Press Briefing on Honduras

By Stephanie Majerowicz
July 7, 2009

Listen to an audio recording of this event.

After a coup d’état ousted elected President Manuel Zelaya last Sunday, the OAS presented the interim government led by Roberto Micheletti with an ultimatum: either reinstate the legitimately elected Zelaya within 72 hours, or face suspension from the OAS. The ultimatum, which followed region-wide condemnation of the coup, failed to bring resolution to the crisis and instead has led to a tense standoff between the OAS and Honduras. A thwarted attempt by Zelaya to land in the Tegucigalpa airport, clashes between military forces and protesters that left two dead, and continued pressure from the ALBA group led by Hugo Chavez, have also all contributed to what has been termed an untenable stalemate.

In the midst of these troubling developments, the Dialogue’s Peter Hakim and Michael Shifter, joined by Dialogue senior fellow and former Chilean minister, Genaro Arriagada, hosted a press roundtable on Tuesday, July 7 to discuss the crisis in Honduras.

Hakim led off the discussion by analyzing some facts and uncertainties related to the situation. While asserting that there is no doubt that Zelaya is the legitimately elected president of Honduras—and as such should probably be returned—Hakim questioned the wisdom of making his return the sole objective of the crisis resolution. He also questioned the hemisphere’s treatment of Honduras as “the worst offender against democracy ever,” by shutting it off from the international community and refusing to negotiate with the interim government.

Shifter then explained three factors which may explain such a hard-line response from the OAS member countries: the powerful imagery of a “pajama-clad Zelaya” being escorted out of the presidential palace by 200 military; Zelaya’s membership in the Chávez-initiated Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), which created impetus for ALBA countries to come to the defense of one of its own; and finally, the Obama administration’s desire to repair the damage done to the credibility of the U.S. following the ill-advised decision in 2002 by the Bush administration to tacitly endorse a coup in Venezuela.

Shifter raised some concerns with the way the crisis had been handled thus far, noting that the issuance of ultimatums has positioned the OAS  “very much on the side of Zelaya” instead of as a neutral intermediary. He argued that this position could make it difficult for any mediator to balance questions of legality and governability.

Arriagada then stepped in to remind the roundtable that we are merely starting the second week of the crisis. He argued for the importance of “looking at this not in a week, but as a process,” which has reached an untenable “catastrophic equilibrium” that will require other countries to take a more active role as mediators. Arriagada characterized the stalemate by explaining that, “Mr. Zelaya has overwhelming international support, but he is unable to be restored to power, and Micheletti continues as governor, but he cannot govern.” Resolution, he argued, will require a pact.

Hakim concluded with the three possibilities for the hemisphere moving forward. The OAS countries can either sustain and even increase their pressure on the Micheletti government to gain more concessions; or  they can pursue a negotiated solution by searching for an acceptable middle ground—which might include returning Zelaya, without much authority, and moving up the elections; or they can allow the situation to deteriorate further by passively waiting and observing.

Arriagada predicted that Zelaya’s “fifteen minutes of glory were up,” and that, “the only rational solution to the crisis will be through negotiations and compromise.” No one, he argued, will allow him to go back, “take out the Supreme Court,” and implement a “Chávez solution.”

The roundtable concluded with Shifter raising concerns about violence on the ground escalating, as, he claimed, “the majority of Hondurans do not want Zelaya to go back.” Even if the hemisphere succeeds in crafting a deal between Micheletti and Zelaya, Shifter argued that much will still depend on the stability of that solution once implemented on the ground.