Honduras and the OAS

By Peter Hakim
Revista América Economía, August 3, 2009

Una versión de este articulo en español está disponible aquí.

 

On Sunday, June 28, Honduran army troops took President Manuel Zelaya prisoner and sent him into exile. The Organization of American States (OAS) reacted swiftly and decisively. All 33 OAS members (other than Honduras) condemned the army’s illegal coup d’état, and demanded that President Zelaya be restored to power within 72 hours. Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza flew to Tegucigalpa to communicate the decision in person. When the de facto government rejected the call for Zelaya’s return, OAS members voted unanimously to suspend Honduras and many imposed other sanctions. Two weeks later, the OAS authorized a negotiating effort led by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, which has made little progress.

After more than a than a month, the political crisis in Honduras is unresolved, and may be getting worse. The two sides have become increasingly entrenched and polarized in their positions. Although violence is still minimal, President Arias has warned of the dangers of civil war and President Zelaya has claimed the “right to insurrection.”  Credible observers report growing human rights abuses and press restrictions in Honduras.

How then to explain the OAS’s inability to settle the Honduran crisis? How is it that one of the hemisphere’s smallest and poorest nations has been able to defy the OAS and all 33 of its member states?

First, it has long been recognized that the OAS is not a very satisfactory mechanism for dealing with complex political situations. Like every other multilateral institution, it is constrained by national rivalries and disputes, and by unwieldy rules and bureaucracy. It has the legitimate authority and even the obligation to respond to political crises and democratic breakdowns. But the OAS can only act with the consensus of its membership and according to their instructions. That consensus has never been easy to generate, and it is even harder today when the hemisphere is divided politically and ideologically.
 
True, the needed agreement was reached quickly regarding Honduras, particularly on principles and objectives, but differences emerged over the strategy for proceeding. Some countries felt, for example, they had a green light for aggressive actions to return the deposed president, while others wanted to avert open confrontation.  Ideally, the OAS might have sought to defuse rising tensions in Honduras weeks and months before the coup. But without President Zelaya asking for help or the consensus of member states, OAS activities in the country were restricted.  Someday perhaps, the members states will give the OAS Secretariat the authority it needs to take action early when a crisis threatens.

Second, the OAS’s limitations notwithstanding, the Honduran crisis could surely have been managed better.  In retrospect, the OAS and its members may have too quickly adopted a punitive approach of ultimatums and sanctions, rather than making an attempt to negotiate an acceptable resolution. It is surprising that the intense resistance to Zelaya’s return was not anticipated, although a fact-finding mission in the aftermath of the coup would have almost certainly have revealed the determination of the new authorities to keep him out. When President Arias was finally asked to mediate, the situation had polarized badly. The opposing sides had become fixed in their positions, compounding the difficulties in finding a compromise. The OAS Secretary’s early identification with a particular approach may have limited his subsequent role in finding a settlement. For a short time, Venezuela and its small group of allies, rather than the OAS, seemed to be driving events—although their influence has since declined.

Its success in reversing the Honduran coup is not a fair test of the importance or efficacy of the OAS, however. After all, no military coup has ever been undone in Latin America—except in Haiti, where it took three years and the threat of a UN-authorized US invasion to restore Aristide to power. The fact is that the military is no longer a major threat to democracy in the Americas. They are now, happily, few and far between. A more relevant challenge today is the welcome expansion of political participation in the region, which has provoked conflict between traditional political forces and newly enfranchised groups, and multiplied the demands on governments.  The greatest danger to democratic rule, however, comes from elected leaders, who overstep their legitimate authority—by concentrating power, curtailing opposition political activity, and short-circuiting constitutional processes. The most critical challenge for the OAS is to adjust to a new agenda of issues.