorate.  A level-headed, deliberate stance from Correa, currently the rotating-president of UNASUR, can also be expected.  

Barring a major regional crisis, Colombia and Ecuador appear to be on the path to restoring relations.  It is a positive sign that both countries seem serious about ensuring that future relations be contingent on a new paradigm of cooperation and understanding with regards to shared problems and grievances.  It is wise for Colombia and Ecuador to move at a steady pace, because in reality, restoring relations is not about returning to the status quo prior to March 1, 2008.  As we have seen, the problems in the Colombia-Ecuador relationship transcended the raid, and encompassed key issues for many neighboring countries: sovereignty, security, and mutual respect. 

In a region of the world where there is still much polarization and disarray, it is important for Colombia and Ecuador to show that two neighbors, regardless of their ideological differences and admittedly divergent national interests, can build a working relationship to address the key problems facing their citizens.   These differences will not disappear, but 2010 is the year in which they can start to be better understood and addressed without undue threats to peace and stability.