Honduras highlights OAS limitations

By Michael Shifter and Dan Joyce
Oxford Analytica, July 14, 2009

ANALYSIS: With the beginning of US President Barack Obama's administration in January came the promise of stronger emphasis on multilateral approaches to deal with regional challenges (see LATIN AMERICA/US: Atmospherics dominate cordial Summit - April 27, 2009). The administration of former President George W Bush had been widely criticised for its preference to operate unilaterally or bilaterally and for neglecting the Organization of Americans States (OAS) and other regional bodies. Washington was not reluctant to block resolutions with which it disagreed, even though that meant rendering the OAS less effective and relevant. In this light, regional governments were eager to see if Obama would fulfill his pledge of forging a genuine partnership with Latin America. The US decision at an OAS meeting in early June to support dropping the 47-year-old resolution suspending Cuba from the organisation only raised expectations that the OAS could be reinvigorated.

OAS response. The series of events in Honduras culminating in the exile of President Manuel Zelaya on June 28 provide a test case to evaluate the role of the OAS in a changed political context (see HONDURAS: Zelaya removal poses acute challenges - June 30, 2009). Member governments responded swiftly and forcefully to the coup, convening a special meeting and arriving at a unanimous position of condemnation based on the Inter-American Democratic Charter adopted in 2001. From the outset, Secretary-General Jose Miguel Insulza assumed a prominent role in implementing and enforcing OAS resolutions on the Honduras situation.

By embracing such a stand, however principled, the OAS essentially forfeited its role as an honest broker in trying to ease tensions between Zelaya and the de facto government headed by Roberto Micheletti:

• The OAS issued a 72-hour ultimatum for the return of Zelaya to power and Insulza went to Honduras to persuade the Micheletti government to respect the resolution. On July 4 the deadline passed and the OAS suspended the country -- only the second suspension in the group's history, after Cuba in 1962.
• The move failed to secure Zelaya's reinstatement and hardened positions on all sides. Zelaya's fruitless attempt to return to Honduras on July 5 -- accompanied by the president of the UN General Assembly and, on another flight, by Insulza and several Latin American presidents -- was also not constructive.
  

Having condemned the coup in emphatic terms, the OAS decided to adopt a punitive stance towards the de facto government rather than try to begin dialogue with the relevant parties.

US reaction. Obama took a firm position on the Honduras situation, calling Zelaya's ouster "illegal," and saying it set a "terrible precedent". In this respect, the Obama administration also stood on principle and acted in concert with other regional leaders and the decisions of the OAS. However, at the same time, Washington remained somewhat measured in its rhetoric and actions, generally eschewing the term "coup" to avoid triggering cuts in aid and maintaining some distance from Zelaya. The United States condemned the interruption of the democratic process but also recognised Zelaya's questionable conduct in bringing about the institutional crisis. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was notably more cautious than Obama in her statements, trying to leave room for diplomatic manoeuvring.

In the US Congress, the partisan divide on the Honduras situation has been clear, even though the Obama administration's policy barely has been criticised:

• Republicans generally do not recognise what happened as a "coup", emphasising Zelaya's questionable conduct and close ties to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez; while
• Democratic lawmakers tend to insist that what occurred was a coup, worthy of the strongest condemnation.

The Obama administration's response to the Honduras crisis has drawn praise from the region as both evenhanded and forceful. It combined principle with a good measure of pragmatism. The posture enabled the United States to position itself credibly as an honest broker, reflected in Clinton's announcement on July 7 that Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, would take on the assignment of mediating between Zelaya and the de facto Honduran government. Since OAS efforts faltered and punitive measures failed to yield the desired result, the crisis has now moved to a negotiation phase. Although initial reports from the Costa Rica talks are far from auspicious, the beginning of a dialogue is a positive development and the designation of Arias has generally been applauded.

Consequences and lessons. Although unique in its nature and timing, the Honduras crisis has appropriately called attention to the state of hemispheric relations and role of the OAS, including what reforms and changes should be pursued. It has also given some clues about how the Obama administration is likely to deal with Latin America.

While the OAS's swift and forceful reaction to the Honduras crisis may have been warranted, legitimate questions can also be raised:

• Some have usefully pointed out that the OAS should have been equipped with mechanisms to anticipate the crisis and try to prevent it before it erupted. Alert mechanisms are difficult, and there are sensitivities involving sovereignty, but in the Honduras case the head-on collision and institutional crisis had been building for months and might have been averted by, for example, a mission to the country.
• OAS decisions such as suspending Honduras from the regional body did not serve to prepare the ground for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The punitive measures may have made it more difficult to reach a political settlement down the road and may discourage support for the OAS as an honest broker in situations of internal conflict and polarisation.
• The Honduras case should make it clear that other situations in Latin America of dubious legality and democratic legitimacy -- including Zelaya's power grab prior to the coup -- have been met with relative silence and passivity. It can be argued that the Inter-American Democratic Charter should be employed to address other challenges to democratic governance in Latin America, such as the executive's defiance of democratic institutions to concentrate power -- a key demand by leaders of the Venezuelan opposition.

In responding to the coup in Honduras, the Obama administration faced difficult dilemmas. The first concerns how to combine a commitment to democratic principles with an effort to reach a pragmatic, realistic solution. The second involves taking an active role in shaping a constructive outcome without imposing a unilateral policy on the region. The Obama administration has generally received high marks on both of these tests, which augurs well for its response to complicated political situations that are bound to emerge in the region.

CONCLUSION: The Honduras case is revealing about the strengths and weaknesses of the OAS, and the likely policy of the Obama administration in dealing with future democratic crises in Latin America. Regional governments, including Washington, took a strong stand in denouncing a rupture in the democratic order, but mechanisms for both averting a coup and for calming the waters in the wake of such crises have yet to be adequately developed.